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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, looking at the relation 
between state-building and transitional justice.  It relies on reconciliation, as a socially 
constructed term, to look at how international and civil society organizations in the country, 
as well as Bosnian citizens, perceive processes put in place after the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Accords.  In doing so, it contributes to debates in literature discussing how to approach 
peacebuilding holistically, identifying spaces for connecting top-down and bottom-up 
processes, supporting the establishment of a sustainable peace.  The thesis relies on a 
constructivist framework, seeking to understand the frameworks and mindsets shaping 
reconciliation as a working concept for international and civil society associations and as an 
experience for Bosnian citizens.   Such constructions are identified through thematic analysis 
of semi-structured interviews.  The data was gathered through ethnographic fieldwork aimed 
at interviewing representatives of international organizations involved in transitional justice 
and state-building, non-governmental organizations approaching working on reconciliation, 
and Bosnian citizens who have lived in the country after the war.  I support the view that a 
holistic approach to peacebuilding requires connecting state institutions with the building of 
political communities on the ground to foster a legitimate and viable process of social 
reconstruction. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
State-building and reconciliation within peacebuilding 
As a critical approach looking at contradictions human creations place on individuals, 
communities, and societies, this study starts as a debate on the meanings behind such 
creations, contrasting different understandings and bringing various possibilities of action in 
dealing with such obstacles.  Studying peacebuilding as a creation designed, implemented and 
evaluated in societies subject to violent conflict, requires such exercise.  A common reference 
for peacebuilding is the Agenda for Peace: “action(s) to identify and support structures which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict…prevent(ing) the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples” (United 
Nations, 1992).  Boutros Ghali exemplified peacebuilding’s various tasks: disarmament and 
demobilization processes, refugee returns, security reforms, electoral monitoring, human 
rights protection, institutional strengthening and reconciliation among others.  By setting 
peacebuilding as a distinctive activity, grounded in the aspiration of solving conflict, western 
attention was channeled to issues of war and peace, seeking consensus for peacemaking, 
development and social justice (Sabaratnam, 2011, p.13) 
Peacebuilding’s activity spectrum offers possibilities for narrow or broad definitions, 
affecting the orientation of peace missions.  Paris (2009) describes three peacebuilding 
transitions, exemplifying different engagements: a social transition from fighting to peace, a 
political transition from war-time to post-war government and economic transition from war 
accumulation to equitable, post-war development.  Peacebuilding can be defined via narrow 
approaches of stopping armed violence and maintaining ceasefires or broader approaches of a 
self-sustainable, durable and positive peace, including state-building, democracy-building, 
development and national reconciliation (Newman, 2009).  Two strands are visible in 
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achieving sustainable peace: one describing tools and capacities available to the international 
community, another focused on understanding the conflict in question, its nature, intensity, 
and level of social support (Cousens et. al, 2001).  Conflict transformation frames 
peacebuilding as constructive transformation of conflicts to create a sustainable peace 
environment beyond the solving or management of a conflict, addressing multiple 
components (fixing problems threatening core interests of parties in conflict, changing 
strategic thinking and interaction between parties) (Reychler, 2001).   Peacebuilding can be 
measured through tangible targets and benchmarks (numbers of refugees resettled, 
demobilization and disarmament targets, employment figures, and economic development 
measures) or subject to broader, intangible objectives such as reconciliation and conflict 
resolution, less conducive to assessment yet prone to combine local conditions with 
international priorities (Newman, 2009). Peacebuilding takes different meanings, leading to 
varied courses of action and outcomes that are not only evaluated by those implementing 
them, but perceived and criticized by individuals, communities, and societies subject to such 
initiatives. 
This duality between objective and narrow peacebuilding views and subjective and intangible 
understandings is illustrated in meanings attached to state-building and reconciliation as two 
peacebuilding activities.  State-building has been understood as institution-building: 
(re)building governance institutions able to provide citizens with physical and economic 
security (Barbara, 2008, p. 125).   It becomes an objective measure of peacebuilding with 
distinguishable channels: governance reconstruction, service delivery, territorial and border 
control and establishing capacity for participation in international norms of interaction 
(Newman, 2009), and a conflict management tool, concerned with long-term and historically 
rooted processes for building institutions capable, accountable and responsive to citizen needs 
(Domingo et. al, 2013, p.3).  State-building is a negotiation of mutual demands between state 
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and citizen (Jones and Chandran, 2008) to the point that it is not about the state in isolation, 
or constructing governance institutions, but a process based on the quality and nature of 
relationships linking state with society (Rocha-Menocal, 2009, p.2).  Reconciliation is linked 
to legal frameworks of retributive (punishment and perpetrator-focused) and reparative 
(compensation and victim-based) justice (Nordquist, 2006, p.23).   It relates to psychosocial 
trauma-healing requiring an agreement between adversaries and the establishment of 
procedures for dealing with trauma at individual, collective and national levels (Francis, 
2002).  It connects with the concept of ‘truth’: factual truths, interpretative truths, forensic 
truths, and socially-constructed truths (Christie, Wagner and Winter, 2001).   Both terms 
show possibilities for broad, holistic peacebuilding approaches connecting state and its 
institutions with society: in state-building by supporting the establishment of a political 
community solidifying its relation with the state, and in reconciliation by connecting victim 
needs and citizen priorities in justice and truth processes with activities for judicial 
strengthening and transitional justice. 
Critical literature (Campbell 2011, Sabaratnam, 2011, Thiessen, 2012) highlights the 
tendency of implementing narrow conceptualizations, leaving out linkages between state and 
society with unintended consequences for peacebuilding, complicating prospects for 
sustainable peace seeking to avoid further violence.  In state-building, criticism points 
towards narrow, dominant western discourses ignoring processes towards a participatory, 
democratic political community (Brown et al, 2010).  Institution-building, as narrow state-
building, has become a dominant aim, subsuming the marginalized, the individual, the 
community, processes for kinship and even the contexts for its establishment (Richmond, 
2010a).  Institution-centred solutions are criticized as an ideology based on Western 
experiences imposed from the outside via conditionalities, policy advice, operational projects, 
elite co-option and military intervention (Tadjbakhsh, 2009, p. 635).  Although institutions 
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and norms are vital contributions to peacebuilding and state-building they are just one aspect 
within many, turning narrow state-building into a disempowering process that ignores local 
voices unable to connect with state-building’s complex language and frameworks, making it 
difficult for alternatives to be considered (Richmond, 2011)  In reconciliation, narrow views 
appear in legalistic approaches of ‘transitional justice’ giving primacy to retributive justice 
over other forms of reconciliation.  This turned transitional justice into a component of liberal 
peacebuilding (Andrieu 2010, Shaw and Waldorf 2010, Webber 2012, Sriram, 2012).   The 
critique points to lack of empirical evidence on the claim that transitional justice actually 
leads to reconciliation, pointing to a gap between international aspirations in transitional 
justice and local communities’ needs and experiences (Eastmond, 2010, p.6).  Transitional 
justice, now a compulsory component of liberal peacebuilding, is interpreted as a mechanism 
concerned with addressing impunity, reintegrating victims and perpetrators and establishing 
judicial reform.  Transitional justice relies on a legalistic and human rights lens but not 
necessarily as peacebuilding lens (Andrieu, 2010, p.539), a consequence of state-building’s 
influence over transitional justice.  A consequence of implementing transitional justice’s 
toolkits has been disconnecting legal norms from local priorities and practices, leading to 
accountability mechanisms often evaded and critiqued in unexpected directions (Shaw and 
Waldorf, 2010). 
State-building and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: unintended consequences  
State-building and reconciliation are peacebuilding activities implemented in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The 1995 Dayton Accords inscribed a framework for international intervention 
including social and political reconstruction, judicial reform, state-building and measures 
dealing with human rights violations.   While state-building was orientated by different 
international organizations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and EU representation, 
5 
 
transitional justice was guided by the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the establishment of civil society organizations promoting 
reconciliation, democracy and social advocacy.  State-building was guided by 
consociationalism, an institutional prescription for plural and divided societies giving priority 
to collectivities rather than individual citizens (Rose, 2006).  This established a confederal 
union (the Bosnian State) between two political entities (an autonomous Republika Srpska 
and a Federation of BiH whose competencies are devolved to ten cantons).  Transitional 
justice was guided by retributive justice, a criminal tribunal set to punish perpetrators, under 
the tenet that prosecution would individualize guilt, putting an end to demonizing ethnic 
collectivities (Eastmond, 2010, p.6) 
Both processes have been under academic scrutiny, concerned with how narrow 
conceptualization of state-building and transitional justice affects reconciliation.  Bosnia’s 
state-building failure is evident in the ongoing political crisis stemming from Dayton: not 
only was the agreement imposed by powers external to the conflict but also gave far-reaching 
powers to the international community which extended over military issues, covering key 
aspects of governance and state matters (Chandler, 2000).  Early postwar reconstruction saw 
state-building treating Bosnia’s state institutions as an empty shell, an externally induced 
process domesticating Western institutions which lacked local support (Bieber, 2006, p.18).  
Despite ending violence, Dayton planted the seeds of instability, establishing a decentralized 
political system undermining the state’s authority, evidenced in the co-option of state-
building by ethnic nationalist agendas from political elites claiming representation of the 
country’s three constituent groups (McMahon and Western, 2009, p.70).   Not only were 
ethnic divides inscribed into Dayton, but have found various channels for their 
institutionalization.  Education is guided by ethnicity, leading to practices where students 
from different ethnic groups study separately, open and covert ethnic discrimination takes 
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place in employment practices of local authorities.  Public space is often shaped after ethnic 
cleansing as roads and squares are often named after historical figures from the locally-
dominant ethnic group, media coverage is skewed and ethnically biased, promoting the 
viewpoints of one ethnic group or ethnopolitical party, often sponsoring ethnic propaganda 
and hate speech (Nansen Dialogue Center and Saferworld, 2010, p. 5-6).    
Transitional justice has not fared better; critics point to its disconnection from local needs and 
understandings, its inability to contest ethnopolitical narratives marked by genocide denial 
and hate speech, as well as constant attempts to keep the country divided.  Initial ICTY 
activities avoided working on the foundations for social reconstruction, such as the 
consolidation of a national shared history of the war or the creation of domestic institutions 
for human rights protection (Hoogenbom and Vieille, 2010, p. 190).  Linkage between 
ICTY’s criminal trials and reconciliation is tenuous regarding genocide cases, as over-
reliance on retributive justice ignored dealing with the broader responsibility of bystanders of 
genocide, or establishing processes for facilitating victim closure (Skaar, 2013).  Although the 
ICTY dedicated its work to investigating and prosecuting war crimes, there is no evidence 
indicating that individual Bosnians, Croats or Serbs blame individuals for crimes committed 
against them rather than collectivities as a whole (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013).  Clark (2009b) 
argues we should be more realistic about what criminal tribunals can accomplish in war-torn 
societies, and such societies cannot rely solely on retributive justice to deal with the aftermath 
of former atrocities. 
Reconciliation (as aim and process in BiH’s state-building) has not benefitted from either 
institutional reforms or transitional justice, appearing as distant goal when observing current 
trends.  For instance, Serge Brammerts, chief ICTY prosecutor recently stated how war 
criminals are being treated as heroes by nationalists from various ethnic groups, recognizing 
that the message of denial and revisionism in BiH is stronger than ever (BIRN 2017a).  Also, 
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Croatian nationalist singer Marko Perković was stirring ethnic tensions in the ethnically 
divided city of Mostar, calling for support of six former Bosnian Croat Generals and 
politicians awaiting final verdict before the ICTY for crimes committed between 1992 and 
1994 (Milekić, 2017) (BIRN, 2017b).  Panic (2015) reported on ongoing disputes between 
protesters and the local community in Prijedor over the recognition of crimes committed in 
the concentration camps of Omarska and Trnopolje, leading to discrepancies and denial over 
the number of detainees, deaths, and disappearances during the war.  This is further 
complicated by delays in establishing a law on torture victims which could force politicians to 
recognize the atrocities committed during the war. 
Framing the nexus: research questions and project rationale 
Within this complex background, this thesis identifies possible connections between state-
building and reconciliation missed by processes implemented in BiH peacebuilding.   The 
connection of high-level political processes within state-building and transitional justice and 
ground processes for interethnic reconciliation can map the complexities of Bosnia’s post-war 
reconstruction.   This stems from a recognition that peacebuilding should broaden from 
narrow top-down formulas, connecting with grassroots, bottom-up activity, engaging with the 
local and the marginalized (Thiessen, 2012, p.120).  This critical account of peacebuilding 
points out connections and disconnections between actors engaged and affected by 
peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina, seeking areas where state-building and transitional 
justice (as activities of peacebuilding) can become a negotiation between local and 
international actors.  Regarding reconciliation, this thesis accepts a variety of approaches 
(trauma-healing, transitional justice, inter-ethnic cooperation, truth work) that should not be 
in competition against one another, but rather seeking an overarching common goal requiring 
coordination (Brand and Idrizi, 2012, p.5). 
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This research locates itself between ontological/meaning and critical perspectives, presenting 
how peacebuilding agents and citizens conceive reconciliation in Bosnia, how agent and 
citizen conceptions shape policy and NGO work and how these relate or disconnect from 
local understandings and needs.  Analyzing discussions on meanings of issues attached to 
state-building and reconciliation supports a critical observation of peacebuilding’s impact in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, adding to liberal peace critiques of how promoting institution/state-
building practices through international intervention can negatively impact peacebuilding.  
Located within international relations, this research questions the relevance of transitional 
justice and its effect on local views on peacebuilding, interpreting the meaning behind 
“reconciliation” as conceived by different actors: international officials, representatives of 
organizations engaged in reconciliation practice and Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens.  Such 
interest leads to the following main research question: 
• If reconciliation is part of peacebuilding, how has this concept been understood by 
international and local actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how can these 
interpretations demonstrate sites of agreement and tension within post-conflict 
peacebuilding?  
To address this question I will look into the following sub-questions:  
• How are different meanings around reconciliation constructed and implemented by 
agents involved in BiH peacebuilding? 
• How is reconciliation understood and experienced by Bosnian-Herzegovinians in their 
everyday lives?  
• What are the concerns regarding the implementation of processes for truth, justice and 
reconciliation for Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens? 
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• Where do these concerns connect and differ from the priorities of statebuilding actors?  
• How can different interpretations of reconciliation and their obstacles establish links 
between top-down approaches to state-building with bottom-up reconciliation 
initiatives? 
Through a constructivist analysis of reconciliation as a peacebuilding concept and as a term 
perceived, experienced and critiqued by Bosnian citizens, the thesis distinguishes between 
project frames shaping work done towards ‘reconciliation’ and the social meaning behind the 
term, reflecting the worldview of citizens who lived and experienced the country’s social 
reconstruction after 1995.    This difference is not only a semantic exercise in identifying 
reconciliation but also in looking at its priorities, worldviews, power relations, and 
possibilities.   Reconciliation for peacebuilding agents becomes trauma-healing and 
restorative work, dealing with the past, interethnic cooperation, and retributive justice 
practices and promoting peace education.  Each approach has potential for connecting high-
level political processes with grassroots work, often categorized as thick and thin forms of 
reconciliation, recognizing that the distancing between state-building and reconciliation work 
limits and creates obstacles to achieving the claims derived from each practice. 
Reconciliation, as everyday citizen experiences, is shaped by forgiveness, youth work, 
communication and economic development (Nordquist, 2006, Schaap, 2008, Hamber and 
Van der Merwe, 1998).  Some understandings reinterpret technical concepts into everyday 
terms (truth telling becomes communication, interethnic cooperation turns into dealing with 
pressing needs, retribution turns into acknowledgment and forgiveness), pointing to some 
agreement with peacebuilding definitions of reconciliation.  For others, reconciliation 
becomes a concept different and alternative to what practitioners conceive (the rejection of 
reconciliation as a term applicable in Bosnia, the idea of an organic form of reconciliation 
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stemming from neighbour relations rather than political agreements) hinting at discrepancies 
and distancing between peacebuilders and citizens. 
Connecting and distancing meanings emerge in the analysis of barriers to reconciliation, 
placing attention to problems such as the rise of ethnopolitics and its insistence on social 
divisions, the establishment of mechanisms enabling ethnic distance (media and education) 
and the rise of new concerns regarding youth extremism, economic and physical insecurity 
and terrorism.  Mapping these barriers leads to identifying common concerns between 
peacebuilders and citizens regarding peacebuilding priorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well 
as different forms of impact that barriers create for interviewees, marking a distance and a 
difference between peacebuilders and citizens, leading to questions of legitimacy in 
reconciliation processes. 
To address the research questions, this doctoral thesis reviews literature concerning the 
foundational concepts of the nexus.  It explores the concept of state-building,  as one of many 
activities in peacebuilding, pointing out problems derived from narrow conceptions of state-
building that rely rebuilding state institutions as a formula for post-conflict reconstruction.  
Critical analysis of state-building leads to my concern with how top-down and bottom-up 
approaches have been presented in theory and practice, establishing a problematic distancing 
between actors and practices in peace work that demands broader understandings of state-
building.  This problematic division is reformulated in the study of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ forms of 
reconciliation.  This division is explained through the analysis of different approaches, those 
located at the top level (thin) and those at the grassroots level (thick) for dealing with issues 
of relationship-building, different forms of justice and practices surrounding truth.  By 
deepening the critique of the separation between the thin and thick of reconciliation and 
analyzing what holistic approach to reconciliation and transitional justice entails, this review 
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advocates for linking thin and thick, recognizing problems with the legalistic domination of 
the field.  
The work continues by describing the methodological framework structuring the nexus, 
pointing to an interpretative approach to studying reconciliation, relying on a social 
constructivist perspective to identify different avenues for meaning construction that allow 
the recognition of linkages, and areas of convergence and divergence in reconciliation.  The 
methodological approach derived from this, points to the importance of meaning construction 
in reconciliation, relying on case study as a design for the nexus. 
A third chapter contextually studies Bosnia-Herzegovina’s peacebuilding, marking the 
reconciliation barriers derived from unintended consequences coming from international 
intervention in various areas (social, political, economic).  The section describes state-
building, observing how the establishment of the state architecture in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA) supported ethnically dividing structures, strengthening ethnopolitics, 
leading to local contestation of liberal peace formulations and the legitimacy of Bosnia’s 
international state-building experiment.  The chapter then makes an account of transitional 
justice, focusing on the primacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the externally-driven insistence on retributive justice as an approach to 
reconciliation and the various obstacles present in the development of a Bosnian judiciary as 
well as in attempts at non-judicial transitional justice measures. 
Following this context, a fourth chapter begins analysis of fieldwork data.  It presents 
different ways in which reconciliation is thought of by different international and local 
organizations using it as a working concept in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The description of 
activities and meanings establishes linkages between thin and thick reconciliation within 
organizations involved in peacebuilding.  The section analyses five approaches: trauma-
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healing and restorative work, story-telling and fact-finding, cooperation, retributive justice 
and peace education.  In each approach claims made towards reconciliation are presented, as 
well as a description of meanings and projects from different organizations, pointing towards 
the linkages between practices and possible dilemmas presented in the work of peacebuilding 
actors. 
The fifth chapter studies meanings from citizens’ stories and experiences.  It recognizes that 
reconciliation stories are framed differently from the technical and operational frames from 
peacebuilding actors, and visualizes possible connections between citizen interpretations and 
the peacebuilding initiatives presented in the previous chapter.  Thematic analysis looks at 
eight views: forgiveness, youth engagement, learning, external imposition, everyday practice, 
communication, economic prosperity and as a pre-war state. 
The sixth chapter establishes connections and separations between international, civil society 
actors and citizen views, looking at identified obstacles to reconciliation: ethno-politics as a 
barrier to reconciliation, the establishment of education and media structures strengthening 
divisions for future generations, economic stagnation and lack of prosperity and youth 
radicalization as a possible source of re-emerging violence.  The chapter ends looking at 
perceptions between international, civil society and citizens on what guarantees legitimacy in 
peacebuilding and reconciliation work. 
The last chapter highlights the need to connect state-building and reconciliation work as 
subsets of peacebuilding, addressing some concerns expressed in the identification of 
reconciliation barriers and obstacles to transitional justice work.  It focuses on how missed 
connections between thin and thick reconciliation have affected the delivery of claims made 
in the name of transitional justice as a peacebuilding activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Contribution to literature: bridging different literatures to map peacebuilding 
This thesis recognizes the need for a comprehensive engagement in the study of 
peacebuilding, recognizing the interdisciplinary origins of ‘reconciliation’.  This is what is 
considered a holistic approach to reconciliation, understanding need to rely on different 
angles, literatures and fields in order to attempt at a comprehensive view of this phenomenon, 
where the final research is the bigger picture made up of all the contributions from the 
different smaller components. 
 Its main contribution is connecting critical literature from statebuilding and transitional 
justice in order to methodologically map the complexities of peacebuilding.  To attempt this 
holistic engagement with peacebuilding, it will relate literature from different perspectives: 
traditional IR literature on liberal peace, statebuilding and peacebuilding, critical literature on 
transitional justice and its engagement with the rights to truth, justice and reconciliation, 
psychosocial literature on trauma-healing in post-conflict settings, legal literature referring to 
reparative, retributive and rehabilitative justice and conflict transformation literature on peace 
education and its benefits for social reconstruction,  
This attempt at interdisciplinary engagement, builds from Millar and Lecy’s (2016) concern 
with how literature on post-conflict justice and peace, despite being composed from various 
scholarly traditions, fails to communicate meaningfully between disciplines as different 
streams appear disconnected from one another.   The direct contribution out of this exercise in 
literature bridging is establishing a map of reconciliation barriers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
done through two simultaneous processes.  The first one identifies connections between 
different sources of ‘reconciliation‘presented in chapters 4 and 5.  Here such connections 
support the idea that effective statebuilding, a process linking top-down institutional reforms 
with bottom up reconciliation initiatives, can produce legitimacy through the strengthening of 
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state-society relations.  The second process is visible in the identification of barriers to 
reconciliation, structuring debates around the impact of reconciliation, expressed in chapter 6.    
By mapping out problems of reconciliation in Bosnia, the thesis looks at areas where 
disciplines and policies connect and clash, permitting a detailed frame for understanding the 
impact of peacebuilding.  By doing a deeper analysis into the ‘local’ and ‘international’ via 
reconciliation, this thesis sheds light into various realities that derive from the experience of 
intervention in the country.  It permits the sketching of alternative, yet feasible spaces for 
sustainable peace existing in modern day BiH, fulfilling a task in the critical theorization of 
peace research. 
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CHAPTER 1 - ASSEMBLYING THE NEXUS: STATE-BUILDING AND 
RECONCILIATION DEBATES 
Introduction 
This chapter establishes the nexus’ foundations, starting with state-building as a 
peacebuilding activity.  Exploring narrow understandings of state-building and limited 
institution-building approaches explains why state-building is often unfit in societies subject 
to peace interventions.  By critically describing state-building, a division between top-down 
and bottom-up approaches emerges as a problematic separation between actors and practices 
in peace work, demanding the need for open understandings of state and peacebuilding.  The 
top-down and bottom-up division is reformulated in reconciliation, under ‘thin’ and ‘thick’: a 
division between approaches located at the high political level and at the grassroots level 
when dealing with processes for relationship-building, justice and truth are identified.  Thin 
reconciliation addresses state-building objectives (implementation of retributive justice and 
establishment of formal mechanisms) aimed at collective reconciliation whereas thick 
reconciliation deals measures towards more intimate, individual and localised spaces. 
Distinguishing peace and state-building 
Distinguishing peace and state-building clarifies state-building’s role in post-conflict 
reconstruction.  Reviews point towards a practical tendency of equating both, leading to 
highly contested institution-building approaches (Newman, 2009, Brown et. Al, 2010).  This 
suggests the broadening of scopes, accommodating both for the creation of a political 
community and the development of a state, linked to strengthening state-society relations. 
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From peacebuilding to the liberal peace 
Peacebuilding’s technical definition emerges in the United Nation’s Agenda for Peace: 
“comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate 
peace…may include…reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation” (United Nations, 1992).  U.N. 
Secretary-General Boutros Ghali exemplified peacebuilding through various tasks: disarming 
previously warring parties, custody, and destruction of weapons, refugee repatriation, 
advisory and support for security personnel, electoral monitoring, human rights protection, 
state institution reform amongst others (Paris, 2004).  The 1995 supplement to the Agenda for 
Peace recognizes the difficulty in reaching the established goals, due to their vague 
conceptualization, hinting at the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace 
(Cousens et. al, 2009).  This challenged peacebuilding by recognizing possible strategic 
incoherence in international assistance processes, placing peacebuilding into a high standard 
that overestimates what international engagement can realistically construct. As different 
peacebuilding programmes emerged, a new research field advocated for broadening 
intervention agendas with comprehensive peace programmes, advancing debates about 
conflict prevention, early warning, mediation, humanitarian action and human rights as 
underpinning a deeper role in peacebuilding practices (Sabaratnam, 2011, p.6).  Such calls 
exemplify Johan Galtung’s peace work, emphasizing non-elite processes (as opposed to the 
high political location of international interventions), recognizing the social, psychological, 
religious dimensions of processes operating at the local level (Call and Cook, 2003). 
Such different approaches illustrate the implications that broad and narrow definitions have 
on sustainable peace.  Peacebuilding falls into minimalist and maximalist understandings: 
from peacebuilding aimed at preventing the recurrence of armed conflict to advocacy for 
social transformation, addressing fundamental grievances, horizontal inequalities and root 
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causes of conflict, focusing on the development of capacities and institutions to manage 
conflict (Wyeth, 2011).  Narrow approaches are geared towards negative peace (stopping 
armed violence, maintaining ceasefires), whereas broader approaches hint at a positive and 
durable peace (combining institutional strengthening, development, reconciliation and 
democracy goals amongst others) (Newman, 2009).   Broad peacebuilding incorporates 
activities beyond crisis prevention, particularly longer-term development initiatives and the 
building of governance structures and institutions, integrating peace with state-building 
(Lemay-Hebert and Toupin, 2011).  Illustrative of different approaches is Barnett et al’s 
(2007) survey looking at international mandates, distinguishing various peacebuilding 
formats: programmes geared towards stability and security immediately after an agreement’s 
implementation, others focused on building vibrant civil societies or furthering development, 
democracy, justice and rule of law.   Findings from comparing twenty-four mandates discover 
an ingrained belief by western agencies that liberalization, as a movement from war to market 
democracy and rule of law, is the best way to reach positive peace in war-affected states.   
This commonality exemplifies a dominant paradigm in the 1990’s and 2000’s, ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’, a maximalist approach focused on promoting democracy, market-focused 
economic reforms and institutional reconstruction as driving forces for building peace 
(Wyeth, 2011) 
This faith in liberalization as a formula for sustainable peace supports the emergence of a 
post-Cold War order promoting democratic peace theory as a peacebuilding formula.  Boutros 
Ghali’s peacebuilding implies that democracy naturally creates legitimacy, linking legitimacy 
to the political and its location in the public arena of voters and elections (Kappler, 2013, 
p.15).  Democratic peace theory promotes the idea that democratic states do not wage war on 
one another due to various structural, institutional and normative accounts (Bellamy et al, 
2004, Newman, 2009).  Legislatures, rule of law and electorates can mitigate the decision of 
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going to war.  Integrating liberal states into an international society places international and 
domestic responsibilities upon political leaders.  Inhibiting war, trading through global 
markets makes the decision of war costly and irrational.   A central belief in this theory is that 
states share common values, are mutually interdependent and eschew the strategy of war to 
settle differences (Lemay-Hebert and Murshed, 2016).  Liberal peace interventions have 
necessitated integration of neoliberal economic policy and liberal political structures to create 
market democracy in war-affected settings (Thiessen, 2012, p.116), giving peacebuilding a 
distinctively liberal orientation in the creation of conditions for recovery and lasting peace 
(Paris, 2009).   Rhetorically, liberal peace is based on core tenets of liberalism: the 
reformability of individuals and institutions, pluralism and tolerance, and individual liberty 
(Mac Ginty, 2010).  Liberal peacebuilding is held to go beyond traditional approaches of 
maintaining a negative peace, or on conflict prevention towards engineering post-conflict 
societies, exporting liberal frameworks of good governance, elections, and human rights, rule 
of law and market relationships (Chandler, 2006b). 
Boosting the liberal peace: state fragility and institutionalization 
The promotion of a liberal framework guaranteeing sustainable peace found in ‘state fragility’ 
a case for implementation in war-affected states.  State failure is the failure of public 
institutions to deliver positive political goods to citizens, contributing to determining the 
legitimacy and existence of the state. (Rotberg, 2003).  Amongst those political goods are the 
provision of security, a legal system to resolve conflicts, provision of economic 
infrastructures, the supply of welfare policies and opportunities for participation in the 
political process (Bogdandy et al, 2005, p.580).  Common to fragility definitions are the 
presence of weak institutions and governance systems, a fundamental lack of leadership, state 
capacity and/or political will to fulfill basic functions of the state, particularly providing 
services to the poor (Rocha-Menocal, 2010, p. 1).   State fragility is understood as 
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establishing conditions for violent conflict and impoverishment within the borders of the state 
(Brown et al, 2011).  ‘Fragile states’ gained increased recognition in security discourses after 
September 11th, interpreted through the dominant lens of western security interests, deeming 
them as breeding grounds, harboring terrorism, turning them into a matter of international 
security of western states.  This state focus emerged as reaction against humanitarian 
intervention policies of the 1990’s, which underestimated the importance of states for 
maintaining international stability (Chandler, 2005).  Bringing back the state in discussions of 
state failure and state-building became an extension of the agenda of internationalizing the 
domestic policy-making sphere of non-western states.  Although policy and academic debates 
about state failure existed before September 11th, this event led to the belief that state failure 
was a major enabler of international terrorist networks, moving international interventions 
from humanitarian emergencies and threats to regional security to state failure as the key 
focus for international security (Wolff, 2012, Brinkerhoff, 2005, Grimm et al, 2014).  The 
focus on fragile states emerges as an increasing preoccupation of policy-makers in areas of 
development, security and foreign policy with states that are peaceful, stable and resilient, 
tying in international development (international and national) (Rocha-Menocal, 2010).  
Security that often reflects a conviction that neoliberalism provides basis for peaceful and 
stable states as well as a more peaceful international politics (Marquette and Beswick, 2011) 
Through increased focus on state fragility, state-building promotes further the liberal peace as 
a response to challenges from violent conflict.  Post-Cold War preoccupations with 
peacebuilding and state failure led to an interest in good governance: the technical and 
functional requirements of modern statehood.   International agencies became involved in 
legal reforms, state reforms and promoting civil society (Sabaratnam, 2011, p.9); the 
expansion of this state-building agenda within peacebuilding occurred parallel to the 
expansion of peace and security agendas, connecting conflict and underdevelopment to the 
20 
 
malfunctioning political society in need of externally driven support.   State strengthening 
programmes within peacebuilding became means for building liberal, democratic free market 
states, equating peacebuilding with state-building and narrowing state-building as the 
building of state institutions. The establishment of institutions identified as key in the 
management of liberal states became the preferred mechanism to support the creation of 
peaceful political communities in post-conflict states (Brown et al, 2010).  Such approach 
derived from discourses of international state-building identifying the state with a centralised, 
institutional and legal apparatus, existing in a realm distinct from society.    Externally led 
sate models demanded a transition from collapsed ‘de jure’ state to a Weberian ‘de facto’ 
state via institutional development, as a shortcut to the Weberian state (Ottaway, 2002, p. 
1004).   Institutionalisation, as a model, saw the international community organizing 
government departments and public agencies to discharge functions efficiently and 
democratically, focusing more on transplanting best (western) practices rather than solving 
local problems. 
Intrusive liberal peace: unintended consequences of institutionalization  
Institution-building, as a channel for peacebuilding, focuses strongly on rebuilding states and 
dealing with state fragility.  This has not been void of criticism, particularly for its 
implications for international interventions and their relationship with local communities.  
Underpinning the criticism of liberal peacebuilding is the reliance on the paradigm of liberal 
internationalism, recognizing that peacebuilding activities are largely imported to post-
conflict societies by the international community, international organizations, donors, and 
NGOs resulting in a set of activities that reflect western forms of governance and institutions 
(Sriram, 2009).  The main concern regards the type of state being built: a state focused on the 
history, culture, needs, and interests of local society and its communities or a western, 
Weberian state, reflecting needs and interests of international interveners.  This turns state-
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building into imperialism/colonialism from the West towards post-conflict societies, giving 
peacebuilding a destructive purpose (Paris, 2009).  State-building proponents respond to such 
accusations arguing that this neo-colonialism is unlike previous forms of colonialism due to 
its altruistic nature, its multilateral form, its inclusion of a non-governmental sector and the 
inclusion of early exits (Marquette and Beswick, 2011).  It is concerning how state-building 
meets the needs of external actors in the international community rather than the 
impoverished communities subject to intervention: rebuilding Westphalian state forms, 
adopting broad concerns about universalizing western liberal ideals, ignoring local concerns 
of identity and culture (Chandler, 2006a, p.5).    ‘State-building as peacebuilding’ falls into a 
trap: good intentions unable to improve living standards and conditions, or provide autonomy 
due to the nature of the intervention, which dictates a peace dividend mainly for elites and 
international actors holding the infrastructure of the state, rather than local communities 
(Richmond, 2010b).     
Distancing international from local understandings of governance and state carries risks for 
interventions.  External support for democratization based on criteria and models from a 
different historical and cultural heritage than those prevalent in local society tends to promote 
fragmentation and institutionalization of conflicts rather than stability and democracy 
(Stilhoff, 2009).   Liberal interventionism highlights a belief in the liberal market democracy 
as a model for domestic governance, superior to all others, giving little space for alternative 
approaches to dispute resolution, minimizing space for local contributions to the process 
(Mac Ginty, 2008, p.144, and 2010, p. 579).  Rapid institutional transfer results in central 
institutions and processes divorced from the socio-political and economic dynamics that 
shape people’s lives, giving little chance for government strictures to establish legitimacy 
within local population and culture (Brown et al, 2010, p. 112, Rocha-Menocal, 2010).    Also 
problematic is the exclusive focus on state (elite) actors.  This excludes forms of political 
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community and political-economic frameworks, making them matters of secondary 
consideration, obstacles or spoiler factions (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008).  The gulf 
between a technical version of state institutions and the forms of language of political 
community that make sense to ordinary people serves as a reminder that state fragility is not 
only about capacities, resources, and institutions but also legitimacy.  The main critique of 
state-building’s propagation of western liberalism on intervened societies is how it writes off 
local forms of political organization, interpreting them as tribal, clan-based or simply lacking 
modern functionality (Thiessen, 2012, p. 117).  This separates the organic and mechanic 
governance institutions from frameworks for governance derived from external theoretical 
models.  Also, the assumption that institutions that resemble the western notion of the state 
goes unquestionably accepted as legitimate or appropriate in all contexts is problematic 
(Newman, 2009), leading to interpretations of state-building as a hegemonic agenda aimed at 
containing conflicts by constructing manageable and familiar institutions. 
The inability of institutionalization practices to address local needs often ends in resistance 
against and mistrust of actors conducting such processes.  In many post-conflict 
environments, liberal peacebuilding is perceived as ethically bankrupt, plagued with double 
standards, a-cultural, unconcerned with social welfare, insensitive towards its subjects 
(Richmond, Bjorkdahl, and Kappler, 2011 p. 454).  Intervention’s external nature affects 
state-building, external actors end up facing social backlash inherent in the exercise of 
authority (Lemay-Hebert, 2011).  They lack social bonds to allow trust between governments 
and citizens, leading often to populations resenting international rule.  Focusing on 
institutional aspects ignores legitimacy aspects embedded in the broader social dimension of 
state-building (Lemay-Hebert, 2009a).  Intervention’s political focus, state-building, is often 
seen as unfit to correctly address the social challenges of post-war state-building, as the neo-
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colonial taint of intervention seems contradictory to the goal of fostering legitimacy in 
externally led state-building. 
An issue at stake is how interveners and intervened societies perceive one another and how 
excessive the focus on liberal values affects their interactions.  Interveners, seen as 
imperialists, meet resistance due to the way locals perceive them, which in turn is affected by 
their view of local populations as retrograde, illiberal and not modern.  A heavy international 
footprint, missing spaces for genuine local ownership generates a confrontational 
relationship, producing local opposition against neo-colonial interference, negatively 
affecting the perception of a large international presence (Newman, 2009, p.32).  State 
institutions end up more responsive to external agencies than to intervened communities, 
creating in populations a sense of alienation from systems of law and governance, 
disenfranchising locals, making the state into an alien force to the everyday life of intervened 
societies (Brown et al, 2010, p.111).  The ‘local’ ends depicted as a homogeneous and 
disorderly ‘other’ whose needs and aspirations do not unfold according to liberal standards 
(Richmond, 2011, p. 37).  Narrow state-building deems indigenous forms of social and 
political organization as tribal, clan-based and lacking in modern functionality, justifying the 
need for western versions of organization into non-western contexts (Thiessen, 2012, p.117).  
“The non-liberal other is shown as a barrier to western liberal aspirations of social peace and 
progress as it lacks institutional, social, economic and cultural capacities” (Chandler, 2006b, 
p. 9) 
This distanced and confrontational relation between intervening actors and subject societies 
has deep implications for the legitimacy and responsiveness towards peace processes when 
implemented at the political level (as a top-down approach).  The relationship between 
western liberal interveners and non-liberal, non-western others is marked by the west 
claiming to possess on behalf of others the know-how to peace, progress, democracy and 
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development (Parent, 2016).  This obscures local possibilities of peace and makes 
peacebuilding, as something from the outside, not built from within, rejecting local agencies. 
There is an excessive propensity, from liberal interveners, for top-down peace processes all 
while giving inadequate attention to grassroots actors (Thiessen, 2012, p.117).   This leads to 
a bifurcation of the political and social spheres of the international and local words in state-
building, leading to unforeseen consequences for peacebuilding (Lemay-Hebert, 2011, p. 28). 
State-building demands a focus on the relationship between actors at international, national, 
local and grassroots levels.  This relationship is at the core of legitimacy building as the 
outcomes and norms of any intervention depend on how much, in the eyes of local 
populations, peace and development improve their everyday lives (Tadjbakhsh, 2009, p.637).    
When institutions disconnect from local traditions and understandings of political community, 
negative, unintended consequences affect peace interventions, deeming them unfit and 
illegitimate for the everyday citizen.   A lack of fit between political culture and institutions 
brings incentives for corruption, rule-breaking, poor accountability and bad governance as a 
political struggle at local or national levels occurs through channels that have opportunistic 
relationships with governance institutions (Brown et al. 2010, p.111).  This encourages 
instability and violence as excessive institution focus and promotion of liberal democracy that 
ignores social and economic rights results in exclusionary democracies legitimizing the 
continued suffering of an impoverished majority (Bellamy, 2004).   The top-down 
institutional format characterizing state-building, fails to consider requirements for a social 
contract other than political rights for grassroots actors, leading to resistance that rejects an 
empty institutionalism (Richmond, 2009a, p.55)  Lack of authority becomes the main feature 
of new institutions and their inability to curb the power of different political factions 
(Ottaway, 2002, p.1015).  Converting organizations into functioning and legitimate 
institutions is a very slow process, often the result of a domestic political process.  Ottaway 
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concludes that the challenge for recovering states is not the creation of institutions but of 
mechanisms for generating power and authority, which can only be created from the inside.  
Many of these critiques explain these unintended consequences on the fact that liberal 
methods are socially and culturally inappropriate.  Particularly, in communally organized 
social structures, democracy, and competitive economic structures are viewed with suspicion 
due to the liberal omission of welfare schemes in devastated war-zones (Thiessen, 2012, 
p.117).  
Distancing top-down from bottom-up 
A commonality in critical state-building literature is the emphasis on local populations rather 
than “top” peacebuilding agents.  This serves as a response to how institution-building 
privileges work at high political level.  This emphasis becomes problematic by disconnecting 
high level and grassroots levels through top-down and bottom-up categories.  Liberal peace’s 
imposition is based on its focus on top-down institution-building; despite bottom-up 
engagement with civil society being part of the process, the focus of international actors is on 
the development of the liberal state its institutions and a neoliberal economy, justified by the 
idea that security, order, and institutions always come first (Richmond, 2009b).  An 
alternative to imposed macro-level peacebuilding is the idea of an elicitive transformative 
approach to peacebuilding ‘from below’ or ‘bottom-up’ as a counter-hegemonic form of 
peacebuilding (Campbell, 2011).  Bottom-up required support to those affected by violence 
so that they could develop their own diagnoses of the problems they faced and transform 
relations and structures in which violence was embedded.  Bottom-up also refers to 
citizenship and participation mechanisms within peace interventions.  Genuine processes of 
participation and inclusion require engagement with the social values and practices of the 
people on the ground, requiring a process of listening, interaction and exchange with locals, 
particularly when identity, leadership, and power is derived through affiliations to local 
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places, membership to language groups or residence in particular communities (Brown et al. 
2010, p. 112).  The arena for bottom-up engagement is the “everyday” space where local 
individuals and communities develop political strategies towards state and international 
models of order (Richmond, 2010a, p. 671),  a site of needs, rights, custom, agency and 
political mobilization hidden from mainstream top-down approaches.  Richmond’s proposal 
looks at the representation of interests of everyday political subjects and the way it works in 
the every day: a dynamic site of resistance and politicisation, solidarity and local agency.   An 
everyday view of peacebuilding includes rights, needs, and welfare in a specifically 
contextualized process inclusive of custom and tradition (Richmond, 2011, p. 43), a site for 
engaging with the local: from transnational or trans-local elites to the local, subaltern and 
what is beyond the artifice of civil society.    Mac Ginty (2008, p.142) justifies a 
local/indigenous approach to peacebuilding for two reasons: participation and sustainability.  
Participation is not merely involvement of locals in the implementation of peace processes 
but reliance on local involvement in the guidance of the promotion of development as well as 
the way development (and peace) is defined.  Sustainability sees local communities accessing 
their own resources and capacities over the long term, reducing their reliance on external 
support.   
This conceptualization of the bottom-up, local sites of peacebuilding engagement has caught 
the attention of academics, international actors, and practitioners, spawning debates 
surrounding local ownership.  Local, as a ‘range of locally based agencies present within a 
conflict and post-conflict environment…aimed at identifying and creating the necessary 
processes for peace…and framed in a way in which legitimacy in local and international 
terms converges.”  (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013, p. 769).  Local ownership may be a 
necessary institutional response to difficulties experienced by peacebuilding missions in their 
legitimacy deficit, yet it becomes superficial rhetoric to disguise the power grasp of dominant, 
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wealthy national and international institutions (Lemay-Hebert and Kappler, 2016, p.3).  A 
challenge for post-Cold War peace missions has been the legitimization of new transitioning 
political order on the ground, through the empowerment of people and increasing local 
ownership (Andrieu, 2010, p.539).  Local ownership concerns the voice and ownership of the 
local in peacebuilding processes as liberal goals have restricted this to the domestication of 
elites into cooperating with the overall peacebuilding project (Thiessen, 2012, p.120).  In this 
sense, cultural sensitivity combined with a greater sense of local ownership can give a 
mission a greater degree of legitimacy (Lemay-Hebert, 2011), which is almost antithetical to 
the liberal peace view that anything outside liberalism is primitive and threatening to peace.   
An ethical understanding of peacebuilding implies the recognition of local ownership, human 
rights culture, social and grassroots resources for self-government as significant in relation to 
the priorities, institutional capacities and international order (Richmond, 2009a).  Genuine 
local ownership implies emphasis upon local formulation and implementation of 
peacebuilding strategies, encouraging local responsibility and capacity building from the 
outset of peacebuilding, ending in sustainable national institutions (Newman, 2009).  This 
often means recognizing and drawing upon local institutions of governance and authority, 
avoiding local institutions known to be abusive, factionalized or weak.   
In practice, reliance on ‘local ownership’ by liberal peace practice co-opts groups into frames 
and dispositions setup by international intervention.  Local ownership becomes a rhetorical 
device from international actors to build their own legitimacy, avoiding local resistance 
(Richmond, 2010b).  Instead of a natural concept, being local turns into a rhetorical device for 
actors’ positioning in wider peacebuilding networks, reflecting both the needs of different 
actors as well as the values and labels associated with being local and international (Kappler, 
2015).  Responses to local ownership, civil society development, and participation, rarely 
represent a genuine local, commonly depicted as a homogeneous and disorderly other whose 
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aspirations do not adhere to liberal standards (Richmond, 2011).   Liberal state-building 
barely embraces the language of the local, fitting with a convenient narrative of social impact 
where state and society work together according to liberal norms, with ‘resilience’ as a 
process where local communities simply require a light touch intervention focused on self-
help, good governance and stability (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013, p. 779).  
Peacebuilding’s participation processes co-opt local elites into western schemes or the 
steering of communities towards technocratic problem-solving formulas for complex social 
problems (Mac Ginty, 2008).  Ownership is often located in aid recipient governments over 
policy, but rarely does it refer to citizens on the ground (Marquette and Beswick, 2011).  
Lemay-Hebert (2011) warns about this tendency: participatory intervention, local ownership, 
and indigenous empowerment do not fit with the direct governance approach taken by the 
international administration, whose empty-shell approach (treating institutions as a blank 
canvas or ignoring domestic institutions for being illiberal) negatively impacts state-building.   
This tendency to seeing the state as a vacuum demands attention to ‘culturally informed 
practices’ that help people cope with everyday life, mechanisms that help gain an accurate 
understanding of the needs of people as well as the obstacles and possibilities for building a 
supportive state-society relationship (Pouligny, 2010).    
Insistence on a genuine local, exploring its meaning and understanding of peace is a 
methodological consideration put in place by critical scholars.   Demanding every day, 
localised focus extends interpretations of state-building, avoiding restrictive institution-
building approaches. Yet, this disconnects from the high political process involved in state-
building, by categorizing interventions as top-down and bottom-up, separating international 
and local both in theory and practice.  State-building debates are often framed through 
opposing distinctions: top-down versus bottom-up approaches, international versus local 
peacebuilding.   A top-down state-building approach focuses on stabilization, security and 
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creation of government institution, different from a bottom-up model focused on conflict 
prevention and the creation of local capacities for peace (Haider, 2012, p. 5).  Top-down 
approaches are seen as realist exercise of achieving security and stability through negotiations 
between power holders and bottom-up approaches emphasizing on sources of conflict, 
accommodating conflicting communities and engaging with civil society actors in a 
community-focused approach (Newman, 2009, p. 37).  Bottom-up advocates constantly insist 
on top-down approaches’ perpetuation of a negative peace.    
Both critical and problem-solving frameworks identify peacebuilding’s liberal spirit within 
international interventions; their separation lies in whether to accept or reject the framework 
and the possibilities of working within it.  Both recognize how needs and interests of those 
subject to intervention are ignored, sustaining inequalities and reigniting conflict, challenging 
the idea of quick and easy solutions to post-conflict challenges. The distinction lays in the 
differences between power-based and ideas-based critiques (Chandler, 2009, pp. 3-7).  The 
first identifies liberalism as an instrumental discourse that covers western self-interest with 
little concern around security and freedoms of the intervened society.  The second focuses on 
how concepts and ideas are misused in discursive frameworks and policies of the liberal 
peace.  The matter of dispute is whether the liberal peace discourse is amenable to policy 
change: power-based critiques see no room for reform whereas ideas-based critiques state that 
policy focus can be changed to make the framework legitimate.  Sabaratnam (2011, p.13) 
explains this distinction, comparing Roland Paris and Mark Duffield’s works, highlighting 
Paris’ concern with appropriate timing of liberalization processes, how solving this issue is 
crucial for stabilizing divided societies; she identifies  Duffield’s argument that liberal peace 
lacks emancipation and is merely a regulatory framework of governance and state control, 
reflecting impositions of western values.  For Sabaratnam (2011) this debate evolves into a 
“metacritique” whose scholarship ends less concerned with policy discourse and more with 
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challenging the liberal framework.  The result has been a distancing between top-
down/problem solving and bottom-up/critical advocates, and a disconnection between policy 
debates seeking to refine peacebuilding methods and academic debates centred on the politics 
of intervention. 
These “top” and “bottom” critiques turn peacebuilding into an option.  A top-down “problem-
solving” approach deals with ‘top’ concerns of coordination, efficiency and best running of 
liberal institutions while a bottom-up “critical approach” advocates for a localised, indigenous 
and more legitimate structuring of peace.    Instead of separations, it is important to see the 
linkages between approaches, connecting different spheres of interaction.  Broad 
peacebuilding requires a viable mechanism for exchange and discussion of unscripted 
conversations between local (recipients and actors), state elites and international officials in 
order to determine what type of peace they envisage for their own context (Richmond, 2011).  
Thiessen (2012, p.118 and 119) calls this “emancipatory peacebuilding”, broadening the 
narrow top-down state-building focus, holistically connecting it with grassroots, bottom-up 
activity which engages the local and the marginalized.  Peacebuilding becomes a process 
where political organization and state-building activities are negotiated between local and 
international actors without relying on pre-determined models and outcomes.  It involves 
versions of human rights and rule of law inclusive of local groupings views as well as the 
broader international expectations, allowing local conditions and capacities to determine 
projects and processes to be developed.  Peacebuilding processes need to engage with 
communities and non-customary institutions as well as with central institutions and 
governments (Brown et al, 2010, p.113).  Such positive mutual accommodation applies to 
interactions between communities, customary governance mechanisms, state institutional 
forms, international agencies and the broader political dynamics that shape relations between 
national and international agencies. 
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Beyond liberal peace: broad peace and state-building 
Moving past liberal peace frameworks’ limitations requires broadening up state and 
peacebuilding, making them inclusive of the needs, perspectives, and priorities of local 
communities that directly engage and participate in a wide range of peacebuilding activities, 
besides the building of institutions.   A modification of the relationship of peacebuilding with 
its subjects is required, particularly changing the reductionist processes of peace and state-
building, in order to move to a transformative and social form of peacebuilding (Richmond, 
2009b).  Broad state-building processes involve a reciprocal relation between a state that 
delivers services to people and a set of social and political groups who constructively engage 
with the state (Haider, 2012, p. 4).  What makes state-building viable, more than simply 
constructing institutions is that it allows for formal dimensions of the state to interact and 
affect the lives of populations (Brown et. al, 2010, p. 107).  Institutions function only when 
embedded in networks of social practice and frameworks of meaning that generate social 
interactions and enable trust.   If state-building is related to meaning and social interaction, it 
requires more than institution-building or setting up “organizations” such as electoral 
institutions, executive agencies, parliament, police, and judiciaries (Ottaway, 2002, p.1004).  
Unless these organizations become relevant to populations, believed to provide solutions to 
real problems, they will not become real institutions.  Successful state-building enhances 
security and conflict resolution by carrying legitimacy in the eyes of the population: only 
when institutions provide a framework for social groups to express preferences and resolve 
issues non-violently, will these mechanisms gain legitimacy and efficiency (Call and 
Cousens, 2009, p. 9).   State-building is about establishing, reforming and strengthening state 
institutions and state capacity but “in relation to an effective political process to negotiate 
mutual demands between state and citizen” (Rocha-Menocal, 2009, p.2).  It is not about the 
state in isolation but about improving the quality and nature of state and society relationships, 
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which implies a trust-building exercise between the two, connecting both through essential 
social provision (Roberts, 2008, p.551). 
Broad state-building visualizes society in its scope; focusing solely on building institutions 
negatively affects state-building creating a gap in state legitimacy.   State-building’s social 
dimension is a crucial aspect in any peace operation: lacking the social bond needed to enable 
trust between a government and its citizens generates resentment by local populations and 
affects state-building (Lemay-Hebert, 2009b, p. 70).  Lemay-Hebert concludes that 
approaches focusing on political response or direct governance are unfit to address the social 
challenges of post-war state-building.   State-building efforts excessively focused on formal 
central state institutions overlook non-state players, traditional leaders and informal 
mechanisms and institutions that may have more meaning to people than state institutions 
(Rocha-Menocal, 2009, p.3).  This is caused by a lack of knowledge to engage effectively 
with processes and players locally.  Broad state-building relies on including political 
communities outside the state, connecting institutions with society via state-building.  This 
makes state-society relations a key determinant in the legitimacy of state-building.  
Broadening state-building implies extending its scope, participants and guidance, connecting 
top-down and bottom-up; shifting the conduct of state-building, recognizing local actors as 
true partners in state-building rather than as mere recipients of aid (Lemay-Hebert, 2011).  It 
necessitates connecting state-building with nation-building, the efforts to rebuild a sense of 
community within the population of a polity (Gunnar, 2004).   Nation building, as collective 
identity formation to legitimize public power within a territory, resides on its indigenous 
nature, drawing on local traditions, institutions, and customs that can support claims to 
sovereignty and uniqueness (Bogdandy et Al, 2005, p. 586).  This requires state-building to 
consider the complex nature of socio-political cohesion, as externally led efforts affect the 
33 
 
legitimacy of intervention by shaping the conditions under which citizens share common 
values (Lemay-Hebert, 2009b). 
Reconciliation 
This section reviews reconciliation as a working concept in peacebuilding.  Presenting a 
variety of meanings interpreting reconciliation highlights a dividing logic of top-down and 
bottom-up, derived from state-building debates, presented as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ forms of 
reconciliation.  Such categorization leads to academic calls for a holistic and comprehensive 
approach to reconciliation, connecting thick and thin perceptions of truth, justice and 
reparation. 
Top-down and Bottom-up reconciliation: ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ choices 
Reconciliation has become an important activity in post-conflict reconstruction, grabbing the 
attention of donors, and international organizations, visualizing it through a top-down 
perspective where state-building is means for achieving reconciliation.  For instance, the 2012 
U.N. workshop ‘Building Just Societies: Reconciliation in Transitional Settings’, defines 
reconciliation as  
“…building or rebuilding relationships damaged by violence and coercion, not 
only among people and groups in society but also between people/citizens and the 
state… (With) specific consideration to societal stakeholders that have a great 
interest in reconciliation and peacebuilding, without having a strong or organized 
voice, e.g., victims, youth, ex-combatants, displaced people, Diasporas, women, 
etc.”  (Sánchez and Rognvik, 2012, p. 6) 
Here reconciliation becomes important for state-building and in developing the role of the 
government: to facilitate reconciliation processes in order to be accountable to societies and 
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to build confidence among the public.   Another example is the OSCE’s “Towards a Strategy 
for Reconciliation in the OSCE Area”, suggesting high state involvement in reconciliation:  
“…an on-going, a non-linear process involving the creation or restoration of 
relationships on political and societal levels. It was underlined that reconciliation 
can take place between and within states and is based on notions of trust, equality, 
acceptance of differences, partnership, mutual or joint interests and positive 
perceptions of the other.”  (OSCE, 2012, p. 2).   
Reconciliation is set as building bridges between or within states and their societies; adopting 
reconciliation from a multidimensional perspective with political, social, economic, 
institutional, scientific, regional and international implications.  The fact that reconciliation is 
placed on the sphere of state and state-society relations displays the close connection between 
state-building and reconciliation for the OSCE. 
Academics working on reconciliation in peacebuilding develop their own bottom-up 
perspectives (Nordquist, 2006, Fischer, 2011).  Authors exploring connections and dilemmas 
of reconciliation within peacebuilding defend localised approaches where the focus is not just 
state-society relations but relations between former adversaries, individuals, and 
communities.   Calls for a grassroots approach to reconciliation stem from a critique of 
international approaches based on legal practices seeking to influence the rules of the game, 
evidencing that international justice and rule of law initiatives are not politically neutral 
(Lundy and McGovern, 2008, p. 266).  Such critique identifies a tendency to exclude local 
communities as active participants in transitional justice mechanisms, leading to questions 
about legitimacy, local ownership, and participation.  For them, a full participatory 
transitional justice process means that locals are included at every stage of the process: 
conception, design, decision-making, and management. 
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Reconciliation involves relationship-restoration, bringing people with a conflictive history 
together into a harmonious relationship or bring people into an agreement on a set of 
historical events, leading to the capacity to live with one another (Christie, Wagner and 
Winter, 2001).  As such, reconciliation can be between individuals and collectivities, 
individuals, families and groups.  This is interpreted as intercommunal understanding, a form 
of community building concerned with coexistence and tolerance, which requires clearing of 
mistrust between previously conflicting parties and rebuilding personal bonds at the local 
level (Hamber and Van der Merwe, 1998).  Here reconciliation, as viewed at the personal 
level, insists on a localised approach where reconciliation is natural to communities and 
individuals rather than national groups.  This distinction is key in developing projects: 
national reconciliation is obtained when societal and political processes function and develop 
without reverting to previous patterns of conflict, whereas individual reconciliation is the 
ability of every human being to conduct their lives in a similar form as prior to the conflict 
without fear or hate (Mobekk, 2005, p. 263).  The question for theorists and practitioners is 
where to locate reconciliation, who should be the ones to reconcile and what best conditions 
and contexts allow sustainable reconciliation leading to a lasting peace.  Answers often imply 
choosing between top-down and bottom-up, labeled as thick-localised and thin-
internationalized reconciliation.     “Thick” refers to understandings of reconciliation based on 
relationship restoration, social healing and forgiveness and “thin” to legal mechanisms 
towards a departure from violence based on accountability (Eastmond, 2010, p.5).   Thick 
reconciliation is understood as unity, harmony, healing, the building of relationships and 
restorative justice and thin as retributive justice, the punishment of perpetrators, 
democratization, institutional development and mechanisms to stop physical violence 
(Hoogenbom and Vieille, 2010, p. 186).   Reconciliation is thick due to the emotional 
component of processes focused on community-level approaches and thin when based on 
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institutional mechanisms.  This interpretation implies a gap between international and local 
when prioritizing reconciliation practices: a technical-legalistic international language of 
criminal justice and accountability contrasted with a local needs-sensitive language of 
trauma-healing, victim acknowledgment and restoration. 
Both represent a separation between practices, complicating possibilities for linkages.  Thin 
reconciliation adopts an institution-building framework viewing transitional justice, political 
dialogue, and reform as means for reconciliation, promoting peaceful democratic transitions.  
Thick reconciliation promotes local practices of trauma-healing, a victim-based approach to 
justice and a grounded perception of how to deal at community level with the wounds and 
barriers left by violent conflict.  To clarify distinctions and point to the dividing logic of this 
debate, “reconciliation” is differentiated between thick and thin in three respects: the building 
of relationships, justice and truth telling, showing what reconciliation looks like both at “thin-
top” and “thick-bottom”. 
From coexistence to reconciliation: local or national relationship-building?  
The only academic and policy consensus around reconciliation is that it has to do with 
rebuilding broken relationships.   The base for dialogue is understood as a pre-requisite for 
reconciliation, the result of an encounter with another person (Sobczak, 2013, p. 58).   
Reconciliation requires two sides becoming acquainted with and acknowledging each other’s 
narratives, where national narratives that often become a barrier, turn into the starting point of 
a reconciliation process (Auerbach and Lowenstein, 2011, p. 212).   Here, the establishment 
of a pre-determined definition of reconciliation will determine whether it is treated as a social 
phenomenon or as a matter for individual victims and their relation to their perpetrators 
(Little, 2011, p.84).   As a form of dialogue, reconciliation can rely on many means (artistic, 
economic, judicial) dependent on local conditions.  This asks which spaces and depths are 
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viable for establishing and maintaining communication, as it may be fraught upon, requiring 
sensitivity to local possibilities and limitations (Komesaroff, 2016) 
Understanding reconciliation as the rebuilding of relations identifies various spaces of 
dialectic interaction: international, national and local levels as well as community, formal, 
political and non-political spaces.  The aim is promoting dialogue and activities dealing with 
animosities and hatred, allowing some level of reconciliation (from simple coexistence or 
cohabitation to the reformulation of ties and friendships).  It is in this definition where 
controversies emerge.  As pointed by Jansen (2013, p.233), the debates on depth and space 
for reconciliation have seen the concept interpreted as a western-imposed idea, sometimes 
demanding processes such as forgiveness, apologies, punishment, and compensation, and in 
other contexts, and in other contexts, rejecting the concept altogether.  Thick and thin forms 
of dialogue can be reinterpreted as a difference between coexistence and reconciliation 
(Bloomfield, 2016, p.20).  The first understood as a grudging acceptance of the necessity to 
exist in a shared space, and the second a more complex set of activities to mend-relationships, 
co-operate and develop harmonious living.  Bloomfield concludes that coexistence is a more 
modest term, with less negative implications due to the absence of ideas about forgiveness 
and integration.  Coexistence sees reconciliation as an absence of violence in the 
establishment of relations (a form of negative peace) without the need for interaction 
(Sampson, 2003, p. 181).   Sampson sees coexistence as two conflicting parties simply ignore 
one another, there is neither conflict, nor reconciliation, yet a step forward over a possible 
threat of ethnic cleansing.  The choice of depth in the dialogue of reconciliation can indicate 
the type of activities supporting dialogue processes.  Auerbach (2009, 9. 292) writes about 
‘cold’ reconciliation made up of concepts such as societal beliefs and national narratives as 
focal points for dialogue.  In contrast, ‘warm’ reconciliation encompasses processes for 
empathy, remorse, and forgiveness, which can potentially be integrated into the political 
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process that leads to reconciliation.  The thick and thin choice revolves around the depth of 
dialogue (whether a simple tolerance and non-violent engagement between former 
adversaries or cooperation and friendship) and the ideal context for relationship-building 
(local, community, national).      
Thick relationship-building: grounded transformative dialogues 
Thick relationship-building places communities as reconciliation sites, a space that does not 
need state-building or institution-building frames but rather reconstructing broken social ties 
among populations on the ground.  Reconciliation as “coming to terms with one’s old 
adversaries and creating a new partnership” (Jeong, 2000, pp. 192) is explained by the fact 
that in civil wars, relationships between protagonists are intimate and complex as parties 
share geographic areas, community spaces, have strong interdependence and social ties 
between them.   Reconciliation, as a conflict handling mechanism, is relationship-building 
through acknowledging harm, a process of regret and remorse and a readiness to apologize 
for one’s role in inflicting the injury (Assefa, 2001, p. 342).  Reconciliation begins with the 
premise that relations require particular attention in order to build peace.  Addressing the 
fracturing of relations via peacebuilding activities involves developing a shared vision of an 
interdependent and fair society, dealing with the past through healing and acknowledgment.  
Also, building of positive relationships addressing issues of trust, prejudice, intolerance and 
accepting commonalities and differences, and significant cultural and attitudinal change: 
transforming how people relate to one another (Hamber and Kelly, 2004, p.5) 
Thick relationship-building implies working with a wide range of actors, particularly local, 
grassroots actors and NGOs effectively working at the individual and community level.  This 
is the preferred site for addressing ethnic animosities and intolerance, reintegrating 
relationship-transformation into peacebuilding (Blagojević, 2007, p.559).  For Lerche (2002), 
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reinterpreting Lederach (1997), this process occurs through a workshop approach aimed at 
changing relational dynamics between participants, where they see beyond victimization and 
experience reconciliation.  Yordán (2003, p. 65-66) also writes about interactive problem-
solving workshops where influential community leaders can meet and discuss contentious 
issues; characterizing this process as open dialogue towards the construction of relational 
empathy that can de-escalate the conflict, change adversarial attitudes and build a culture of 
trust and co-operation.  The assumption in these workshops is that a trickle-down effect of 
reconciliation will occur as they include top actors (military, political and religious leaders), 
grass-roots actors (local politicians, local NGO representatives, and small business owners) as 
well as middle range actors (journalists, academics, representatives of political parties).  
These wide-ranging actors are expected to construct solutions to root causes of conflict, using 
their own cultural resources and then share them with their respective communities, ideally 
bringing about reconciliation. 
This process accentuates on trust: from casual acquaintance or collegiality to a deepened, 
complete trust..  Localised reconciliation aiming at affecting individuals requires high levels 
of trust: a confident expectation that the other is accepting, honest, truthful and non-
manipulative (Govier and Verwoerd, 2012, p.193).  Here, the best form of dialogue towards 
reconciliation is internal and voluntary rather than external and coerced; when dialogue is 
external adversaries marshal and mask their arguments, inhibiting change (Assefa, 2001, p. 
343). Thick reconciliation links to acknowledgment, contrition, mercy, and forgiveness, 
features so intimate and individual that cannot be dealt via state-building but through 
grassroots work: local intervention and dialogue between victims and perpetrators at the 
community level.  Reconciliation equated to apology and forgiveness incorporates admitting 
the commission of wrongdoings and expressions of regret (De la Rey, 2001, p.13).  
Forgiveness requires that the offended party accept the offender’s acknowledgment of the 
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wrong together with an authentic expression of sorrow.  Reconciliation deals with contrition 
from perpetrators and forgiveness from victims as essential elements for abandoning cycles of 
revenge and retaliation towards positive reconciliation (Lerche, 2002).  Grassroots NGOs 
often develop such tasks: organizing workshops to help deal with past trauma, providing 
spaces to talk about experiences aimed at furthering mutual understanding, developing local 
initiatives towards forgiveness and attrition (Theissen, 2004, p.9).   
Thin relationship-building: reconciliation as a political and social dialogue 
Thin relationship-building is concerned with top-down, high-level national processes to solve 
animosities between former adversaries via political agreements.  This is aimed at identifying 
misunderstandings, mutual recognition and the viability of agreements to overcome divisions 
through political commissions that channel dialogue towards security, trust and 
socioeconomic possibilities (Nordquist, 2006, p.16-17).  This political process involves 
elements of conflict transformation that move from ethnic hatreds towards agreement on 
political coexistence and planning of a common future.  A politics of reconciliation is based 
on a discourse of mutual recognition delimiting the terms of reconciliation (Schaap, 2004, p. 
524).  The expectation is that a process of intercultural dialogue leads to the identification of 
misunderstandings, a recognition of the other’s identity and the possibility of establishing an 
agreement.  High-level transitional justice becomes politics, as differing narratives of the past 
compete for political dominance, making state-building a policy for revisiting the past and 
dealing with conflicting beliefs about the past by warring parties (Kostić, 2012, p.651).   The 
assumption is that as the absence of dialogue gave rise to violent conflict, reflexive dialogue 
between disputing parties can help articulate their views and needs to one another and 
discover meeting points in their narratives that fit reconciliation (De la Rey, 2001, p.19). 
41 
 
By placing reconciliation in a political rather than a private setting, it becomes relevant to 
state-building.  Van Zyl (2005, p. 214) advocates for a national political process that 
overcomes divisions between groups, placing emphasis on the need for a constitutional 
settlement that offers protection and reassurances to vulnerable groups.  The government’s 
role in the process is vital, taking necessary measures to demonstrate that democracy serves 
all citizens and that diversity is a source of strength rather than conflict.  This political 
dialogue towards reconciliation is connected to institution-building as a form of ending 
violence.   Institutions need to be adapted to the process of bridging ethnic tensions, 
suggesting that: institutions need to be ethnically diverse, they need to promote ties that are 
acquaintance rather than friendship based, must possess a norm that allows interethnic 
cooperation and venues that promote mutually dependent interaction among ethnic groups 
(Pickering, 2006, p, 80-81). 
Thin reconciliation suggests that reforming or re-creating a state after violent conflict leads to 
a recognition of antagonisms and the possibility of them being “reconciled” via the political 
process.  Political recognition is a necessary foundation, established in terms of identity and 
otherness according to which past wrongs were perpetrated (Schaap, 2004, p. 534).   This 
form of reconciliation requires recognition that political violence was committed, that 
reparations must be negotiated through politics and that reconciliation is not just a matter 
between victim and perpetrator but one that matters to society as a whole, a public 
acknowledgment that steps have been taken towards addressing past injustices and that 
reconciliation has taken place.  Politics of reconciliation are a crucial task of peacebuilding, 
orientating the political system towards adjustment and stabilization of peaceful relations via 
addressing of economic, political and infrastructural problems that could initiate an outbreak 
or recurrence of violence (Francis, 2002).    A politics of reconciliation includes 
encouragement of consensus-building processes that foster inclusion and the reorganization 
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of social relations through new forms of governance that lead towards peaceful relationships.  
Francis further adds that this includes structures for maintenance of peace, efforts to enable 
return and resettlement of displaced and refugees, physical reconstruction as well as the 
rebuilding of the economic life, social networks, institutions, legal and political systems.    
This is discussed by Blagojevicć(2007, p.559) who sees in economic reconstruction a space 
for interethnic dialogue and exchange towards reconciliation: when introduced into the 
economic, political and institutional dimension of peacebuilding, reconciliation means that 
new state measures allow equal opportunity and access to societal resources for different 
(ethnic) groups.  Reconciliation involves governance modes and structures focused on the 
building of legal and human rights institutions together with fair effective governance and 
dispute resolution systems (Hamber and Kelly, 2004, p.3).  As reconciliation requires 
addressing root causes and consequences of conflict it must involve processes at the political 
level: building institutions, community development, legal and political mechanisms to 
address the past and build effective governance, processes for identification and 
reconstruction of the social, economic and political structures that gave rise to conflict.  The 
contribution of transitional justice towards reconciliation relies on the idea that new 
institutional settings should hold institutions accountable for the breakdown of the state, 
repression or human rights violations and become a pre-requisite for truth and reconciliation 
(Fischer, 2011, p.411).   
Thin reconciliation connects with legal and institutional reforms, mechanisms assumed to 
transform relations and deal with animosities.  Political reconciliation recalls an entire social 
system by determining the level of reforms in a post-war society:  if intergroup relations 
existed before conflict then state-building should become a form of conflict transformation 
and if they never existed in the past then it is about a social, economic and political 
transformation on an unprecedented scale (Lerche, 2002).   Transitional justice prioritizes 
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state-building through the establishment of political reforms, establishing a legal frame for 
rebuilding relations and achieving peaceful coexistence.  Van Zyl (2005, p. 216) explains: 
reconciliation seen as institutional-transitional justice implies reform and abolition of abusive 
institutions, responsible for human rights violations.  It requires ensuring human rights 
protection via mandates, training, and staffing of specific institutions.  It mandates the 
removal of persons responsible for corruption on human rights abuse from state institutions.  
It includes political, legal and social measures against the exploitation of the minority by the 
majority (policies that raise awareness of insecurities and marginalization, reparations that 
assure recognition of minorities as right-bearing citizens).  In addition, the proactive pursuit 
of accountability and reconciliation via transitional justice encodes impunity and sends a 
message about the importance of the rule of law. 
Reconciliation as justice: victims and perpetrators  
Justice is vital to reconciliation, linking relationships-building to the question of how to best 
address a past comprised of violence, gross human rights abuses and configuring relationships 
between victims and perpetrators.  The thick and thin choices focus on questions about best 
context and mechanisms for delivering post-conflict justice (international, national, local, 
indigenous), whether justice should be perpetrator or victim-focused and the impact that 
justice can have on the prospects of sustainable peace, known as the peace versus justice 
dilemma. 
Thick justice: victim-centred reconciliation 
Thick Justice deals with reparative processes recognizing victims’ pain and loss as well as 
plans for a compensation process within the emerging legal system, demanding for attention 
to the grounded realities of victims.  Reconciliation requires empowering victims through 
social, political and economic means in order for them to leave the role of victim and gain a 
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position as individual members of a community (Nordquist, 2006, p, 24).  Reparations may 
include financial compensation, memorials, policies, and procedures focused on protection of 
communities against future violations, a compensatory justice aimed at restoring the dignity 
and humanity of victims (Christie, Wagner and Winter, 2001).  Restorative justice focuses on 
the victim’s right to justice.  To achieve reconciliation, recognition of multiple levels of 
societal repair (individual, family, neighbourhood and society) is needed, requiring hearing 
the views of victims, prioritizing them over legal and political opinions of social 
reconstruction (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010, p. 4-5).  Here, a localised understanding of justice 
prioritizes the subjective and contextualized needs of those affected by violence (Garbett, 
2004, p.26). 
Restorative approaches can be bottom-up, insistent on local needs and customary justice 
practices.  Restorative justice focused on social healing and reconstruction, requires listening 
to victims’ needs and experiences, helping develop a collective memory based on their 
accounts of what occurred during the conflict period (Betts, 2005, p. 744).  By promoting 
customary law initiatives, it deals with justice issues through local practices and institutions.  
Customary, localised law is highly flexible and adaptive, accessible and legitimate for the 
rural poor in post-conflict settings as it deals with issues of great concern to the rural poor 
(lands, family issues) ( Shaw and Waldorf, 2010, p. 15).  It seems to have greater capacity 
and practices than those offered by conventional justice systems and can be more responsive 
to local needs, providing accountability for lower perpetrators and bystanders, also providing 
restitution.  For some authors, restorative justice is a form of compensatory justice:  De la 
Rey (2001, p.15) understands reparations as compensatory measures aimed at restoring the 
dignity and humanity of victims, responsibility of both the state and perpetrators.  In 
reparations, perpetrators should take actions to redress the wrongs committed through 
dialogue with victims and communities (Lerche, 2002).  The idea of reparations may bring 
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the view that it is the new government’s responsibility to offers the material restitution to 
victims, permitting a view of reintegrating victims back into society, reducing the likelihood 
of conflict by recognizing the harmed they endured (Theissen, 2004, p.8-9).   The claim is 
often that, if carried out well, reparations will enhance the perception of justice, having a 
positive effect on people’s perception of the state, strengthening their faith in democratic 
institutions (Skaar and Malca, 2015, p.11).  Restorative justice can also focus on healing and 
reconciliation at the community level, restoration promotes social healing and victim through 
the creation of collective memory based on truth telling practices at local and community 
spaces (Betts, 2005, p. 745).  When this is done through public deliberation, it helps create 
legitimacy within victims and their communities by recollecting facts around the past, 
different meanings on the violence that occurred, allowing victims’ stories to be publicly 
available, acknowledging the victim’s psychological trauma. 
Thin justice: perpetrator-focused reconciliation 
Thin justice necessitates institutional arrangements for punishing perpetrators of gross human 
rights violations, leaning towards a top-down approach to addressing the past.  The focus is 
accountability, reform of national justice systems, the promotion of international transitional 
justice mechanisms and strengthening of rule of law to generate trust in state institutions.  The 
claim is that punishment creates accountability, restores justice and dignity to victims, 
creating a break from past regimes, contributing to reconciliation and demonstrating respect 
for democratic (judiciary) institutions, ensuring that no atrocities will happen again (Skaar 
and Malca, 2015, p.5).  Prosecutions focus on perpetrators, the advancement of a just order 
and the establishment of a rising democracy that succeeds an authoritarian or violent system 
(Reychler and Paffenholz, 2012).  Thin reconciliation connects with state-building goals: 
good governance, constitutional, legal equality and individualizing accountability that 
facilitates trust and cooperation (Kostić, 2012, p.651).  Prosecutions have great priority for 
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their potential to deter future crimes, reflect a new set of social norms and a solid process of 
reforming and rebuilding trust in government institutions (Van Zyl, 2005, p. 211).  The 
concept of transitional justice acquires importance for its ability to highlight practices focused 
on juridical answers to the ways of past repressive regimes (Andrieu, 2010, p. 539).   
Transitional Justice has been used for processing war crimes and massive human abuses in 
conflicts through the establishment of tribunals, lustration of state administrations, reparation 
and settlement processes amongst other mechanisms.  Theissen (2004, p. 2-4) sees the 
development of retributive justice through the formation of international criminal courts, 
national prosecution systems, and national courts.  The criminal system is responsible for 
regulating past injustices, transforming violent conflict into peaceful settlement, based on the 
fact that there is an international consensus that gross human rights violations, genocide, and 
war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity, must be investigated and punished.   
Transitional justice affirms the need to build institutions promoting justice and a commitment 
to good governance.  This includes measures against impunity, reintegration of victims and 
perpetrators and a judicial reform process.  It involves mechanisms for international criminal 
justice or reinforcement of a national prosecution service, often in the form of criminal 
tribunals and a system to regulate past injustices, investigating and punishing gross human 
rights violations and processes for transforming violent conflict into a peaceful settlement.  In 
this sense, the claim of the contribution of transitional justice and accountability to the 
construction of positive peace is on the constitution of a shared political project built on trust 
(García-Godos, 2015, p. 342). 
Retributive justice connects with state-building via punishing perpetrators.  Peacebuilding can 
present democratic justice institutions and procedures as preferred alternatives when 
compared to oppressive and abusive systems.  Retributive justice advocates argue that 
punishment supports the construction of a morally right order that supports a growing 
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democracy, in contrast with the institutional structures prevalent in a previous authoritarian 
system (Huyse, 2005).    For democracy and rule of law to be solidly built, legal 
accountability is required to prevent future crimes (Sriram, 2010, p.279).  As prosecutions 
serve as a crime deterrent, this reflects a new formation of social norms that can help rebuild 
trust into government institutions, making criminal trials a vehicle to prove to citizens that 
state institutions are willing to protect rather than violate their rights (Van Zyl, 2005, p. 211). 
Thin reconciliation, through retributive transitional justice, is praised for countering collective 
blaming that persist in divided societies after violent conflict, giving institutions a role in 
dealing with warmongering, collective victimization and guilt.  Retributive justice is 
understood to help set up criminal tribunals to individualize guilt, putting an end to the 
collective demonization of ethnicity (Eastmond, 2010, p.6-7).  As criminal tribunals 
marginalize nationalist political leaders and discourage vengeance, they are said to contribute 
to peace through the individualization of criminal accountability (Hoogenbom and Vieille, 
2010, p.189).  Retributive justice is assumed to have a cathartic role, appraising desires for 
vengeance, by creating a view of justice through prosecution, embracing the rule of law and 
facilitating the creation of judicial structures (Betts, 2005, p. 744).   Mechanisms point 
towards the creation of a human rights culture that supports changes in social structure 
towards the achievement of reconciliation via the new legislations and measures that can 
safeguard human rights initiatives (De la Rey, 2001, p.20).  A thin-liberal view of 
reconciliation focuses on a strong defense of equal rights and legal protection, affirmation of 
the rule of law and a culture of human rights where reconciliation is understood as 
commemorating the past as a history of human rights violations in order to prevent their 
reoccurrence (Schaap, 2008).  To promote reconciliation this way, it is imperative to 
condemn inappropriate behavior and discourage people from repeating the sort of offenses 
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that lead to mass human rights violations, setting up appropriate institutional and social 
safeguards (Hamber and Van der Merwe, 1998). 
Truth telling: multiple localised truths or top-down national narrative? 
Revealing ‘truths’ is a process linked to reconciliation: knowing what exactly happened in the 
past, victims having the chance to be heard, and establishing an official narrative that can 
dispel myths and prejudices created during periods of armed conflict.  The thin/thick division 
questions whether Truth Commissions should be linked to state-building, leading to a national 
official (documented) version of the truth or whether various truth(s) can be reconciled at the 
local and community level in order to get perpetrators and victims to rebuild broken ties.   
Thick ‘truths’: dialogue at the local level 
Thick truth telling refers to local dialogue between victims and perpetrators at community 
level dealing with trauma-healing issues, admission of wrongdoings and genuine expressions 
of regret.    A common claim regarding truth processes is that they positively influence 
peacebuilding by addressing grievances derived from human rights violations, addressing the 
causes of violence, promoting non-violent ways of dealing with social conflict (Skaar and 
Malca, 2015, p.9).  Adopting a bottom-up approach, truth telling insists on taking account of 
particular worldviews from which local practices draw their meaning and force,  involving 
issues of silence understood as a practical strategy in vulnerable contexts to avoid 
embarrassment and conflict (Eastmond, 2010, p. 8-9).  Dealing with contrition from 
perpetrators and forgiveness from victims is essential to leave cycles of revenge and 
retaliation towards a more positive status of reconciliation (Lerche, 2002).     Dealing with the 
past becomes a search for the truth, not necessarily as a single fact but as an interpretative 
tool that in some cases can bring victims to a satisfaction of their own questions around the 
past, leading to reconciliation (Hamber and Kelly, 2004).  The value of storytelling in this 
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context is that narratives help people make sense of themselves and their social context, 
developing a self-perception and worldview that can solve identity-based conflicts.   
Thin ‘truths’: top-down truth telling 
Thin truth telling is represented in top-down processes seeking official records of past 
atrocities through national truth and reconciliation commissions aimed at recognizing and 
admitting hidden parts of a society’s past.  This institutional approach focuses on establishing 
an official, state-based, version of the truth around what occurred during violent conflict.  
Top-down truth telling attempts to create political mechanisms for investigating what 
happened during the war, the type of atrocities committed, and who was responsible for them.  
Truth commissions serve as narrative builders, mechanisms aimed at building bridges 
between victims and perpetrators and presented as necessary to prevent future violence and 
facilitate healing processes (Andrieu, 2010, p.542). 
Truth commissions connect to justice via ‘truth telling’, making them part of an institution-
building process praised for its viability within society.  Truth commissions are promoted as 
alternatives to prosecutions, justified on the premise that public and official exposure of truth 
provides redress for victims, avoid myths that enable a collectivization of guilt and the 
opportunity for society to engage in a national dialogue that can empower civil society and 
connect it to the state (Fischer, 2011, p. 410).  The mere fact that a government is setting up a 
truth commission may be perceived as an effort to uncover past crimes, something vital for 
victims of violence (Skaar, 2013).  National truth commissions can promote political 
reconciliation via dialogue amidst lines of political and social conflict, fostering a deliberative 
democracy that encourages accommodation of opposing perspectives.  Truth commissions 
can break silences around human rights violation, encourage victims to speak, expose past 
atrocities from a victim’s perspective, create comprehensive accounts of past abuses, 
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identifying victims’ needs for rehabilitation and reparation (Theissen, 2004, p.6).  
Establishing an official record can enhance prospects for dealing constructively with 
grievances and adding impetus to the transformation of state institutions and reforms that 
ensure the promotion and protection of human rights (Van Zyl, 2005, p. 212).  The claim is 
that truth commissions advance democracy by strengthening rule of law, promoting 
democratic institutions, practices, and values, settling disputes over history, contributing to a 
more inclusive, responsible government and pre-empting and deterring future atrocities 
(Skaar and Malca, 2015, p.7) 
The liberal assumption behind top-down truth telling is it generates a record, a version of 
history that helps accountability through resources outside of the criminal justice system but 
that are still officialized and institutionalized.   Such process protects future generations 
against revisionism and growing desires for revenge created by cultures of impunity, 
empowering citizens to resist a return to oppressive practices (Van Zyl, 2005, p. 212). 
Commissions are expected to give a voice to victims in public discourse, which is assumed to 
help rebut lies and myths around human rights violations.  As truth commissions are based on 
peace agreements, government decrees or parliamentary laws, they help establish a public 
record of what happened in the past and how to avoid future atrocities, encouraging public 
debate as to how to best achieve co-existence (Theissen, 2004, p.6-7). 
Neither thick nor thin: disconnecting top-down and bottom-up in reconciliation 
Disconnections between thin and thick reconciliation stem from the legalistic foundations of 
transitional justice.  The field is heavily influenced by the international legalist paradigm 
focused on generating elite and mass compliance with international humanitarian norms 
(Nagy, 2008, p. 278).  This paradigm has extended beyond the push for prosecution through 
the emergence of the right to truth and reparation via customary international law as well as 
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the proliferation of quasi-judicial truth commissions.  This field has evolved from an almost 
exclusive focus on legal responses intended to ensure rule of law to a more diverse focus on 
truth and justice with reconciliation as the desired outcome (Skaar and Malca, 2015, p.3).   
This evolution has led to the recognition that establishing a legal and justice system by itself 
cannot bring healing despite creating an environment for attributing crime responsibility and 
punishment for perpetrators (Barakat, 2005).  Excessive legalism has made transitional justice 
and its reconciliation claims appear distant from affected communities, by the complexity of 
court practices and the technical language it promotes, trials may serve to counter impunity 
but fail to promote reconciliation and regenerate an inclusive political community (Andrieu, 
2010, p.541).   The rule of law guidance of international practice has often been rejected in 
many societies as appropriate means to dispense justice, creating a gap between the meaning 
of legal justice created from tribunals, and meanings of justice defined by victims and 
witnesses (Garbett, 2004, p.26).   Legalistic definitions of reconciliation direct attention to 
top-down institutions such as war crime courts or tribunals that have had little regard for local 
dynamics (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013).  Despite the field’s broadening, incorporating 
localised efforts, there is still a strong focus on the type of ‘silence-breaking’ initiatives 
promoted by retributive justice.  Emphasis on legal accountability may result in transitional 
justice programmes that do not function well in the political and legal cultures in which they 
are implemented, for various reasons: first, legal systems may have collapsed due to atrocities 
and judges and lawyers may become targets of violence.  Second, legal emphasis may be 
inappropriate because the formal justice sector was never important in the lives of citizens, 
who may prefer traditional forms of justice or have never accessed justice.  Third, emphasis 
on individual rights derived from a western liberal conception may not be appropriate in 
cultures based on group or community identity.  Finally, there is the recognition that justice 
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can end up truly being an external imposition, where states and international actors pursue 
trials over the strong objection of states or individuals (Sriram, 2007). 
Separations in reconciliation come from the excessive influence of legalist approaches, a 
product of liberal state-building formulas within transitional justice that see thin forms of 
reconciliation as practical, realist and measurable approaches.  Transitional justice strategies 
share with liberal peacebuilding assumptions about preferable institutional arrangements and 
a faith that goods such as democracy, free markets, justice can stand in for and create peace 
(Sriram, 2007, p. 579).   For Andrieu (2010, p. 541) transitional justice is an extensive part of 
the liberal package, under the influence of a top-down state-building approach that treats 
justice, peace, and democracy as mutually reinforcing imperatives.  Transitional justice tools 
are increasingly embedded in democratization or rule of law strategies: judicial reform, 
reform of security forces, integration of former rebels and vetting processes are explicitly tied 
to transitional justice (Sriram, 2009).  Such thin practices promote institution-building, giving 
primacy to accountability and rule of law as main outcomes of transitional justice, leaving 
aside the more intimate, localised, individual conceptions of thick reconciliation.   This 
prioritizes legalistic views understanding peacebuilding from a state-centric perspective.  
Legalism turned transitional justice into a top-down activity via various mechanisms.  First, it 
has been institutionalized into expensive supra state and state-like structures such as the 
various international tribunals. (McEvoy, 2007).  It also has been transformed into a series of 
state-centric solutions (such as judicial reform and rule of law programmes) based on ‘state 
failure’ assessments.   Transitional justice has a tendency of ‘seeing like a state’, where 
strengthening the state has been promoted as a key element for conflict resolution and that 
what matters most is institution-building.   Although transitional justice evolved from its 
legalistic origins, incorporating various models and disciplines, moving towards a holistic 
model, the need for looking at the connections between thin and the thick, the top-down and 
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the bottom-up maintain relevance, as disciplinary and practitioner divides often affect 
communication and integration between practices and understandings.   This separation leads 
to the question of who is it that needs reconciliation and what are the views of reconciliation 
of those who need to engage in such process?  For Stefanson (2010) the classification of thick 
and thin leads him to ask whose state-building, political and economic interests do national 
reconciliation projects serve.   
Differentiation between thin and thick as opposing terms complicates reconciliation in theory 
and practice.   In early studies, scholars were torn between two scholarships.  One, claiming 
reconciliation as a difficult and delicate process, not just a matter of rational thought but also 
one with emotional, warm-healing aspects.  The second, arguing that the goal of 
reconciliation would be better served if stripped of its sentimental wrapping, presented in a 
more political, realistic concept (Auerback, 2009, p. 292).  Thin scholarship’s influence on 
rule of law is taken to such a normative stance that it ends disconnected from the everyday 
lives of those affected by legal systems, which explains the need for developing thicker forms 
of transitional justice (McEvoy, 2007).  Transitional justice discourses tend to disengage 
audiences, discouraging them from participation.  The difficult choices made in transitional 
contexts regarding violent pasts, are often translated into human rights discourses and 
international legal standards that ‘thin out’ the complexities of conflict-affected societies, 
divorcing human rights institutions from the wider socio-political and cultural contexts that 
created the violence in the first place (McEvoy, 2007, p. 413).  
Despite the evolution of scholarship, the initial focus on legal approaches has contributed to 
the distancing academic approaches.  Legal scholarship initially dominated transitional justice 
literature, recently benefitting from contributions from other fields of knowledge, aiming at 
making the field interdisciplinary (Skaar and Malca, 2015, p.3).  It is positive that the initial 
focus on retributive justice and rule of law has broadened towards discussions on meanings 
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and their relationship.  This has led to scholarship has prioritizing activist voices, neglecting 
empirical research on audiences, leading to silence, exclusion, and lack of reflexivity on 
power relationships and the privilege that leads to such practices (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013).  
In the study of transitional justice, disciplines talk past one another, failing to communicate as 
different streams of the literature (for instance, psychosocial versus legal) are disconnected 
and fail to initiate an exchange of meanings (Millar and Lecy, 2016).  Legal literature has 
emphasized on the need for prosecutions and punishment whilst psychosocial research places 
attention to conflict transformation, the identification of root causes of conflict and a 
reparative ‘relation-building’ approach.  The effect of this separation has been the 
marginalization of other forms of research (constructivism) as well as the impossibility of 
developing holistic models of practice for post-war societies (Millar and Lecy, 2016). 
What these separations tells us about reconciliation and ultimately peacebuilding, is that 
transitional justice is a discourse and practice embedded with power, yet its implementation is 
incredibly depoliticised.  Narrow legalistic focus on gross human (civil and political) rights 
violations often ignores issues of structural violence and gender inequality influence 
subjective experiences of conflict, injustice and their consequences (Nagy, 2008).   Thin and 
thick, translated into top-down and bottom-up approaches, both can potentially ignore, 
neglect and undermine local agencies as they depoliticise both the conflict they seek to 
address and the peace they intend to build (Charbonneau and Parent, 2013).  These 
distinctions are flawed when seen as choices and separated spheres of peacebuilding activity 
(Charbonneau and Parent, 2011).  Making bottom-up approaches relevant in peacebuilding 
does not signify that they are more relevant than their top-down counterparts; this reifies the 
distinction and misses the intimate connections between them.   Identifying how and where 
the distinctions are made, makes the act of choosing transitional justice measures a political 
act with concrete consequences.  The distinction makes spaces for social action and reaction 
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surrounding specific meanings of peace and reconciliation, that when defined in elite terms 
and international circles, usually signals how liberal peace formulas are imposed.  Addressing 
such challenges deals directly with the legitimacy of the global transitional justice project and 
the efficacy and legitimacy of mechanisms geared towards reconciliation and justice after 
violent conflict (Nagy, 2008). 
Separating reconciliation between thin or thick leads to interpreting processes as dilemmas or 
trade-offs missing the space for comprehensive, holistic peacebuilding.  The achievement of 
stability may often imply offering impunity to war criminals and warlords who can be 
legitimized in governance mechanisms (Newman, 2009, p. 33).   This preference for stability 
and impunity forces a view in which justice and reconciliation can be seen as competing 
peacebuilding objectives (Lambourne, 2004, p.5).   Justice and reconciliation are seen both as 
conflicting as well as mutually reinforcing goals and that publicly revealing the truth has been 
seen as an obstacle to reconciliation but also as its prerequisite (Skaar, 2013).  Truth becomes 
an obstacle and a prerequisite to peace.   This narrow debate frames the option as “peace or 
justice” as there is a demand for legal accountability in the name of democracy and rule of 
law at the same time that there is a claim for stability that asks that accountability ought to be 
eschewed (Sriram, 2010, p. 280).   Three dilemmas emerge in narrow interpretations of truth, 
justice, and reconciliation: search for truth and accountability is destabilizing, obstructing the 
consolidation of democracy and peace.  Peace settlements and their derived transition process 
depend upon the cooperation of individuals involved in human rights abuses, implying a 
complex balance: victim’s demands on one side and the inclusion and participation of all 
actors (including perpetrators) into the new post-conflict system.  In addition, some sense of 
justice is needed for the peace and democratization process but stability and inclusion of all 
actors make the search for truth and justice difficult.  (Newman, 2002, p.32) 
56 
 
A thin/thick understanding disconnects peacebuilding practices creating problems for 
individual approaches that do not have enough strength to bring their claimed reconciliation 
outcomes.   Disconnecting legal and psychosocial traditions on justice and peacebuilding has 
promoted contradictory interventions on the ground: legal approaches emphasize on the need 
for prosecutions and punishment whereas psychosocial initiatives often call for conflict 
transformation, root causes of conflict and restoration of relations (Millar and Lecy, 2016).  
Disconnections risk a top-down perspective on reconciliation that ends in victor’s side 
version of truth telling and justice, and exclusive bottom-up approaches that make it difficult 
for victims to extend their narratives to broader layers of society (Nordquist, 2006, p.25).   
Localised peacebuilding, despite its defense in academic scholarship, has not extended 
beyond theory as local ownership, making it a disempowering form where internal political 
forces are expected to uncritically adopt and implement a blueprint for post-conflict 
transformation (Parent, 2016, p.512).  When top-down approaches are linked to externally run 
peacebuilding they often end in excessive emphasis on legal accountability, focusing on 
individual rights and responsibilities, contradicting the collective community identity often 
found in post-war societies (Kostić, 2012, p.651).  Reconciliation cannot be imported, it is in 
the hands of local policy makers and civil society to examine and build upon their own 
political and cultural resources in the search for coping and healing mechanisms (Huyse, 
2005).  When transitional justice mechanisms are implemented under a top-down state-
building focus they aim at creating national narratives, failing to affect local dynamics of 
conflict and the meaning for people living on the ground (Andrieu, 2010, p.542).  This is 
explained by the fact that the language of legalism of transitional justice makes it distant from 
affected communities, focused on narratives of political violence, ignoring economic or 
structural causes. 
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In dealing with the past, transitional justice measures separating reparative and retributive end 
up either isolating victims and benefitting perpetrators or becoming empty measures for 
locals.  Post-transition justice involves decisions that may trespass the rule of law and human 
rights as dealing with the past solely by prosecutions means that successor elites may rely on 
impunity to deal with the past, weakening the legitimacy of the emerging regime (Reychler 
and Paffenholz, 2001).   Although rule of law and human rights are crucial in ensuring justice 
in a post-war environment, this sort of work falls short in the empowerment and healing of 
victims, inadequate in reforming and reintegrating perpetrators and avoid emotional issues 
that lead to revenge and renewed violence (Thiessen, 2012, p. 128). Court decisions can lead 
to prolonged physical and social expulsion of sections of a population, which then, due to 
their isolation, create subcultures and networks hostile to democracy and human rights 
(Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001).   Legalist views of justice and individual accountability 
features de-politicises the conflict as one among individual agents, failing to account why 
human rights violations were atrocious in the first place, denying that the collective 
organization behind them (Schaap, 2008).   
When transitional justice feels internationally imposed, as with the implementation of 
international tribunals, it creates gaps with local populations affecting its legitimacy, leading 
to contestation of sentences and outcomes.   A huge risk for transitional justice is presented in 
the gap between what governments and donors promise and what victims expect and what is 
delivered: practitioners create expectations for justice and victims often demand a range of 
outcomes (truth, criminal accountability, memorials, reparations, reconciliation) (Sriram and 
Garcia-Godos, 2012).  Designing reconciliation through distant legal justice is often 
contentious, as the rule of law orientation of the international community is not locally 
accepted as an appropriate means to dispense justice (Garbett, 2004, p.25).  A gap derives 
from the difference between international aspirations of transitional justice and the 
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experiences and needs of local communities, often reflected when criminal trials of 
perpetrators further divide small multi-ethnic communities by causing suspicion or fear of 
retaliation or revenge (Eastmond, 2010, p.6-7).  This gap is expressed in the existing 
complications when coordinating between international and national justice systems, mainly 
due to the presence of national political interests and a politicised national judiciary.  
Preference among internationals for justice approaches reliant on international human rights 
law ignores customary legal practices that have more meaning and are more accessible to 
local populations than the distant accountability of international trials.  There tends to be 
communitarian challenges to international norms when they are in tension with local custom; 
these ignore traditional norms of justice and reconciliation, limiting the scope for local 
solutions (Newman, 2009, p. 44).  There is a call to avoiding romanticising the local: 
customary law approach may be expressed in terms of a clash between local culture and 
universal human rights norms; while customary law is accessible, it may reconstitute pre-
conflict structures of exploitation (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010, p.16). 
Regarding the right to truth, separating between state-based truth telling processes and local 
approaches to truth leads to either excluding individuals or collectives from mega-narratives 
derived from truth commissions or to a thick reconciliation that does not become accepted or 
acknowledged at the national level.  Narrow views on truth and reconciliation see impunity 
and amnesty as the price for truth telling, a trade-off known as truth versus justice dilemma.  
Truth telling provokes various reactions in a population and does not automatically guarantee 
reconciliation (Lerche, 2002).  It should create a cultural space where legitimacy is agreed on, 
as those who cannot forgive must find other ways to deal with their anger.   Truth 
commissions, when done under a top-down approach may offer an official version of the past 
that may (or not) affect people’s beliefs but on their own cannot rebuild social trust and 
capital (Andrieu, 2010, p.542).  Andrieu further explains that legitimating narratives through 
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truth commissions imposes a top-down authoritative account of the past, often masking the 
plurality of individual experiences.  In cases when their mandate is weak or they lack 
resources to be truly independent, truth commissions end up simply becoming governmental 
public relations (Theissen, 2004, p.5).  Truth telling in the absence of retributive justice is 
risky as recounting the past is traumatizing for victims and can recreate their suffering, 
particularly when they know that wrongdoers will be set free (Elster, 2012).   
Connecting thick and thin reconciliation 
Studying reconciliation initiatives requires an in-depth look at the idea of ‘holistic 
approaches’ to the field in practice and theory.  Reconciliation requires linking top and 
bottom, combining different measures at various levels to support sustainable peace.  If state-
building requires a broad understanding that avoids excessive focus on institutions, 
reconciliation requires a broad understanding beyond the political system and into everyday 
meaning construction.  Peace processes encompass much broader layers of society than just 
governmental institutions, explaining why post-conflict reconciliation requires combining 
top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding (Nordquist, 2006, p.25).   It is an illusion to believe 
that reconciliation imposed from the top will lead to individual steps towards empathy and 
trust or that individual or community practices will move towards national reconciliation 
without a connection to the state (Huyse, 2005).  Reconciliation requires a broad definition, 
including those who are not at the heart of the process: second-generation victims, bystanders 
and silent beneficiaries of past injustices (Huyse, 2005).  This entails an exercise in inclusion 
to broaden up the reach of peacebuilding practices that can help different actors search for 
common ground on key terms.  The catalog of available options is not a spectrum of opposing 
options but a series of instruments that need combination according to local needs and context 
(Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001). 
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Different authors have proposed ways for a holistic linkage between transitional justice, 
reconciliation, and peacebuilding, avoiding narrow, single-mechanism approaches.   
Reconciliation is a ‘complex and multidimensional phenomenon’ (Clark, 2010, p. 345) with 
no broad consensus on definitions or conceptualizations.  This suggests that reconciliation 
may be perceived as a process, yet one channeled by different means: a theological lens, 
political concepts, or psychological aspects (Clark, 2010).  ‘Holistic’ approaches require 
recognizing intrinsic links between peacebuilding and reconciliation: one dealing broadly 
with order and stability after the conflict, the other with deep societal wounds that open up 
after traumatic events (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2013).   It means connecting post-war 
security, institution-building and strengthening rule of law with the need for dealing with 
animosities and wounds that bring new forms of violence.  Peacebuilding requires the 
building of a just society, which includes reparative justice, restoring the rule of law (through 
prison, police and judicial reform), rectifying human rights violations (via transitional justice 
mechanisms both formal and traditional) and redressing inequalities and distributive 
injustices underlying war (Nagy, 2008).    Holistic frameworks benefit from conflict 
transformation, as restoring justice is measured within peacebuilding parameters, connecting 
‘justice’ and ‘peace’ definitions within war-affected societies (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013).   
Holistic transitional justice complements peacebuilding by broadening its meaning of justice.  
Combining reparative and restorative views that incorporate discussions about trust-building, 
societal solidarity and discussing the past, giving a chance for transitional justice to address 
socioeconomic injustices (Hronešova, 2016).  Victims often may not prioritize criminal 
accountability or a truth commission report and are more focused on finding a job, securing 
food and healthcare, to which any reparation program must be tailored made, attentive to who 
victims are and what they need (Sriram, 2012).  By avoiding reliance on individual 
mechanisms, transitional justice practices benefit from creating a thick web of relationships 
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(De Greiff, 2012).  Without such connections, various risks may occur: reparations without 
adequate truth telling being interpreted by victims as a form of buying their acquiescence.  
Prosecutions without reparations have no direct benefit for victims, as they do not change the 
circumstances of their lives.  Vetting processes need prosecutions and reparations otherwise 
the newly built institutions would not be trustworthy in the eyes of victims, the same goes for 
vetting practices without any corrective forms of justice.  The challenge in a comprehensive 
transitional justice is covering a multiplicity of aims: accountability, truth-recovery, a 
reparative dimension, institutional reforms and socio-political reconciliation (Fischer, 2011, 
p.411).  Combining legalistic and peacebuilding lens, criticises ‘peacebuilding as state-
building’ in transitional justice, and its tendency to prioritize creating institutions such as 
criminal courts and truth commissions (Andrieu, 2010, p. 539).  The commonalities in 
different ‘holistic’ proposals are a recognition that singular measures are incomplete and 
insufficient in dealing with the complexity of post-war challenges on their own.   ‘Holistic 
approaches’ require a combination of reparative and retributive measures that explicitly 
addresses the particular needs and contexts of a post-war society (avoiding one-size-fits-all 
formulas), and to be seen as legitimate, models require a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up initiatives that work complementary to one another, rather than as two separate 
spheres.  These features, allow holistic understandings promoting an understanding of 
peacebuilding ‘rooted in and responsive to the experiential and subjective realities shaping 
people’s perspectives and needs, demanding a shift away from frameworks and activities 
established in statist approaches’ (Lederach, 1997, p. 24).     
When studying reconciliation, a holistic approach to the field requires reducing the excessive 
influence exerted by legalistic approaches within transitional justice and how this contributes 
to distancing thick and thin forms of reconciliation.  A departure point for such approach is 
accepting the imperfect context in which transitional justice measures operate, not just by the 
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massive violation of norms but accepting the challenges and costs embedded in the 
compliance of such measures (De Greiff, 2012).   A holistic view of transitional justice 
opposes the tendency in practice (generally adopted by governments) that different 
mechanisms and measures can be traded off against one another.  As peacebuilding needs to 
deal both with war elites who can act as potential spoilers of a process (and whose adversarial 
relationships need transformation) as well as with the victims and communities on the 
ground, post-conflict reconciliation requires combining bottom-up and top-down approaches 
(Nordquist, 2006, p.25).      
Studying different meanings of reconciliation leads to identifying the power and force of 
ideas, frameworks, looking at how these translate into practice, and how they are supported, 
opposed or ignored by initiative recipients.   As such, the idea of thin and thick as different 
forms of defining and locating reconciliation becomes a range, a spectrum that moves from 
top-down initiatives interested in normative compliance with human rights and accountability 
to bottom-up ones interested in more individual, intimate and localised practices for 
rebuilding relations.   The differentiation between the thick and thin comes with perspectives 
regarding the creation of a shared future between former adversaries: in a thick (idealist) form 
incorporates the need for forgiveness, empathy, dialogue, truth and justice whereas a thin 
(realist) view settles for peaceful coexistence, some minimal level of social interaction and 
cooperation between former enemies (Stefanson, 2010).   On the thin side, reconciliation 
equals a simple coexistence where former enemies comply with the law rather than destroy 
one another, whereas thicker understandings include processes for forgiveness, mercy, shared 
comprehensive views of the past and healing amongst others (Skaar, 2013).    
The idea of spectrum turns the study of reconciliation into a search for common ground in 
key terms (truth, justice, reparations, etc.) at all levels and must be broad enough to include 
those who are not part of the centre of the process (second generation victims, bystanders of 
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human rights violations and silent beneficiaries of past injustices) (Huyse, 2005).  Top-down 
and bottom-up need not be seen as antagonistic or unrelated; both are complementary 
mutually related and supporting which makes the establishment of frameworks for interaction 
between the two an issue of legitimacy in peacebuilding (Bloomfield, 2006, p. 25-26).  What 
is clear is that reconciliation needs both top-down and bottom-up approaches to be effective, 
proceeding in both directions simultaneously: structural/political (top-down) and cultural 
(Bottom-up) forms of reconciliation are understood as complementary and mutually 
supportive (Fischer, 2016, p.25).  The question underlying this recognition is whether and 
where bottom-up, top-down approaches converge, and how initiatives were taken at the top 
level relate to those undertaken at grassroots levels by civil society actors.  It is clear that 
reconciliation, as a process rather than an end goal, can use many channels.  The prioritization 
of objectives, mechanisms, and practice deemed effective will necessarily depend on local 
conditions (Komesaroff, 2016).  The particular focus of this nexus is to figure out how to 
establish and maintain a process of communication between different understandings of 
reconciliation, maintaining sensitivity to local possibilities and limitations.  Ultimately, the 
nexus recognizes reconciliation’s concern with dialogue:  
“it involves a sharing of meaning-generating perspectives….a stream of 
meaning…out of which may emerge some new understanding.  (An) open 
dialogue occurs between discrepant discourses and meanings produced, different 
from the pre-existing meanings within each of them.” (Komesaroff, 2016, p.5)   
Connecting reconciliation and state-building requires channels for communication that open 
up ways of dealing with the past, addressing issues relevant to people and building a political 
community around them.  Peacebuilder Judith Brand mentioned this in an interview 
“reconciliation is knowing that we share the same values that we do not want to harm each 
other and this is where trust is built.  This is part of this civic trust model which implies more 
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openness to discuss issues, admit them, question them and be open and talk about the serious 
issues.”1 
Connecting state-building and reconciliation: The nexus as a framework for critical 
analysis 
Seeing the nexus as a framework for visualizing connections linking state-building and 
reconciliation processes, its main objective is determining spaces within such linkages 
supportive and problematic for peacebuilding.  The nexus makes peacebuilding its object of 
analysis, observing two key components: state-building and reconciliation.  Taking the 
Agenda for Peace’s definition, the nexus sees peacebuilding as a wide range of activities that 
in conjunction support sustainable peace.  As Cousans, Kumar and Wermeser (2002) point 
out, activities encompassing peacebuilding (state-building, reconciliation, human rights, 
elections, etc) are not inherently equivalent to peacebuilding unless they design themselves as 
part of a strategy.  For this reason, the nexus seeks connection, cooperation and 
communication between its constitutive parts. 
As a critical peace research exercise, the nexus takes concerns regarding liberal peace (the 
problem of liberal co-option, imposition of western frameworks, lack of legitimacy and fit, 
the external nature of peacebuilding interventions) and uses them as indicators of whether 
peacebuilding is broadly or narrowly defined.  This thesis recognises the need to move 
beyond universal blueprints for peacebuilding, incorporating an empathetic multilevel 
procedure that gives grassroots a voice that takes into account local community concerns 
above liberal (Western) goals (Thiessen, 2012).  As definitions of peacebuilding (in narrow or 
broad terms) help determine its effectiveness (Newman, 2009), the nexus sees both the 
institutionalisation approach in state-building and the legalistic nature of reconciliation 
                                                          
1 Interview, 07-06-2016 
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(through the concept of retributive transitional justice) as expressions of narrow 
peacebuilding.  It also sees the connections and opportunities between top-down and bottom-
up processes (such as thin and thick reconciliation) as spaces for broader (holistic) 
peacebuilding. 
The two components viewed by the nexus, state-building and reconciliation, are present in the 
U.N.’s understanding of peacebuilding, both have received significant attention and 
implementation by international donors, agents involved in peace work as well as civil 
society actors.  Both are identified as requirements for sustainable peace, subject to both top-
down and bottom-up approaches.  As primary concepts in this research, their potential for 
hindering or aiding peacebuilding allows for thinking about a holistic approach, where 
peacebuilding activities support the restoration of legitimate political authority and the 
incorporation of voices from below (Newman, 2009).  This entails reconciling global 
objectives behind peacebuilding with the local conditions for their realization (Thiessen, 
2011).  A holistic interpretation of peacebuilding represents an effort to characterize the 
context in which different measures and activities operate; this requires drawing on local 
knowledge and culture for sustainable peace (Nagy, 2008). Connecting top-down and bottom-
up requires observing issues of local ownership, agency and legitimacy, central to 
peacebuilding. 
A holistic approach privileges connections between peacebuilding activities appropriate for 
dealing with identified needs in a post-conflict context.  For Fischer (2011, 2016) holistic 
peacebuilding requires connecting accountability, truth recovery, reparations, institutional 
reform and ground reconciliation.  A holistic approach entails criticising the view of 
peacebuilding solely as top-down state-building, and extending it towards discussions on 
transitional justice (Andrieu, 2004).   Connecting state-building and transitional justice allows 
linking of political, economic, cultural, psychological and sociological dynamics that 
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contribute to social transformation.    In transitional justice, a holistic conception of this work 
contributes to seeing complementation between different mechanisms, rather than the 
traditional legalist understanding of different measures being traded off against one another 
(De Greiff, 2012).   
With this holistic spirit in mind, the observation of connections between state-building and 
reconciliation distinguishes between broad and narrow forms of both practices.  Broad state-
building moves beyond institutionalist approaches, towards the construction of a political 
community and the strengthening of state-society relations.  In reconciliation, such relations 
are seen in the interaction between citizen needs, citizen justice priorities, truth processes, 
judicial reform and transitional justice measures.    On the other side, narrow state-building 
limited to an institution-building approach, will often miss processes for participation, local 
ownership and agency, turning this activity into an imposed Western discourse tied to 
conditionalities, policy advice and elite co-option into the liberal peace.  An indicator of 
narrow state-building is the distancing of top-down and bottom-up approaches, leading to 
institutions disconnected from local views of political community, in a lack of fit between 
institutions and political culture that is evidenced in practices of corruption, rule-breaking, 
and lack of accountability.  In reconciliation, the limitation derives from a legalistic insistence 
on retributive approaches and individual transitional justice mechanisms focused solely on 
pursuing accountability.  This turns transitional justice also into a Western discourse of 
distant justice, disconnected from the realities and needs of victims and citizens on the 
ground.   
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When the nexus addresses debates around meaning of reconciliation, it relies on secondary 
concepts (thin and thick) determining different practices determining narrow and broad 
peacebuilding.  As reconciliation focuses on restoring broken relations, and state-building’s 
deals with strengthening of state-society relations, the nexus uses thin and thick categories as 
spaces in which relations are being dealt with in peacebuilding.   The process implies seeking 
connections and tensions between thin/top-down approaches to reconciliation that see state-
building as a main channel, and thick/bottom-up approaches concerned with local voices, 
interests and needs where working with individuals and communities becomes priority.  Thin 
reconciliation relies on institutional creation and reform, promotes accountability and rule of 
law as key aims of peacebuilding and promotes practices of transitional justice.  Thick 
reconciliation relies on grassroots work, promotes trauma-healing, forgiveness and 
community-building as key goals of peacebuilding.  
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Both thin and thick, as practices working towards reconciliation, are analysed through 
different goals, serving as a test of claims awarded to reconciliation work.    As a process for 
rebuilding relations, reconciliation becomes thin by promoting high-level political dialogue 
and creating commissions to rebuild relations amongst leadership between different opposing 
groups.   It becomes thin when the scope of relations becomes localized, dealing with 
animosities between victims and perpetrators on the ground.  If reconciliation and transitional 
justice contribute to positive relations, cooperation and peaceful dealing of animosities, the 
nexus asks how high level processes can support the needs and issues identified at the local, 
and community level, particularly those from victims of the conflict who may not have a 
place in the deliberations of high level politics. 
 As a form of promoting justice, thin reconciliation deals with perpetrators and punishment, 
creating a record against impunity and seeking state-building practices where institutions 
effectively address past atrocities.  In its thick version, reconciliation centres its attention on 
victim needs, often adopting a reparative, socioeconomic and rehabilitative approach that 
requires understanding local needs and interests regarding justice.    Here, if the claim is that 
reconciliation seeks to give a sense of justice that enables trust into an emerging post-conflict 
regime, the nexus asks about interactions between perpetrator and victim centred forms of 
justice, and between retributive, reparative and socioeconomic justice. 
On the issue of truth, thin practices seek officialising a version of the truth than can serve as a 
deterrent of myths and contradictions regarding the past, promoting institution-building via 
establishing truth and reconciliation commissions.  In its thick version, thee search for the 
truth seeks to deal with different accounts and versions of the past, which are often 
contradictory and prone to tensions, as a way of bringing in forgiveness, acknowledgment, 
regret and victim recognition.  If the claim is that dealing with the past and promoting truth 
telling helps reconcile victims and perpetrators, then the nexus asks how peacebuilding deals 
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with dilemmas inherent in facing different forms of truth; those from legalistic, forensic and 
scientific processes contributing to an official ‘accurate’ truth, and those socially contracted, 
grounded in the experiences of individuals and communities.  
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CHAPTER 2 - METHODS 
Introduction 
This chapter establishes the nexus’ methodology via a social constructivist approach 
identifying avenues for meaning-construction, recognizing linkages and areas of convergence 
and divergence in ‘reconciliation’.  A methodological discussion is presented on what 
meaning-construction implies for reconciliation and how through case study research, the 
nexus links different reconciliation views from participants. 
Connecting thin and thick reconciliation through meaning 
Holistically approaching peacebuilding means bridging gaps between top-down and bottom-
up practices, understood as thick and thin reconciliation.   As projects are determined by 
specific definitions of reconciliation (rebuilding relationships on the ground, establishing 
national agreements between conflict parties, seeking justice, doing truth-telling or fact-
finding), exploring existing frameworks creating specific forms of ‘reconciliation’ establishes 
different connection points. 
Exploring meanings goes beyond semantics, identifying how the concept is built, what the 
structures underpinning such construction are as well as the goals for those implementing it: 
“the success of reconciliation is closely tied to its linguistic expression and the extent to 
which it reflects or challenges existing social divisions” (Little, 2011, p. 85).   Reconciliation 
is also an experience for individuals and communities, marked by encounters and emotions 
shaping the content and extent of reconciliation, illustrated as a day-to-day phenomenon.  
Studying reconciliation requires mapping out the complexities of its meaning, identifying 
points of clarity and consensus whilst pointing out areas requiring explanation (Christie, 
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Wagner and Winter, 2001), a key task for developing theories, policies, and practices for 
promoting peaceful societies.   
Research design considers the technical and everyday language of reconciliation.  
Reconciliation framed by peacebuilding priorities, projects, outcomes, and indicators looks at 
transitional justice operationalized into top-down or bottom-up projects, identifying different 
forms of implementation.   A problem faced by transitional justice, perceived as a channel for 
achieving reconciliation, is that the term ends up narrowly defined, its scope specifically 
shaped (retributive justice) and intertwined with possible narrow formulas (institution-
building).  Transitional justice initiatives aimed at establishing a national narrative and 
creating new national mythologies are often criticised for failing to affect local dynamics of 
conflict and the meaning for people on the ground (Andrieu, 2010, p.541).  Trials may end up 
being effective in countering impunity but insufficient in promoting reconciliation or 
establishing an inclusive political community.  Narrow definitions can make claims on truth 
or justice based on different meanings (retributive, reparative, rehabilitative, socioeconomic, 
etc.) potentially generating tensions, exacerbating conflict, undermining peacebuilding 
(Sriram, 2007, p. 582.).  Concerns with narrow transitional justice stem from the field’s 
legalistic origins, prioritizing a top-down process carried out through war crime tribunals with 
little regard to local dynamics (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013).  Even though transitional justice 
broadened from its legalistic origins, it still promotes a focus on breaking silences, advocating 
for retribution.  Recognizing narrow forms is vital when reconciliation is dictated externally 
via distant legal justice, creating a contentious and tense relationship between internationals 
and local victims (Garbett, 2004, p.25) Prioritizing trials to find guilty parties, combating 
impunity and re-establishing social order cannot overshadow processes for societal repair at 
the individual, family, neighbourhood and societal levels.   
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Everyday reconciliation experiences, and meanings created from worldviews of those 
expreincing it, reveal a different form.  Reconciliation understood through meanings arising 
from individual speech acts, dependent on complex horizons combining the life-worlds of 
individuals entwined with the intuitive background knowledge of participants (Komesaroff, 
2016).   In studying reconciliation, “it is in the internal, localised experiences where key 
characteristics of conflict come from” (Lederach, 1997, p. 23).  Experiences of trauma from 
adversarial pasts and everyday encounters with perceived enemies become dynamics driven 
by real-life experiences require peacebuilding to be “rooted in and responsive to the 
experiential and subjective realities shaping people’s perspective and needs…” (Lederach, 
1997, p. 24).  When understanding reconciliation, it is vital to recognize that the moral roots 
of the term imply that people will bring their own ideological bias to the subject, making 
individual definitions of the term a construction informed by people’s basic beliefs about the 
world (Hamber and Kelly, 2004).  Defining reconciliation recognizes its inextricably and 
immanently rhetorical nature, as individuals locked in conflicts employ speech to turn 
historical justifications for violence towards mutual oppositions that set the stage for civil 
disagreement and common understanding (Doxtader, 2003, p. 268). 
Emotions play an important socio-political role, influencing reconciliation.  Individual 
feelings emerge from and are constituent of social and institutional processes binding society 
together, understanding emotion as derived from social context rather than individual 
psychological conditions (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2013).  Emotions help  constitute the type 
of identity attachments binding communities together, traumatic events can pull people 
together, giving them a common purpose.  As thoughts and values are only possible via the 
meaning provided by language, then political recognition sought through reconciliation needs 
dialogue confrotning meanings and interpretations, allowing shared ways of being (Schaap, 
2004).   Thoughts, feelings, and values are possible only via meanings provided by 
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communication.  Language exists between members of a community, containing shared ways 
of being.  The value of language and communication is a social good, enjoyed in common 
with others, making it a base for the building of relationships. 
These reconciliation sources turn the nexus into a device discovering points of convergence 
and divergence present in how reconciliation is operationalized and experienced in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  By mapping meanings, reconciliation turns into a phenomenon, a process 
which entails the transformation of something (a state of mind, an event or a relationship) into 
something completely new (Doxtader, 2003), and a form of communication, a speech act that 
seeks a kind of agreement on issues (political, social, existential, ethical…) (Sobczak, 2013, 
p. 61).  The nexus links different meanings and underlying frameworks, identifying 
agreement and tension (through definitions) between actors embedded in peacebuilding 
(international actors, civil society, and citizens).  Constructing meanings through technical, 
theoretical or everyday language not only identifies where participants come from and how 
they construct meaning but also uncovers themes and ideas connecting different spheres of 
peacebuilding.  This highlights opportunities for joint understanding or further tension in 
peacebuilding, relating to the concept of ‘common meanings’: ideas and values of identifiable 
actors that show their efforts to agree among themselves and avoid steps of confrontation, as 
the creation of common meanings implies a voluntarism based on pre-existing and informal 
constructions (Williams, 2003, p. 39).  
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Operationalizing the nexus: Bosnia-Herzegovina as case study 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s peacebuilding is viewed as a case study, in-depth investigation of 
various examples of a current social phenomenon utilizing a variety of sources of data (Jupp, 
2006).  Case study design permits empirical investigation of a phenomenon within its real-life 
context via multiple sources of evidence (Robson, 1993).  Reconciliation becomes the studied 
social phenomenon and different approaches, forms of implementation and grounded 
understandings become data.  Case study requires intensive field research for data gathering, 
requiring researchers to immerse themselves in the culture of the studied group, developing 
an open-ended and exploratory research process (Goel and Singh, 1996).    
The nexus is developed in three moments: an exploratory visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
2014, establishing interviews with international officials and NGOs.  Another visit in 2015 
where I worked in a peacebuilding environment, annotating experiences regarding 
achievements, obstacles, and dynamics of NGO-based reconciliation work.  Ending in 7-
month ethnographic fieldwork, developing semi-structured interviews with international 
organizations, NGOs, and citizens, complemented by active participation in reconciliation-
orientated activities.  Case study design benefits the nexus by its holistic and embedded 
quality for its units of analysis.  For De Vause (2001) case studies consist of various 
components, turning research into the building up of the bigger picture made up of 
information gained from many levels, where the final case study tells more than what each 
constituent element can.   The bigger picture comes from connecting different meanings and 
backgrounds (trauma-healing, legalistic approaches, truth telling and fact-finding, 
cooperation, relationship-building, etc.) 
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The nexus recognizes that reconciliation cannot be observed without tackling identity issues 
and narratives upon which they are built (Auerback, 2009).  A narrative is a story; stories tell 
things that occurred or are occurring to the research subjects.  Important is recognition that 
narratives take place over a specific time, entailing ontological and epistemic choices with 
distinct ideological and political implications, often derived by metanarratives (Auerback, 
2009).  Narratives add to the critical spirit behind this work; reconciliation narratives often 
generate critiques of reconciliatory processes and greater or lesser degrees of non-
reconciliation (Little, 2011).  As such, the function of reconciliation narratives is not only 
producing accord but also opening up forms of disagreement.   
This narrative component takes a social constructivist form, seeing story telling as a process 
intrinsic in human social activity, where stories give meaning to the activities making up 
social reality (Linklater, 2007).   This is highly relevant to discussions regarding the 
misinterpretation and complicated translation of ‘reconciliation’ in the Bosnian languages, 
addressed empirically in chapter five. 
This narrative consideration forces the nexus to collect life stories of citizens who lived the 
process of post-war reconstruction.  Interviews ask about what happened in the lives of 
citizens from different backgrounds and ethnicities during the period of 1995-2016.  
Questions seek information about their education and work history, views on the political and 
socioeconomic changes occurring in that period, the way citizens experienced and understood 
the term ‘reconciliation’ in their lives and the challenges and obstacles in their personal 
development as a consequence of post-war reconstruction activities. 
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Data collection 
Two issues require attention in the nexus’ methodological framing: accessing research 
subjects and personal engagement with Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The method utilized was 
critical ethnography within peacebuilding, requiring experiencing ‘reconciliation’ to identify 
contradictions emerging from different meanings and practices.   A duality of roles was 
adopted: as a researcher seeking participant interviews, and as agent exploring reconciliation 
initiatives.    
Regarding the researcher role, accessing participants started by contacting via e-mail 
international and local organizations in BiH who stated ‘reconciliation’ as an approach to 
their work.  This study of mission/vision and values of different organizations helped 
visualize different angles and meanings on reconciliation, (legal practices, trauma-healing, 
peace education, community-building) getting me involved in forums, activities, workshops 
extending my participants’ network.  Additionally, I was involved in everyday activities and 
spaces encountering citizens: I enrolled into a language center to learn local languages, 
meeting local students who later became intervierwees, contributing to snowball sampling 
with their friends and family.  I participated in university and student-based activities (street 
demonstrations, memorial practices and student social activities) connecting with young 
people in the country, extending further my contacs within participants with little recollection 
of the war, providing insights into growing up in postwar BiH.  Sampling also meant I 
travelled throughout the country, establishing a balance between urban and rural participants, 
seeking equal distribution between participants in Republika Srpska, Brčko District and the 
Federation, and between the three main constitutive identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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As a peacebuilding actor, activities led me to research participants working in reconciliation 
(snowball sampling), and obtaining documents and reports evaluating and analyzing projects.   
This allowed me to further contact and work with different organizations giving me access to 
their staff, documents and activities.  This allowed contact with experienced individuals (local 
and international) promoting different ways of doing reconciliation, helping my identification 
of different frameworks of practice.    Fieldwork allowed me to join different NGOs in their 
work: a youth-orientated organization working on historical memory, a teacher-training 
center for peace education, an initiative for teaching mediation to high school students, 
various feminist and gender-focused organizations as well as organizations working with 
missing people and dealing with the past.   
This duality demanded self-reflexivity, making me recognize my position of power within the 
research and the type of connections made with participants.  It also made me inquire about 
how I was being perceived (as a researcher from a western university, as a potential 
peacebuilder in the country, and as a Colombian, an identity that helped me gain sympathy 
and interest of citizens for the narrative side of the nexus).  My concern with duality reflects 
Madison’s (2005) insistence on the role of the critical ethnographer as someone who engages 
in self-reflection in order not to resist domestication, making accessible voices and 
experiences of subjects whose stories would be otherwise out of reach. 
Another issue is translation and interpretation.  Throughout the research process, I sought to 
learn local languages (Bosnian-Serbian-Croatian), but considering the nature of the research 
and addressed themes, it was challenging to acquire such a high level of language proficiency 
to interview participants in their native tongue.2  My language skills allowed me to identify 
themes, using language in day-to-day needs but not to the point of having fluid conversations 
                                                          
2 It is politically contentious to state that there is one ‘Bosnian language’ in BiH.  People usually refer to the 
‘Bosnian languages’ referring to the three official and national languages of Bosnia: Bosniak, Serbian and Croat 
(Kamusella, Nomachi and Gibson,  2016 , p. 545) 
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on state-building and reconciliation.  For collecting data regarding the ‘working concept’ of 
reconciliation, translation was not needed, as international organizations and NGOs use 
English as a working language, permitting access without a problem.  The linguistic barrier 
proved at times to be a difficulty, solved through translators.  In this sense, I adhere to 
Temple and Young’s (2004) view: social constructivism as an epistemology demands that 
translators form part of the process of knowledge production, acknowledging the power 
relationships within research.  This means identifying translators as decision-makers in 
research on the cultural meanings carried by language.  During interviews requiring 
translation, I was able to find people who were bilingual and at some level involved in 
activities mentioned in the interview.  It was important to me that they could understand the 
context of research and engage in a dialogue about the interviewing/translation process in 
itself.  When requiring translation, I established an initial dialogue with translators not only 
explaining the background and logic of the research but also in making them comfortable 
with the topics part of the interview discussions (not only for the highly sensitive issues that 
could emerge but also from their ethnic positionality).  In contexts needing translation, 
translator and interviewee knew one another as colleagues or through a working connection 
between them (in one interview a beneficiary of a particular initiative served as translator).   
This facilitated a common understanding between interviewer-translator-interviewee of 
relevant terms, contexts and ideas for the interview process. 
Organization of semi-structured interviews in this research ended with ninety-one  interview 
moments: five focus groups and eighty-six individual interviews.  One hundred and four 
interviewees were approached: seven academics and researchers, thirty-seven citizens, forty-
three NGO representatives and seventeen international organizations’ representatives.   
Twelve individuals were treated anonymously as requested. 
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Data was Categorized between information from academic experts in BiH confirming ideas 
regarding theory and facts about the post-war history), information from international 
organizations (donors, international NGOs and agencies linked to the peacebuilding process), 
civil society organizations (identifying themselves as local or locally constituted) and 
citizens3.   
Data analysis 
Considering the two sets of data collection, (the implementation of reconciliation projects and 
the collection of ‘life stories’), this research differentiated between technical language and 
everyday language in interviews.  This can be appreciated in the difference between chapters 
4 and 5 of this thesis, one concentrated on the peacebuilding language that turns 
reconciliation into a series of thin/thick projects defining reconciliation and the other 
presenting a more natural, everyday language explaining how individuals experience 
reconciliation.  Separating both two chapters derived from different terminology and 
expressions in both data sets: one relied on scientific/professional terms such as trauma-
healing, reparative or retributive reconciliation, pedagogical and practical reconciliation 
amongst others.  The other was linked to emotions, talking about communication, neighbour 
relations and even resistance.   Despite differences, some connections are appreciated, 
appearing as a translation from peacebuilding technicalities to everyday expressions: for 
example, both chapters have education and youth engagement as common denominator.   
As the nexus was structured towards identifying areas of convergence and divergence in 
different interpretations, it bridged the two data sets through thematic analysis, connecting 
them through one single form of analysis, rather than mixing thematic and narrative analysis.   
Thematic analysis, as a method for identifying and analyzing patterns of meaning in a dataset, 
                                                          
3 See Annex I, interview information, pages 282-285 
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focuses on illustrating themes important in the description of the studied phenomenon (Joffe, 
2012).  Thematic analysis comprises of several steps: data collection through ethnographic 
interviews leading to the identification of patterns in transcribed conversations.  Identification 
of data related to the classified patterns, the establishment of sub-themes emerging from 
informants’ stories and that put together create a comprehensive picture of a collective 
experience, the building of a solid argument that justifies the choice of themes and 
establishment of a storyline that connects different themes into statements (Aronson, 1995). 
The reason for combining the two data sets into one form of analysis (thematic rather than 
narrative) has to do with the fact that interviews brought out many commonalities when 
identifying reconciliation obstacles.  These themes established clear connections between 
peacebuilding and the everyday contributing to one of the objectives of the nexus: seeing how 
different approaches and views bring areas of convergence.   Although thematic analysis 
identified similar problems in both datasets, they also showed how same problems are faced 
in different ways.  For instance, concern with ethnopolitics is an issue shared by interviewees 
in both datasets.  However, for internationals and NGOs this has to do with barriers to 
projects and their relation with political actors, whereas for citizens, this same issue is 
expressed as concerns with employment, social stability and barriers to personal 
development.  In this sense, thematic analysis helped identify common problems, but in 
exploring themes and how they are described by the datasets, it established the divergence 
and impact of such differences.  This emerges in discussions about legitimacy and views 
between dataset participants, at the end of chapter 6. 
For one dataset, data collection identified the sources from where specific organizational and 
project-specific definitions of reconciliation come from (legalistic, psychosocial, conflict 
transformation, economy literature).   Interviews explored the technical language that defined 
reconciliation into projects, formats, indicators and outcomes.  These types of interviews were 
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based on publications created by organizations themselves, many seeking local outreach.  
Analysis focused on how different organizations within a specific practice of reconciliation 
expressed a method for doing their work, identified common challenges and portrayed a 
specific ‘field’ in peacebuilding.  These interviews focused on the rationale for reconciliation 
projects, looking at their history (expressed in the mission, vision, and values within an 
organization) and identification of achievements and obstacles in the development of projects.  
Data reflected technical, academic and practitioner-based sources for understanding 
reconciliation, their trajectory as peacebuilding projects and an assessment from interviewees 
of what is the state of reconciliation, taking into account all previous elements. 
The other dataset’s interviews asked participants about memories of life after Dayton.  It 
gathered stories dealing with ethnic identification, of experiences within education promoting 
or inhibiting reconciliation, of the challenges in society, the political system and the economy 
to reconciliation and evaluation of the most important issues and events in the eyes of 
interviewees affecting post-war interethnic relations.  Participants were asked for their 
opinions of the type of organizations making part of the other part of the research, about their 
legitimacy, perceptions and relations between citizens, NGOs, and international 
organizations.   
Communication between the two approaches is mediated by thematic analysis, identifying 
common themes emerging between the two processes, enabling an interpretative dialogue 
between forms of reconciliation embedded in projects and initiatives in peacebuilding and 
those identified as everyday experiences.  This dialogue serves as the basis for establishing 
the connections between projects and experiences, between frameworks and memories, and 
between a wide array of interpretations of reconciliation dispersed in the spectrum of thick 
and thin.  Such connections and oppositions present areas of convergence and divergence, 
illustrating where state-building work on transitional justice and understandings of 
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reconciliation encounter engagement opportunities.  The nexus allows for sketching debates 
on reconciliation, mapping the complexities of meaning, identifying points of clarity and 
consensus and sketching areas that require further explanation (De la Rey, 2001, p.1).  
Through perceptions of locals and internationals around truth, justice, and reconciliation, 
peacebuilding can be observed, not as a formula but as a day-to-day reality.  The nexus 
focuses on constructions of reconciliation by different actors and the alternative spaces this 
creates, avoiding divisions of top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding.  It looks for common 
spaces between international and local and the various versions of peace emerging from these 
connections.  This helps open up the peace research agenda, giving room to voices of dissent 
about dominant peace models and investigating the potential for alternative coexisting forms 
(Richmond, 2007).    
Epistemology, positionality and research journey 
The study’s reflects a post-positivist stance regarding social research, accepting that 
knowledge is cultural and adopts many forms.  As qualitative research places importance on 
the validity of multiple meaning structures, investigation rests upon recognizing the 
importance of the subjective, experiential lifeworld of human beings, establishing avenues 
leading to the discovery of deep layers of meaning (Burns, 2000).  The thesis accepts basic 
premises of post-positivist methodology:  knowledge is subjective and value-laden, data is 
dependent on the relationship between researcher and researched, research should favor 
naturalistic research avoiding manipulating either setting or subjects or putting the data into 
pre-defined categories, knowledge perceived as subjective, holistic and not based on a cause 
and effect logic, acceptance that scientific methods are social constructs (Guthrie, 2010). 
The epistemological convictions guiding this recognize constructivism’s iterative, interactive, 
hermeneutic and open nature.  By accepting that knowledge is subjective and that a single 
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reality is replaced by intersubjective competing worlds of knowledge, the investigation treats 
worldviews as mediated by different social identities that characterize society and reflect 
different levels of social power (Holland and Campbell, 2005).  This admits that both 
researcher and researched are actively engaged in the construction of their world, accepting 
that there will always be different ways of seeing things and a range of interpretations can 
always be made (Harper and Marcus, 2003). 
This research seeks to gain a comprehensive understanding of reconciliation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, taking as a departure point the establishment of the Dayton Peace Agreement as 
an indicator of a post-conflict stage.  As a researcher this demanded active participation in the 
life of those being researched, trying to know those involved in the process of peacebuilding, 
their values, beliefs and emotions (Nachmias, Nachmias and DeWaard, 2014).  Central is 
recognition of field research as main strategy for data collection, understood as the study of 
people acting in the natural courses of their daily lives.   Fieldwork is expressed engagement 
as a researcher in critical ethnographic practice, studying Bosnia-Herzegovina as a natural 
setting for observing reconciliation, and as a practitioner in reconciliation initiatives.  
Both modes demand explanation of my position as a social researcher and my interest in 
reconciliation.  My research is framed by academic interests in conflict resolution and peace 
studies within International Relations, particularly with the study of post-conflict settings and 
how different activities are deployed to support sustainable peace, avoiding re-emergence of 
violence.  My training in political science, international relations and conflict, security, and 
development studies have led to an academic interest in peace processes and interventions, 
taking my research into the Western Balkans, particularly Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
This interest came out of academic and personal curiosity surrounding processes for ending 
violent conflict and the emerging challenges after signing a peace agreement.  This is marked 
by the fact that I was raised and professionally trained in Colombia during times of intense 
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armed conflict, putting me at centre-stage of complex human rights dilemmas regarding truth, 
justice, reconciliation, rehabilitation and the possibilities for action in a prospective post-
conflict scenario.  My area interest in the Western Balkans began as curiosity with how 
transitional justice was developed as a field of practice and academic concept, constantly 
encountering Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina as case studies on transitional justice’s 
complexities.  The personal and academic observation of post-conflict peacebuilding in this 
region of the world has led to asking questions about barriers emerging within international 
intervention, state-building and peacebuilding in divided societies emerging from war, 
placing me as an academic observer of Balkan experiences. 
More profound are my personal reasons.  As Colombian, I was exposed to wartime realities 
and experiences, marking my curiosity and interest in life during war and the difficulties 
societies face when enduring armed conflict.   I lived the 1980’s drug wars, the 1990’s move 
from cartels to escalating guerrilla warfare, and various (failed) attempts at peace negotiations 
in the 1990’s and early 2000’s.  While writing this thesis, Colombia achieved a landmark in 
its violent history: the signing of a peace agreement between FARC-EP and the Colombian 
government, an issue that constantly made me contrast the Balkans experience with the 
realities of the Colombian conflict. Witnessing degradation of conflict in Colombia, sparked 
my interest in political science and international relations, influencing my decision to work 
and study in the field of human rights and conflict resolution.  
Additionally, I am a victim of violent conflict, particularly affected by the phenomenon of 
forced disappearance in the midst of Colombia’s war on drugs.   My father was forcefully 
taken from me when I was sixteen years old, a turning point in my life that ignited a curiosity 
with the dynamics of violence in armed conflicts and with the limits and possibilities that 
victims have within peacebuilding.  These difficult circumstances have turned this academic 
project into a personal one, an exercise in personal trauma-healing, seeking to connect and 
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understand how people deal with human rights violations, injustice and how they move 
forward amidst painful and challenging circumstances.  I personally wanted to meet people 
facing the difficulties of the Bosnian war and its atrocities, how they coped with them, their 
resilience and the processes to move away from victimhood and into empowerment (as active 
citizens, survivors, and story-tellers).  To gain personal learnings from this process, I 
immersed into civil society work, participating in victim-centred events, meeting many 
individuals whose stories, trajectories and experiences contributed to this research.  The 
choice for taking an ethnographic stance derives from the need to personally experience the 
dilemmas, advantages and challenges of reconciliation work in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I have 
no ties to the country other than personal and professional interests in its study, yet with an 
underlying need to establish connections with survivors and those devoted to supporting 
reconciliation.   
These motivations guided my ethnographic fieldwork, leading me to accompanying NGOs 
devoted to truth telling, trauma-healing, and reconciliation-promoting work.   Also, 
connecting with citizens, as active listener of their narratives, concerns, and expectations, 
learning from their experiences to make sense of their traumas and needs.   The journey began 
in 2014, with a one-month field visit, meeting and interviewing NGO and International 
organization representatives, asking about their work, what they found challenging and 
getting a feel for the field of transitional justice and reconciliation.  This served as an initial 
guide for doing field research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, creating categories regarding 
transitional justice work: working with retributive justice processes, working in political and 
social advocacy for transitional justice and various approaches to memorialization and 
remembrance.  What was clear from this visit was the need to participate in reconciliation-
focused work, to understand the challenges and aims of organizations dedicated to projects 
that sought the rebuilding of relations within society. 
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The second visit in 2015 led to an internship with the Centar Za Izgradnju Mira (Center for 
Peacebuilding) in Sanski Most, Northwest BiH.  Through this I was able to experience the 
work of an NGO dedicated to reconciliation, talk to local citizens regarding their experiences 
with the organization, listen to their stories and participate in the organization of what I 
consider to be community-building work.  I helped organize an IFTAR dinner for the Bosniak 
community, supported the establishment of youth art projects geared towards building work 
skills for students in the area and giving workshops for my colleagues in areas that required 
training.  This experience helped gain insight into the rural life of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about 
the concerns that this community had (youth unemployment, the distancing relations with 
nearby Bosnian-Serb towns) and the everyday problems of NGO work (fundraising concerns, 
the distance between rural, more local organizations and the more professional. urban ones).  
By connecting with local citizens, this visit helped me understand the importance that ‘life 
stories’ played in establishing the nexus. 
The third experience, forming the core ethnographic experience for this study, is the seven-
month fieldwork conducted between April and November 2016.   Its focus was to conduct 
semi-structured interviews with international organizations and NGOs dedicated to 
‘reconciliation’ and ‘peacebuilding’ as stated in their mission, vision, and objectives.  It also 
required collecting reconciliation stories from citizens living in The Federation of BiH, 
Republika Srpska, and the Brĉko District, seeking knowledge of what life was like after the 
war, the advances and challenges in peacebuilding and what they thought were the main 
obstacles to achieving reconciliation in the country.  And to continue my experiential journey 
into transitional justice, actively participating in the work of international organizations and 
NGOs.   
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This last aim supported my snowball sampling as I was actively participating in talks, 
workshops, and seminars with practitioners in the field: a six-month internship with the Post-
Conflict Research Center, doing publications and field visits in support of activities for 
remembrance and memorialization.  Here I participated in visits to organizations such as the 
OSCE, the ICTY-Outreach office, the BiH State Court and the International Commission for 
Missing Persons.  I worked as a mediation trainer for the Nansen Dialogue Center Prijedor as 
well as the United World College (Mostar), delivering workshops for teachers and students 
engaged in peace education.  I participated in memorialization visits by the Association for 
Social Research and Communications, meeting victims and organizing memorial trips to 
areas known for genocide denial.  I supported the International Commission for Missing 
Persons in the commemoration of the day of the Missing, meeting citizens and raising 
awareness of the problems of enforced disappearances in BiH.  I again supported the Center 
for Peacebuilding Sanski Most in their 2016 Iftar dinner, participating in community-
building.  I worked as a local reporter for the Sarajevo film festival, focusing exclusively on 
the festival’s ‘Dealing with the Past’ segment, often interviewing film-makers devoted to 
transitional justice issues.  Finally, I participated in the OSCE’s youth training in security and 
defense policy, where I had the chance to visit and talk to staff connected to the Defense 
sector in Republika Srpska as well as join students from various universities in their training 
on combating extremism and terrorism in BiH. 
Highlighted from this journey is an attempt at comprehensive engagement with reconciliation 
practices.  The fieldwork focus was to participate in events encompassing different ways of 
engaging with truth, justice and reconciliation processes in order to experience the 
frameworks, processes, and outcomes of projects surrounding reconciliation.  Such a wide 
array of experiences allowed me to meet people from different backgrounds, ages, and 
experiences, contributing particularly to the search for life stories of reconciliation.   
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Reflecting back, adopting the role of practitioner in the field of reconciliation as part of the 
ethnography, permitted a useful approach to different forms of non-academic literature, 
(policy/think-tank/reflective accounts), of participants and of dynamics that helped visualize 
different modes of doing reconciliation.  Although this duality of roles 
(researcher/practitioner) forced a rethinking of positionality and participant access, it 
strenghtened this process by allowing an understanding of different ways of meaning 
construction, even those diametrically opposed to my academic framing.  This was not 
without problems, when engaging in memorialization practices I often faced local resistance, 
questioning my presence as an international in Bosnia-Herzegovina, leading to concerns 
about Bosnia’s research fatigue and whether there was anything innovative from my 
engagement. 
Although provisions were established for dealing with the language barrier, this research 
could have benefitted more from further exploration of different towns and more remote areas 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The design and planning of this research initially focused on 
balancing and maximizing representation of all three constitutive people in BiH, but this 
proved to be not as important as a better balancing between urban and rural settings.   With 
this in mind, the research did attempt at contacting participants in remote areas with some 
degree of success, yet as I adopted the role of an international practitioner as part of the 
research this took me mostly to urban centers and small cities rather than the more remote 
areas of the country.  This second role led to accessing more educated, liberal-minded citizens 
whose voice became prominent in the analysis and findings of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 - STATE-BUILDING AND TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: A CRITICAL 
ACCOUNT 
Introduction 
The following chapter describes post-conflict peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), 
critically commenting on reconciliation barriers emerging in such process.  Starting with 
state-building, this section looks at how state architecture established in the Dayton 
Agreement affected the development of a political system, supporting ethnically dividing 
structures, strengthening ethnopolitics that contested liberal peace formulations and the 
legitimacy of international state-builders.  It follows with an account of transitional justice, 
focusing on the role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
as a guiding international model, the externally driven insistence on retributive justice and the 
various obstacles arising from the development of judiciary institutions and attempts at non-
judicial initiatives, processes strongly influenced by international assistance. 
State-building: From Dayton’s consociationalism to the EU member-state-building 
By describing BiH’s state-building, this section analyses the impact of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA) on the political reconstruction process in BiH: its reliance on an external 
consociational framework for state-building and the creation of a complex, multi-layered 
political system that permitted the continuation of ethnopolitical practices, corruption and 
stagnation.  Discussing the institutionalisation focus adopted by international intervention 
permits critical analysis of Bosnia’s semi-protectorate status and the problems derived from 
the strengthening of the powers of the international community as well as the contestation of 
intervention by political elites in the country.  It ends looking at the change in approaches 
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from the OHR ‘imposition’ approach to the EU ‘local ownership’ approach, discussing 
problems derived from a technical and depoliticised form of state-building.   
Dayton: ending war, complicating peace? 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the Bosnian war, inscribing the components of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s (BiH) state-building.  Amongst Dayton’s achievements, it is worth 
highlighting putting stop to the bloodshed, creating conditions for life to return to normality, 
the establishment of several sets of municipal and national elections and integration of BiH’s 
three armies into a single multi-ethnic Bosnian army (McMahon and Western, 2009, p.72).  
Dayton provided a high level of internal security, facilitating a widespread return of refugees 
and displaced persons.  Dayton was negotiated by nationalist parties involved in the war, 
securing power as ethnically based political parties (Chandler, 2006a).  The war gave rise to 
power structures within each ethnic group, whose interests opposed to normalizing the 
political life of the state (Cox, 2001).  During Dayton’s talks, three nationalist parties 
represented these power structures: the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Croat 
Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), all insisting on regional 
autonomy.  Parties with formal ownership to Dayton had little to say over it; the DPA was 
externally managed driven by an external agenda, affecting the unfolding state-building 
process (Chandler, 2006b).   
Dayton’s wording describes a complex state architecture through a consociational formula, 
dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnic structures.   Consociationalism, a model for 
managing conflict in divided societies, focuses on two stipulations: power-sharing and 
territorial governance (Yakinthou and Wolff, 2012).  These complement each other by giving 
potentially separatist groups a stake in politics at the centre, lowering the contentiousness of 
politics by allowing groups to govern themselves, particularly in policy areas they consider 
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essential for group self-preservation (Yakinthou and Wolff, 2012, p. 4).  This approach 
prioritizes identities emerging as predominant from democratic elections.  An experiment in 
transformative conflict settlements, Dayton assumed that established institutional 
arrangements would enable conflicting parties to transform conflict via peaceful, political and 
democratic means (Weller and Wolff, 2006).  Consociationalism relies on institutional 
prescriptions for divided societies focused on collective rather than individual rights (Rose, 
2006).  Its objective was establishing broad agreement across ethnic groups, differing from 
the majoritarian mechanisms typical of non-consociational democracies.  Dayton’s Annex 4 
(the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina) established a federal state comprised of two 
entities: Republika Srpska (RS) mostly Serb-inhabited, and the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (FBiH) predominantly inhabited by Bosniak and Croat populations.  This 
second entity was further divided into ten cantons, eight of which are dominated by one of 
two ethnic groups (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2006).  The constitution established a tripartite 
power-sharing system at the central state, ensuring inclusion of all ethnonational groups in the 
political system, preventing decisions being made by just one group.  Veto mechanisms were 
established against decisions believed to put at risk any of the three main constituent group’s 
national interests, (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2006).  Decentralization and power-sharing, main 
principles of consociationalism, allowed each entity to have its own government, police force 
and educational system; within the federation, power is further decentralized to ensure that 
Muslims and Croats are able to rule themselves.  To prevent one group from dominating, 
quotas were adopted in national institutions (McMahon and Western, 2009, p.73).  Dayton’s 
consociational formula (inclusive of ethnic veto points and ethnic, territorial and institutional 
divisions) emerges from a primordial conflict understanding by international actors where 
three ethnic groups pursued war, an interpretation that turned ethnic identity in BiH into 
contingent and variable (Pinkerton, 2016).  This prioritized ethnic identities, institutionalizing 
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ethnic divisions into BiH state structures, leading to ethnopolitical parties maintaining 
dominance in the system despite lack of accountability and failures in governance.  Dayton 
established a  
“System that functions on the principle of allocation of (unequal power) according 
to ethnicity and thus administrative decisions. What was supposed to be 
decentralization of the state, ended up creating further political and social 
cleavages between the former warring sides” (Ĉustović, 2014, p. 1.) 
Dayton is criticised for its external nature, inscribing ethnic divisions, impeding reconciliation 
and establishing excessively bureaucratic structures.  As the government is ethnically divided, 
the convergence of similar policies between parties is severely restrained; absence of political 
will from all sides to work together led to perpetual stagnation of a slow decision-making 
process (Parent, 2016, p. 515).   Dayton’s structure breeds corruption, weakens political 
moderates and stunts economic growth: every public office is allotted according to an ethnic 
quota, a spoils system that has permitted extensive patronage networks, corruption, and 
inefficiencies (McMahon and Western, 2009, p.73).  Governance institutions appeared unable 
to function from the start; elite cooperation took a long-time and excessive executive 
representation of the three main constituent ethnic groups led to an ineffective and excessive 
state apparatus (Weller and Wolff, 2006).   Consociationalism enables political dysfunction, 
helping cement the war’s ethno-nationalist chaos, its tendency towards social exclusion and 
exclusive ethno-nationalist power sharing.  Ethnic self-rule was emphasized at the expense of 
shared rule in post-war BiH, questioning the viability of a common state for several years 
(Recchia, 2007, p. 8).  
 This precipitated BiH’s ongoing socioeconomic crisis, limiting avenues for citizens to 
exercise political agency.  Political clientelism, created through party affiliation, is often the 
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only employment avenue, and as membership is paid through ethnonational identification, 
ethnopolitics became the only politics in post-Dayton BiH (Majstorović et al, 2015, p. 662).    
This was reflected in the views of some of my interviewees.  Practitioner Djana Pegić blames 
Dayton for creating barriers for projects as a result from excessive layers of government in 
the country:  
“We are divided into so many cantons and this is a nightmare.  We are doing this 
project with UNICEF in the Federation and RS but it is so exhausting to do 
paperwork, organizing talks and meetings with local authorities.  Cantons are like 
little countries and have nothing to do with the Federation: they are completely 
independent.  You have to do everything as if it was a different country.”4   
Similarly, youth worker Maja Kapo expresses:  
“This is the problem, so much paperwork, so much administration.  The problem 
with the state organization is that everyone is trying to cheat on you and the only 
way to stop them is to threaten them with lawsuits, only then they will stop.  It 
works the same with issues of pensions and health, suing definitely works here.”5  
 Hronešova (2016) comments that a common reparative strategy that victims in BiH have 
chosen is litigation before domestic, regional and international courts, something more 
effective than social mobilization.  In BiH, the state system created a deadlock for future 
transformation of an ethnically divided public sphere, where change is dependent on the 
agreement of all constituent nations of the country, something that is highly unlikely 
(Kappler, 2013, p. 12.)   Power sharing in ethnically representative institutions has become 
dysfunctional: negative consensus has prevailed, Parliament and Presidency constantly 
blocked along ethnic lines, impeding decision-making (Marko, 2006).  Ethnic 
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homogenisation became the rule, affecting minority returns, the establishment of a post-war 
education system and the composition of executive and judiciary branches within the entities: 
no “Non-Serbs” were represented in government, judiciary and police in RS during the early 
years and no Serbs were incorporated into Federation structures (Marko, 2006). 
Although Dayton hinted at a state-building process that could give space to a multi-ethnic, 
cooperative Bosnia, its state dispositions enabled ethnically based political agendas contrary 
to the agreement.  The Bosniak state-building priority was establishing a strong central state, 
being the largest ethnic group in BiH, Bosnian-Serb agendas moved from complete rejection 
of Dayton to fierce protection of Republika Srpska (RS) as a Serb entity.  Bosnian-Croat 
agendas depended on geographical location: Croats living in multi-ethnic areas of Central 
Bosnia seemed to be moderate, supportive of the Federation whereas those living in more 
ethnically homogeneous areas tended to denounce the inexistence of a Croat entity as 
Dayton’s failure (Keranen, 2013).   After the war, ethnically homogeneous territories (cantons 
and entities) had greater legitimacy and power than the state, as excessive divisions of 
competencies between various layers of government and the dominance of entities reduced 
incentives for committing to the state (Bieber, 2006, p.21).  Central state institutions became 
a threat to authorities in RS but vital to Bosniak interests in the Federation.  Linking veto 
rights with decentralization made BiH’s institutional setup problematic: power-sharing was 
assumed on the premise that all communities consent to major decisions by the State, but was 
impeded by constant threat and use of veto powers, pre-empting decisions from being taken, 
blocking the work of national-level institutions (Bieber, 2006, p.21).   Political power in 
Bosnia was not dependent on formal constitutional authority but on the control of political 
parties, directed against (ethnic) political opponents (Cox, 2001).  Main political actors had 
no incentives to submit to institutions they could not control, localising political authority and 
95 
 
weakening central structures.  Edvin Cudik, a Sarajevan practitioner facing administrative 
harassment for his memorialization work, identified such localisation of power:  
“We constantly have problems with municipalities who do not respond to us.  
They know who I am; I used to be a soldier.  The municipality once said ‘I will 
not give any chetniks any information or anything about memorials; you look Serb 
like the chetniks.  In other cases they referred to us as vlah, this is a Turkish name 
which is offensive and it refers to Serbs in Ottoman time, it is a very insulting 
term for us.”6   
What allowed such fragile state to survive was the NATO presence in BiH, providing 
effective security (Weller and Wolff, 2006).  Although legislative advances occurred during 
early years (custom agreements, security services, institutional reforms) they were less 
example of local communities taking ownership over Dayton and more a result from 
international intervention (Weller and Wolff, 2006).  
International institution-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Another Dayton legacy was the structuring of an international peacebuilding operation for 
post-conflict reconstruction, focused primarily on state institution-building.  Dayton led to 
parties agreeing to a massive state-building project including the OSCE (electoral programs), 
the UNHCR (minority and refugee returns programs), an International Police Task Force led 
by the U.N. and the creation of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to coordinate 
activities and organizations involved in the civilian implementation of the agreement (Sloan, 
1998).  Not only was the international community involved in technical tasks (demining, 
elections or demobilization processes) but also in creating democratic institutions, promoting 
human rights, refugee returns and capturing war criminals (Keranen, 2013).  International 
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agencies involved in BiH state-building, despite having different approaches, contributed to 
the view of Bosnia remaining as a single state and its pre-war multi-ethnic character was to be 
restored.  This was projected via the idea of the DPA’s irreversibility, directing the 
involvement of the OHR and the international community as a whole (Keranen, 2013).  
Therefore, all local actions deemed challenging of international state-building were 
interpreted as Anti-Dayton in nature, issues to tackle in BiH. 
Defence of a democratic, market-orientated (liberal) peace relied on institution-building, 
assuming that institutional engineering by external actors could build western state models 
and norms.  This Bosnian experiment meant moving from a point of conflict (the war 
experience) towards an envisioned future of security, political stability and socioeconomic 
prosperity to be reached (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2006).   Moving from one end to the other 
meant focusing on institutional evolution as the core task of intervention.  This was an 
externally induced process, where some institutions from the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were domesticated and located in the Federation or the central state (Bieber, 
2006, p.18).  Right from the start, ethnic state-building agendas took hold in BiH: The 
Bosniak Party of Democratic Action dominated the central state administration whereas 
Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Serb nationalist parties minimally invested in the Bosnian state, 
keeping entities and cantons strong.  
The lack of support and reliance on ethnopolitics by nationalist political leadership led to 
prolonging international supervision of the OHR, turning Bosnia into an informal 
international trusteeship.  Extension of transitional international administration began after 
1997 elections resulted in the triumph of nationalist-orientated political parties (Chandler, 
2006a).  The justification was strict reliance of the international community on the wording of 
Dayton, which had become rigid in terms of self-rule but highly flexible in relation to the 
powers of the international community.  Flexibility was evidenced in the extension of OHR 
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power: in 1996, the Florence ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 
discussed the extension of international involvement for a two-year stabilization period.  The 
Paris meeting of the PIC in late 96 ratified this decision, demanding the OHR to create two 
yearly action plans, reinforcing its powers to make recommendations to state and entity 
authorities in cases of dispute.  Then, during the 1997 Bonn summit the OHR was 
increasingly fortified:  the establishment of the OHR’s Bonn Powers meant that the High 
Representative was able to impose legislation that could go against the wishes of elected 
bodies, allowing the OHR to dismiss elected representatives and government officials deemed 
as obstructing the Dayton agreement (Chandler, 2006c).   
The Bonn powers became a landmark in OHR strengthening and contestation against 
international presence (mainly the OHR) in the country.   They appeared as the logical effect 
of the merger between conflict management and economic reform as well as the growth of 
international political discourses about ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ seeking a legal political 
orientation for an increasingly interventionist climate (Sabaratnam, 2011, p.9).   Introducing 
Bonn powers shifted the equation of international presence, favoring civilian efforts, bringing 
the country closer to a protectorate status (Lemay-Hebert and Kappler, 2016, p.12).  These 
powers sought a weakening of ethno-nationalist elites by intervening agencies, leading to the 
dismantling of illegal financing channels, reform of local military and police and 
advancement in structural reforms in public administration ad judiciaries (Bliesemann de 
Guevara, 2006).  Enforcing Bonn powers made local politicians unaccountable, withdrawing 
from any responsibility to their constituencies, leading to opportunistic stances promoting 
nationalist ideals that spoke to their supporters (Dobbins et. al, 2008).  The OHR’s gradual 
evolution into a protectorate led to higher contestation from leadership in Republika Srpska 
(Cox, 2001).   
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The OHR began imposing laws on media and legislature reform, property rights and 
implementation of a common currency, inhibiting local ownership of institutions, having 
distorted effects in the political development of BiH.  A human rights representative 
illustrates this:  
“…we had the OHR with the power to implement every law, its powers as a 
protectorate, one that was never officially recognized here, nobody called it as 
such.  Having a protectorate meant having a plan and presenting results, but they 
were in power to do as they wanted but at the same time they do not want any 
responsibility acceptance.”7  
 As the international community intensified intervention, this triggered fears among Bosnian-
Serbs and Bosnian Croats that peace implementation would strengthen the capacity of 
Bosniaks to impose their will on the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Fischer, 2016, p.5), leading 
nationalist forces in the two communities to constantly challenge the foundations of the 
Bosnian state.   
EU power transfer: a new (problematic) era in state-building 
The extension of OHR’s mandate and the establishment of the Bonn powers created a conflict 
between international interveners and local political elites, ushering in an era of changes 
towards an “EU-member-state-building” approach favoring “local ownership”, marking a 
difference from the more imposition-based OHR approach.  This new phase saw a dramatic 
reduction in international involvement, a diminished role for the OHR in Bosnian politics 
with the idea that international influence should be exercised through the more indirect EU 
accession process (Majstorović et al, 2015, p. 664).   This period saw an increase in power of 
ethno-nationalist parties and sharpening of rhetoric designed to keep the population divided 
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and fearful of ethnic others. Two events illustrate the backlash and distancing between 
internationals and local elites, particularly in RS: The OHR dismissal of hard-line RS 
President Nikola Poplasen in 1999 and the establishment in 2000 of Brčko as a special district 
in Bosnia managed by the international administration and independent from Dayton’s 
entities.  Both events led to disapproval by the government of RS and its constituencies of the 
role of the OHR (Keranen, 2013).   Poplasen’s dismissal was denounced unconstitutional by 
the RS National Assembly whereas the decision to turn Brĉko into an internationally 
supervised district was received with disillusionment by Bosnian-Serb leaders who had 
worked with the international community in introducing multi-ethnic policing and local 
administration.  This tension reached new levels when the OHR linked police reform with the 
process of EU integration, which was accompanied by processes for decentralizing the state 
as a way of disciplining Bosnian-Serb leadership.  The outcome was delayed agreement in 
police reform due to boycotts and mass demonstrations in Banja Luka and the rest of RS 
against OHR power, marking the beginning of the decline of OHR authority.  Sretčko Latal, a 
well-known civil society practitioner, explained:  
“The point of mistake was the demand for police reform affecting Serbs and 
Croats.  At that time, after some successful reforms, the next big thing was police 
reform.  The OHR through Ashdown persuaded the EU to put police reform as 
conditionality for accession.  At this point, the Serbs said no, it was a challenge.  
They were already engaging with the Srebrenica Commission [recognizing 
genocide victims] so the police reform was seen as too much, ‘this is not a part of 
Dayton’ they insisted.  It is at this point where we started losing the Serbs.”8 
Gradual handover of power from the OHR to the European Union (EU) began in 1999, later 
formalized in 2002.  This process was characterized by EU distancing from using 
                                                          
8 Interview, 27-04-2016 
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administrative powers by the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) who would 
later become head of the OHR, and a shift to informal mechanisms for Europeanisation of the 
Bosnian institutional framework (Chandler, 2006b).   It is visible in the EU’s own assessment, 
their desire to avoid ‘imposition’, moving towards ‘local ownership’: 
‘EU conditionality has begun to facilitate a relatively smooth transition 
beyond international trusteeship in BiH, once the HR/EUSR started to 
communicate it assertively and it was clearly linked to the perspective of EU 
membership. The recent shift towards more effective domestic decision-
making thanks to the ‘pull factor’ of European integration has made it 
possible to progressively phase out the OHR’s controversial ‘Bonn 
powers’… EU peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina [sees] 
effectiveness as a tool for fostering viable public institutions in BiH and for 
providing assistance in ways that develop rather than undermine domestic 
capacity’ (Recchia, 2007, p.28) 
 Regulation mechanisms moved from the Peace Implementation Council to the EU, making 
Dayton subordinate to the requirements of eventual EU membership of BiH.  An expansive 
EU role in BiH emerged since 2000: in 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 
was established, and in 2004, the European Union Military Force (EUFOR) was deployed, 
replacing NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2006).   The EU 
mission focused on providing support for the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) 
facilitating institution-building towards harmonization with EU standards towards accession.  
The launch of SAP in 2000 meant intensive engagement by the EU in BiH as the prospect of 
future membership constituted a shift in EU strategy in Bosnia, seeking to restore the EU’s 
reputation after its failure to stop the war (Juncos, 2012). 
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EU-Member state-building required a more technocratic approach, focused on accession 
criteria and EU standards, avoiding a political stance in BiH and relying on “local ownership” 
as a guide for intervention.  Ownership increasingly became central to the EU’s engagement 
in BiH.  The need to close the OHR office as a condition for EU membership made clear that 
the EU wanted to take less responsibility for Bosnia’s political destiny and to include BiH as 
member-state (Lemay-Hebert and Kappler, 2016, p.12).  This was another engagement with 
the liberal peace, an EU attempt at becoming a homogeneous actor in Bosnian peacebuilding 
with an ambition to unify BiH, looking for a single interlocutor to negotiate with rather than 
with many representatives from different levels of governance (Kappler and Richmond, 
2011).  EU engagement relied on “local ownership”, a key challenge in Bosnia’s 
reconstruction and one that many agencies explicitly refer to (Lemay-Hebert and Kappler, 
2016, p.12).  The ‘lack of ownership’ points to the need for cooperation with local authorities 
and population, a political process that should spill from politics to other social elements.  For 
the EU, ownership referred to making politicians responsible for their own actions, making 
state-building a process of knowledge transfer from EU to local partners (Lemay-Hebert and 
Kappler, 2016, p.13).  Local ownership represented an expectation from international actors 
of local elites to accept and implement peacebuilding reforms conceptualized and controlled 
by outsiders (Parent, 2016, p. 514).  Policies on democratization and reconciliation became 
EU devices for claiming legitimacy rather than imposition.  Junco (2012) deems contradictory 
the EU’s demand for compliance and the promotion of local ownership.  The EU engaged 
only with political elites, leaders of nationalist parties, yet genuine engagement with citizens 
rarely took place, as most had been done via the NGO-based civil society.  EU’s interaction 
with local populations was rather limited, evidenced in a late acknowledgment of the need for 
public outreach to inform people of the work done in BiH (Kappler, 2012, p.619).  There may 
have been a dialogue between EU and Bosnia to identify priorities in the partnership process, 
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but the pace of the reform was non-negotiable and the content given by the need to comply 
with EU criteria and its own objectives and not by local interests. 
Distancing between EU and political elites is visible in the 2006 failure of the April package 
for BiH Constitutional Reforms.  Reforming Dayton was identified as a necessary step 
towards EU partnership, generating divisions between local political elites.   The reform 
package included strengthening the Council of Ministers and creation of two new state 
ministries (agricultural policy and science, technology and environment).  Entities would 
retain their place in the constitution but the Council of Ministers would be allowed to 
negotiate, adopt and implement all measures for compliance requirements set out in the 
European integration process (Belloni, 2009).  The aim was improving institutional capacity, 
state efficiency through speedier decision-making and solving the problem of exclusion from 
the political representation of citizens not belonging to the three constituent peoples.  In April 
2006, the House of Representatives rejected the constitutional package.  Bosniak and 
Bosnian-Croat representatives insisted on eliminating the entity-based state structure and 
entity voting, mostly prompted by concerns over the upcoming general elections in October 
of that year (Juncos, 2012).   International efforts failed as both EU and US suggested quick 
fix-solutions to the parties, mediators had little to offer in exchange for reform as well as the 
sense of emergency created by international actors was not enough to coerce nationalist 
leaders into accepting the reforms package.  (Bieber, 2010).  The success of EU 
peacebuilding is limited, evidenced in lack of progress regarding accession and a constant 
stalemate between the EU and its SAP partners (Kappler and Richmond, 2011).  In response 
to Europe’s peacebuilding framework, local peacebuilding agency was expressed as 
resistance constantly reclaiming the state from external interests, evidenced in processes like 
the April reforms failure.   It was hoped that the EU would find a middle way to ensure the 
transformation of political affairs of BiH (and being less imposing than the OHR).  This 
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approach failed as EU popularity declined as people realized that EU-sponsored changes were 
not significantly improving their lives, contributing to a reduction of people’s trust in the 
public sphere and frustration in the political dynamics within it (Kappler, 2013, p. 15).   This 
has led to an awareness, in the BiH public as well as the international community that the EU 
is not prepared to intervene as much as the OHR does, in turn leading to a positive appraisal 
of the OHR (for the Bosniak population) when contrasted with the non-intervening EU. 
Transitional justice: from the ICTY’s retributive focus to a ‘distant’ approach to 
addressing the past  
This critical account of transitional justice in BiH focuses on how establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as a perpetrator-focused 
mechanism for dealing with past atrocities, became a guiding model for transitional justice in 
the country.  An externally driven insistence on retributive justice disconnected from victims 
and local understandings of justice, becoming an obstacle for other efforts such as the 
development of judiciary institutions and non-judicial initiatives led by civil society 
organizations, all processes influenced by the view from international organizations. 
Establishing justice: (distantly) creating the ICTY 
Transitional justice, dealing with past atrocities, was externally brought to Bosnia-
Herzegovina via the ad-hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), following resolution 827 by the United Nations Security Council.  The ICTY was 
established to help end wars in the Balkans, facilitating reconciliation, assuming that 
condemning ethnic prosecution and insisting on individual accountability for crimes, 
transitional justice would transcend identity politics, advancing to a liberal order (Skaar, 
2013). 
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The ICTY became a cornerstone for transitional justice, an experiment on dealing with 
justice, truth and reconciliation.  Its establishment in 1993, during the height of the Bosnian 
war, follows a western policy preference for legalized accountability in dealing with the past, 
particularly investigation and prosecution of war crimes and finding missing persons 
(Obradović-Wochnik, 2013, Fischer, 2016).  As an international criminal tribunal, it was 
designed to examine and assess testimonies on past atrocities presented during trials, 
assuming that settling accounts through institutionalized legal means would help societies 
reconcile.  The ICTY was inscribed into Dayton’s legal framework, which included various 
human rights and humanitarian law treaties applicable to BiH (European Convention on 
Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Geneva 
Conventions).  As prosecuting war crimes became a post-conflict obligation, the 
governmental bodies of Dayton’s entities were required cooperation with the ICTY, 
particularly transferring those indicted for war crimes (Moratti and Sabic-El Rayess, 2009).  
The EU defined government cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition for accession, 
along with establishing rule of law and fighting corruption (Fisher and Petrović-Ziemer, 
2015). 
As main transitional justice instrument, the ICTY led the way in prosecutions and 
documenting the past in BiH, as national institutions were unable or unwilling to perform 
such tasks. Often was the case that proceedings conducted in BiH during and straight after 
armed conflict often failed to meet standards of a fair trial or coordination between the 
national courts and the ICTY (Court of BiH, 2015).  The Tribunal became a point of 
reference for state institutions, civil society and domestic judiciary in war crime prosecution, 
contributing to capacity building for the judiciary (Fischer, 2016, p.27).  The aftermath of the 
Yugoslav conflict (and the BiH war) was the elevation of criminal justice issues to the 
universal level, based on the argumentation that states had the duty to prosecute (Fijalwoski 
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and Grose, 2015 p. 2).    The Court’s main achievements are bringing justice to victims and 
establishing facts about the wars in the former Yugoslavia (Banjeglav, 2016, p.81).   
According to a former ICTY member, its main achievements are investigating in detail and 
rendering judicial findings on the vents in the Balkans since 1990.  Establishment of 
individual responsibility as a prerequisite for establishing accountability and for 
reconciliation.  Giving access to confidential army and security services archives, 
contributing to truth telling, giving more than 5,500 witnesses and victims a chance to face 
the accused and tell the court and public what had been done to them and supporting domestic 
prosecutions and courts, developing an environment of mutual assistance with the judiciaries 
in the Balkans (Hoffman, 2016, p. 62-64).  Another very important achievement was its 
prosecution of crimes of sexual violence, recognizing rape as a crime deserving international 
attention by the highest international court (Simić, 2016, p. 104). 
As external and international state-building project, the ICTY received criticisms related to its 
institution-building focus.  The court, located far from the affected conflict zone (placed in 
The Hague) and with foreigners guiding the judicial process, failed to connect with local 
populations, to the point that the best rapport achieved was with state institutions that have 
been hesitant to cooperate (Kostovicova, 2014).  Its external imposition of a universal 
jurisdiction disrupted delicate domestic reconciliation processes between conflicting parties, 
leading to different responses to indictments (Kostić, 2012, p.651).  Decisions were easily 
politicised, Serb leadership blaming the Tribunal of ethnic bias, due to high counts of 
suspects from a Serb background.  This led to political elites and media in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to perpetuate national narratives undermining the Tribunal’s work, using 
indictments to bolster prevailing national narratives rather than further reconciliation (Zyberi, 
2014).  International efforts to establish war crime accountability led to their hijacking by 
political elites for nationalistic goals (Eastmond, 2010, p.8).  Such efforts were perceived as 
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an attempt to counter criticism for western inaction during the war.  Efforts also clashed with 
local ideas about justice as the ICTY established a discourse of guilt and innocence in BiH, an 
arena in which nationalist elites hold political stakes.   In this regard, Nenad Vukosavljević 
writes 
 “…in the initial years of its work the Tribunal entirely neglected the need for 
communication and presence in the public of the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia.  The consequence was a lack of understanding of the importance of 
the work The Hague performs, and this provided space for the creation of images 
which portrayed The Hague as a politically biased court….the bias always appears 
to be to ‘our’ detriment [speaking of ethnic constituencies].  I have never heard of 
someone thinking that the court is biased in favor of his or her own people.” 
(Vukosavljević, 2007, p. 149). 
The outcome was reinterpreting transitional justice through dominant ethnopolitical narratives 
insistent on collective guilt and innocence.    Local dynamics in transitional justice tend to 
emphasize tensions emerging from confrontations between local and international approaches 
to justice, resulting in local contestation framed as resistance to hegemonic practices and 
values (Arnould, 2016).  Due to the divided character of Bosnian society, the contestation of 
war crime trials by political elites led to situations where adjudicated cases, proven beyond 
reasonable doubt, remain contested in public political narratives where those found guilty of 
war crimes are cheered as heroes within their own ethnic groups (Porobić-Isaković, 2016).   
Hodzić writes in this regard 
 “It is obvious that the influence of propaganda directed against the tribunals by 
government institutions, the media, and non-governmental organizations 
controlled by people indicted by the tribunal or potentially indicted as well as 
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political leaders from the former Yugoslavia, both at the highest and local levels is 
very strong.  They managed to convince people that war equals war crimes, that 
everything that happened in the war can be marked as a war crime if you belong to 
a certain ethnicity.”  (Hodzić, 2007, p. 130.)     
What is clear from this contestation is that the narratives presented by the courts did not 
resonate in the public and populations that were main targets of these trials, explaining the 
limited success of the ICTY in countering war crime denial in BiH as well as the region 
(Dragović-Soso, 2014).  Legal narratives about victims heard in The Hague do not reach 
perpetrator communities but transferred to the communities of victims, maintaining a sense of 
perpetual victimhood (Ristić, 2014).  These factors contributed to distancing between ethnic 
groups, complicating reconciliation.  Criticism reflects problems with ICTY’s legitimacy in 
BiH whose rejection by the ćlocal population derived from an idea of justice that comes only 
from technical and judicial understandings from UN diplomats and experts in jurisprudence, 
distant from the more long-term justice needs of victims in the country.  This experience 
shows that justice cannot be externally forced, as law-related processes require a form of 
legitimacy to bring social solidarity and reconciliation, one that international tribunals hardly 
achieve (Arenhövel, 2008, p. 578). 
Developing Bosnia’s judiciary 
As political parties and their supporters locally contested transitional justice, it was clear that 
certain cases required processing in Bosnia-Herzegovina so that justice and truth would not 
end up so distant from society and for the fact that the ICTY would not be able to handle such 
a huge number of cases.  The court began establishing measures for securing the fairness of 
trials, leading to a case-by-case supervision, before cases were sent to BiH for prosecution 
(Porobic-Isaković, 2016).  This meant slow jurisdiction transfer between the ICTY and 
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Bosnian courts: From 2006 until late 2011, only 83 cases were transferred to courts with 
territorial jurisdiction (Orlović, 2012).   The establishment of the ICTY in 1993 left little 
energy and resources for the development of Bosnian courts as the tribunal began referring 
war crimes back to BiH’s domestic courts.  The judiciary became overwhelmed by the 
number of cases, added to the problem that Bosnia’s courts were weak and susceptible to 
interference from ethnic nationalist elites (McMahon and Western, 2009, p.75). 
By establishing the war crimes section of the Court in BiH, the Bosnian judiciary would be 
strengthened and equipped to deal with in-country war crime prosecution.    The War Crimes 
section, inaugurated in 2005 as a permanent level organ, was supported by the ICTY to deal 
with grave breaches of international humanitarian law (Fischer, 2016, p. 27).  Designed as a 
hybrid court and complemented by war crimes sections in the office of the prosecutor, a 
registry and a witness protection unit.  By late 2000’s the amount of war crime cases were 
estimated in the thousands, the most complex ones were assigned for prosecution at the Court 
of BiH while the rest were distributed between the judiciaries of the two entities and the 
Court of Brĉko District (Orlović, 2012). 
Despite international support and gradual handover of cases in national and local courts, the 
process has been fraught with criticisms and complications eroding the acceptance and 
legitimacy of the judiciary.  The main obstacle has been the obstruction typical in the 
country’s political process.  Despite the design in 2008 of a National Strategy for Prosecution 
of War Crimes in the BiH Parliament, failure for implementing this strategy derived from 
political obstructions advocating a change of law and the signing of agreements that disallow 
extradition of Bosnia’s citizens charged with war crimes trials (Karup-Druško, 2014).  For 
this reason, many convicted for war crimes have found shelter in neighbouring countries, 
often relying on dual citizenship.  Excessive layers of government also led to discrepancies in 
the application of criminal law in BiH.  Orlović, (2012) explains that the Court of BiH applies 
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the Criminal Code established in 2003 while courts at a cantonal level as well as the court of 
Brĉko apply the criminal code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1976.  
From an interpretation from the BiH Court, local courts decide independently which criminal 
code they wish to use for war crime prosecutions, leading to discrepancies in sentencing as 
the 1976 code imposes maximum sentences of 15 years for war crimes whilst the 2003 code 
establishes a maximum of 45 years.  More concerning is the fact that as the ICTY mainly 
focused on ‘big names’ (political leadership that ordered atrocities) many low-level 
perpetrators are free and often in positions of power in the post-war period.  In this regard, 
Vukosavijević writes 
 “Local prosecutor offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina only act in places in which 
the crimes happened during the war and were for the most part in the position of 
starting investigations of local powerful people.  Those who gave orders for 
prosecution and murders during the war have become mayors, chiefs of police 
stations or successful businessmen and war heroes in the post-war times”  
(Vukosavijević, 2007, p. 150). 
Of particular concern is the status of war reparations in BiH.  Obstructive politics in BiH 
constantly delay development of reparation procedures, creating differences between the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska in treating victims of human rights 
abuses.  Practitioner Amir Zulić has particular concerns about this:  
“The problem has to do with the legal system and the divisions between entities.  
The administrative divisions make this country function as if there were two 
countries inside it, so there is always a problem with the law, a discrepancy on its 
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application between entities and this is why we do not have a law for our 
recognition.”9   
The problem begins with the ICTY’s lack of a system of reparations, forcing victims to rely 
on national courts for seeking financial recompense and reparations (Garbett, 2004, p.29).  
The initial quest for reparations in BiH began with a lawsuit against Serbia before the 
International Court of Justice, who in 2007 ruled unfavorable to Bosnia establishing that 
Serbia would not be responsible for crimes committed in BiH (Hronešová, 2016).10   
The development of reparations was done via the system of social security and veteran 
protection, giving certain rights to victims and veterans to improve their living standards.  
This ended in reparations being managed at the entity level, creating a power imbalance 
between civilian victims and war veterans (Lai, 2016).    Porobić-isaković (2016) explains 
such discrepancies: victims are recognized by BiH legislation and eligible for compensation 
as long as they can medically prove that at least 60% bodily damage has been suffered, a 
requirement established in both entities as well as in the Brĉko District.  The exception to this 
is for victims of sexual violence and rape who do not need to prove bodily damage, yet this 
stipulation applies only in the Federation, whereas in Republika Srpska such victims are not 
recognized as a separate category.  Another source of discrimination comes from the way 
victims and veterans have been treated through the reparations process.  There is no uniform 
approach to reparations between these two groups, which has led to an imbalance between 
them (Hronešová, 2016).  Veteran associations tend to be politically connected to nationalist 
parties and can get financial support from cantonal and local budgets.  Victims lack such 
                                                          
9 Interview, 29-06-2016 
10 Bosniak presidency member Bakir Izetbegović requested revision of the Court’s ruling before expiration of 
the ten-year limit for appeals on February 2017.  The response heightened tensions between leaders in RS and 
the Federation, as officials from Serbia and RS stated that Izetbegović’s call was illegal and unconstitutional, 
calling on the citizens to challenge the appeal’s legitimacy.  Milorad Dodik, president of RS called the move as 
an act of hatred against Bosnian-Serbs.  Consequently, and due to the tensions created from the call, the 
International Court of Justice rejected the appeal.  This not only has brought back political tensions, but also 
affected foreign investment in the country. 
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political connections, find it difficult to mobilize and set up associations and find obstacles 
when creating coalitions or dealing with state authorities.  In their case, they are often 
provided with limited funding from government budgets and lack the expertise to apply for 
international funds and projects that can help them. 
Non-judicial transitional justice  
Despite the limiting and excessive focus on retributive justice established by international 
transitional justice, various attempts at truth telling, memorialization and other activities 
emerged.  Practices have grown from civil society initiatives, finding opposition from 
political actors and citizens, in promoting truth commissions or doing bottom-up transitional 
justice work. 
The international community and donors in BiH, adopting features of the top-down approach 
of judicial transitional justice, fostered the earliest truth commissions.  The Western Balkans 
saw the introduction of truth telling mechanisms when the United States Institute for Peace 
(USIP) attempted the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission focused on civil 
society (Porobić-isaković, 2016).  According to USIP (2002), the Yugoslav Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, inaugurated by Serbian President Vojislav Kostunica, sought to 
research the social and inter-communal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia from 1980 to 2000.  
Despite efforts in conforming an interethnic team of investigators, the Commission disbanded 
in 2003 over disagreements regarding its mandate, lack of political will, funding and civil 
society support. 
Discussions on truth commissions emerged in the early 2000’s, leading to the 2005 
Srebrenica Commission in RS, yet very little official efforts were done in the region and in 
BiH for establishing an official truth and reconciliation commission.  The Srebrenica 
Commission (focused on investigating events leading to the 1995 Srebrenica genocide) was 
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established by the government of RS (after pressure from the OHR), leading to a historical 
account of certain killings, missing persons and mass graves.  Its work was deeply politicized 
by RS authorities and its effects on public opinion were very little (Porobić-isaković, 2016).   
The lack of success in creating truth commissions in the Western Balkans has to do with 
political conflicts surrounding their mandate and purpose, the lack of legitimacy of domestic 
political actors involved in their creation and the negative impact of the ICTY on the 
prospects of a truth telling commission, due to the excessive focus on factual-judicial, top-
down truths (Dragović-Soso, 2014). 
The most recognized attempt at a truth commission has been the RECOM regional initiative, 
beginning as a series of regional NGO-based discussions, consultations, and roundtables on 
truth telling around 2010.   RECOM moved from an NGO coalition in 2010 from Balkan 
organizations to an initiative with a statute, mandate, and vision by 2011 (Orlović, 2012).  
Important was the gathering of 543,870 signatures in the Balkans for its support and 
declarations of support from state officials in BiH, the EU institutions and the OSCE, 
establishing resolution 1786 supporting the initiative.  Fisher (2016) recognizes RECOM’s 
potential for restorative justice and the space for engaging with a wider variety of actors than 
in other initiatives as it includes peace practitioners, human rights activists, journalists, 
academics and other types of groups.  Yet, she highlights the need for consensus on its scope 
and mandate and the need to convince political leaders and society of the advantages of a 
regional truth commission.   A truth commission proposal in BiH has faced many critics: 
human rights activists, relatives of victims and some politicians have constantly asked who 
will appoint the commission members and what the criteria will be used in selecting 
witnesses.  Others doubt whether a society where there is still no rule of law and consensus 
on the past is ripe for a truth commission (Englbrecht, 2011, p. 20) 
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However, it is political leaders and citizens where RECOM, as well as most NGOs, find 
obstacles to developing truth telling and other ground initiatives for transitional justice.  
RECOM has constantly encountered obstacles in the many elections and presidential changes 
in BiH as soon as an agreement is reached with a president a new election follows,  another 
politician is appointed and a new agreement is therefore needed (Kandić, 2014).  Despite 
gathering signatures for social support, a consultative process and the drafting of a statute, to 
this date RECOM has not been officially established.  Alternatively, many NGOs have 
engaged in truth telling initiatives establishing alternative platforms for survivors to tell their 
stories.  This has meant documentation of survivor narratives, remembrance and 
memorialization projects and organizing discussions and conferences discussing the past 
((Porobić-isaković, 2016). 
The problem with bottom-up, NGO-based initiatives is that actors and projects are usually 
connected to international donor agendas, an extended branch of the liberal peace.  Due to the 
contestation and rejection of state-building in BiH politics and society, NGOs seem to inherit 
that legacy of resistance and lacking local legitimacy.  Concerns about the external origins of 
Bosnia’s civil society sector are rooted in the arrival of big international NGOs in the late 
1990’s.  The NGO model was confusing as emergency relief operations tried to substitute for 
civil society right after the war, leading to a pursuit for international funding that made civil 
society a contested and problematic sector (Deacon and Stubbs, 1998).  Civil society 
development has also suffered from the problems of “local ownership” as international 
donors have recognized being the driving force behind civil society development via project 
funding and grant application processes devised in western countries (Barnes et. al, 2004).  
The lack of domestic agenda and its donor-driven nature has posed legitimacy problems for 
Bosnian NGOs.  Changing donor practices particularly affect these organizations, also, lack 
of coordination between international aid agencies, excessive competition for funds and 
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dependency on international donor priorities and models, creating a problem for their long-
term sustainability and their acceptance with communities on the ground (Sterland, 2006).   
All these different disconnections, in language, in ownership and legitimacy have made of 
‘reconciliation’ a complicated term to apply in BiH.  After the war ending in a foreign-
sanctioned stalemate, many Bosnians treated reconciliation as a western-imposed idea, some 
supporting it as desirable in principle and route towards a unified BiH but for others there was 
no wish for future co-existence in a state called Bosnia and Herzegovina despite wanting 
good neighbourly relations between polities (Jansen, 2010, p. 37) 
Summary 
This chapter narrated peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The state-building intervention 
emerging after Dayton focused on building institutions of governance and consociationalism.  
In addition, a transitional justice process led by the ICTY, characterized by an initial focus on 
individual accountability for war crimes, the strengthening of the judiciary for the prosecution 
of war crimes and the development of a western-prone civil society sector. 
Both processes affect prospects for interethnic reconciliation on the ground, not only by 
creating a distance between the three constituent peoples of BiH but also by creating 
problems of legitimacy and ownership that establish another division between top-down 
practices fostered by international actors and local, bottom-up ways of dealing with these 
processes. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement, which reflects an international understanding of the war as a 
confrontation between identity groups, created structures of governance reliant on an ethnic 
key that promotes divisions in politics, administration and the economy.  The reification of 
existing ethnically based identities has led to three different ethnic state-building agendas and 
structures that turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into a weak state with excessive and competing 
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layers of government.  This affects the prospects of political reconciliation and makes 
decision-making in the country a stagnant, blocked endeavor. 
International intervention in the country meant turning BiH into an informal protectorate 
where the Office the High Representative increased its powers of governance.  This led to 
contestation from political leadership in the country, boosting the use of ethnic constituencies 
and nationalist rhetoric to gain acceptance with society, deeming intervention illegitimate.  At 
the same time, these politicians remain unaccountable to the people and avoid responsibility 
for the country’s problems.   
The change towards EU member-state-building approach logically moves from the 
imposition “Bonn powers reliant” approach of the OHR to a more technical, standards-based 
state-building that uses EU accession as an incentive for political dialogue in the country.  
Despite such shift, ideas of local ownership and technical (depoliticised) state-building have 
not been able to move forward the necessary political reforms that can get the country out of 
the deadlock, as observed in the failure of constitutional reform in the country. 
Transitional justice, a branch of state-building focused on dealing with past atrocities and 
fostering a justice sector in the country, has also been externally driven and distant from 
society.  This has led to contestation and criticisms of ethnic bias, the establishment of 
narratives of collective guilt and victimhood that keep citizens divided and mistrustful of the 
other.  The excessive focus on ICTY’s retributive justice meant missing discussions on 
reparations and victim participation but also allowed ethnopolitical contestation of 
indictments and processes.  Denouncing ethnic bias or lack of interest from the ICTY over 
victims from a particular ethnicity strengthens dividing narratives in BiH, leading to stances 
where war criminals are glorified as heroes and victims sidelined. 
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The development of the Bosnian judiciary, although being an opportunity for local ownership 
of war crime processing, was so delayed and obstructed by politics that it has created 
divisions regarding the implementation of laws for victims, reparations and the processing of 
war crimes in national, entity and cantonal courts.  This has created yet another division 
between war veterans and victims, impeding dialogue and communication between these two 
groups. 
Finally, the development of civil society initiatives towards truth telling and reconciliation, 
have not been able to impact local populations, mainly for lack of engagement and 
obstruction from ethnopolitical parties who dominate the different layers of government in 
BiH.  Additionally, this NGO model exported to the country has been completely dependent 
on international donors, creating a sustainability crisis for many NGOs and a problem of 
legitimacy within the eyes of a population that does not trust projects funded by international 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER 4 - IMPLEMENTING RECONCILIATION: 
MEANINGS AND APPROACHES IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
Introduction  
Highly debated in academic and policy circles, reconciliation is developed through various 
approaches.  In trauma-healing, it deals with “psychological wounds that make continued 
relationships difficult” (Jeong, 2000, p. 192), placing reconciliation in an individual sphere 
where victims of violence deal with personal trauma, encounter the other, the perpetrator, re-
establishing relationships through empathy, understanding, and forgiveness.  A collective-
focused reconciliation is described in Schaap’s (2004) factors: restoration of an original 
harmony or state of relationships, intercultural dialogue that recognizes misunderstandings 
between conflicting parties, developing shared horizons and opening of communication 
channels between grieving parties, developing shared ways of being.  Here, reconciliation lies 
within political and cultural dialogue, collective processes for mutual understanding, placing 
its relationship rather than individual component at the forefront.  Reconciliation deals with 
reparative justice’s handling of human relations: justice empowering victims socially, 
economically and politically so they can make decisions about their needs and encounters 
with perpetrators, developing legal and non-legal mechanisms for these groups to meet 
(Nordquist, 2006, p.24). 
Different reconciliation modes frame different objectives, mindsets and outcomes.  Reflecting 
on these, this chapter presents different ways reconciliation is thought of by organizations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).  By describing these views, the chapter establishes possible 
linkages between thin (state-building) and thick (localised) reconciliation, critically observing 
118 
 
the connectedness, similarities, and discrepancies between practices. The chapter presents 
five approaches: Trauma-healing and restorative work as victim-centred approaches to 
reconciliation; storytelling and fact-finding as researching, documenting and interpreting 
truths; cooperation focused on getting people to work and participate together; retributive 
work as a perpetrator-focused dimension and peace education; fostering reconciliation-prone 
values.  The discussion of each approach includes its claims on reconciliation, a description 
of meanings and projects from interviewed organizations, highlighting possible connections 
between thin and thick practices and dilemmas for peacebuilding. 
Trauma-healing and restorative justice: bridging relationships through individual and 
collective approaches 
Reconciliation as individual and collective trauma-healing relies on psychosocial projects 
supporting victims in recognizing and dealing with trauma as well as reparative processes 
seeking state compensation, recognition, and support to victims of past abuses.  Trauma-
healing focuses on victims, giving them a voice and dealing with sources of trauma, moving 
victims towards becoming active citizens in social reconstruction.  It requires “social safety”: 
acceptance for the expression of the emotions occasioned by trauma and the opportunity to 
talk about what has happened to try to make sense of it (Francis, 2002, p.34).   Dealing with 
“therapeutic effects of interpersonal contact among former adversaries” (Millar and Lecy, 
2016, p. 302), makes reconciliation a psychological process inclusive of a range of projects 
with collective outcomes. 
Healing moves from individual awareness of trauma towards reconciling with the other, 
potentially moving from an individual recognition of injustice towards a possible 
relationship-building process.    Reconciliation deals with residues of conflict that brought 
suffering to a great number of people (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2013, p. 81).  It deals with 
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scars left in the relationship between victims and perpetrators of conflict, bridging gaps 
between them.  Emotions become socio-political forces where individual experiences of 
conflict translate into collective and political formations, shaping reconciliation processes 
(Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2013, p. 82).  Trauma-healing approaches in post-conflict 
interventions are criticised as a pathologizing western understanding of reconciliation, often 
bringing very little help to victims.  Psychosocial initiatives tend to be narrowly focused on 
the vulnerability of affected individuals and collectivities, ignoring their resiliency and 
personal growth, making these a set of ‘pathologizing’ initiatives (Parent, 2016, p.512).   As 
national reconciliation projects seek to address health implications of the effect of violence in 
victims they connect with conflict prevention seeking behavioral and attitudinal change, 
creating a politics of ‘emotionology’.  Trauma-healing as a reconciliation approach resorts to 
emotions as a form of mobilization and identification, blurring the line between the political 
and therapeutic (Humphrey, 2005).  Injustice is reconceived as psychological injury and 
exclusion is made into a question of interpersonal communication.  Consequently, “the state, 
through affirming the self, has adopted the politics of emotionology as a new source of 
legitimacy” (Humphrey, 2005, p. 206)   
Postconflict settings require acknowledgment of the connectedness between the dire socio-
economic conditions left from the past and the trauma experienced by affected populations, 
for this reason, trauma-healing needs linkage with restorative justice.   Restorative justice 
entails repairing damages to those who suffered atrocities, requiring support, compensation, 
and empowerment through victim-focused justice.  Restorative reconciliation gives victims 
socioeconomic and political power to leave victimhood, becoming decision makers of their 
own situation and their relation to perpetrators (Nordquist, 2006, p.24).  It deals with 
structural injustices and living standards, equating reconciliation with social justice and 
development (Andrieu, 2010, p. 543).  Reparations make victims beneficiaries in 
120 
 
peacebuilding, combining needs and recognized rights that improve the social and 
psychological situation of victims (Hronešova, 2016).  It contributes to the legitimacy of 
political transformations by addressing victims in this process (Skaar and Malca, 2015, p.11).  
Reparations help inclusiveness, making citizens equal participants in a common political 
process supporting recognition, civic trust and solidarity, aimed at restoring the dignity and 
humanity of victims, responsibility of both state and perpetrators (Christie, Wagner and 
Winter, 2001).   National reconciliation projects have begun promoting restorative over 
retributive justice in peacebuilding.  In doing so, ‘restoration’ gravitates towards the healing 
of harm to individuals and their social relationships, ignoring the human rights implications 
violence has on societies: “the focus on health and healing helps make violence, and therefore 
the question of rights, disappear from the narrative of reconciliation, by focusing on the 
effects of violence rather than on its causes.”  (Humphrey, 2005, p. 204). 
Practicing trauma-healing and restorative justice  
Trauma-healing and restorative justice in BiH are implemented via psychosocial workshops 
done by NGOs and International Organizations accompanying victims, dealing 
therapeutically with trauma, raising awareness and pushing for legislation that establishes 
compensation, reparation, and welfare for victims and their families.  Such practices are 
disconnected despite targeting as beneficiaries victims of mass atrocities.  
Trauma-healing seeks to avoid feelings of anger and revenge, requiring trust-building as 
“the traumatic experience teaches us that we cannot trust those who hurt us and 
therefore we are…ready to strike back” (Puljek-Shank, 2007, p. 182).  Traumatic 
experiences create stress affecting the way we relate to others in our everyday.  For 
practitioner Amela Puljek-Shank, healing moves from individual to group settings, 
connecting trust-building and reconciliation:  
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“Trauma cuts normality completely and you become aware of how tragic life can 
be, and then it clicks, life is unpredictable and you do not trust life.  Building trust 
begins at the individual level and it becomes a difficult decision to face trauma as 
people end up stuck in a victimhood cycle where they repeat stories of their 
trauma”11.    
 Trust begins at the individual level, facing grieving, loss, helplessness, and fear.  Moving 
towards collective trust-building begins with creating a supportive environment, where 
individuals find someone to confide in, “see(ing) society in a different light, understanding 
the narrative of a group and how it led to individuals taking a specific course of action in the 
war.”12  Reconciliation becomes a skill in constant practice, “requires us to hear the other, 
hear the pain and suffering, recognize the human in the other” (Puljek-Shank, 2007, p. 193).  
During the interview, Puljek-Shank recognized how reconciliation occurs individually and 
collectively: individually implies accepting trauma as part of life and learning how to deal 
and heal, reducing grief.   Collectively requires recognizing the face of the other, coming to 
the possibility of forgiveness and finding spaces for recognizing your neighbours and their 
backgrounds.  Personal reconciliation is fuel for collective reconciliation; you cannot have 
true reconciliation unless it begins at a personal level.  Maja Kapo, also a psychosocial 
practitioner explained 
 “Trauma-healing begins with oneself, as there is a constant tendency to point to 
others (nationalists, war criminals) as responsible for one’s trauma, making it a 
never-ending process of blame.  Dealing with individual trauma is about people 
                                                          
11 Interview, 11-10-2016 
12 Interview, 11-10-2016 
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taking responsibility for their own issues.  Only when the individual faces his/her 
own traumas can reconciliation take place.”13 
Trauma-healing fosters reconciliation by moving from individual to group settings; 
individuals dealing with trauma encounter the other, allowing the possible building of 
relationships.   For practitioner Sinisa Sagević, psychotherapy workshops allow interethnic 
work, which “includes representatives of the different ethnic groups who would openly talk 
about their war experiences, each one would talk for about ten minutes and then open the 
floor to discussions between them and with the different association.” 14   For Sagevic, public 
appearances help audiences change perspectives about the other, as victim stories are similar 
despite belonging to different ethnic groups.   Here, addressing youngsters is a priority; 
victims help in recognizing that “all people get hurt, that there were innocent people on all 
sides, people who can talk about their stories”.  Sagević identifies political potential as events 
help victim associations, traditionally divided along ethnic lines, recognize the pain endured 
by the other side and bring knowledge on reconciliation, changing the ways victim 
associations work in BiH.  
Restorative practices support individuals who experienced loss, either physical or material, 
through compensation, legal support, and political recognition.   For Amela Puljek-Shank, 
this work “responds to people in need, regardless of their religious background…we stay in 
places where the contexts have not changed in order for us to leave.”  For her organization15, 
restorative work entails bringing people who experienced harm or conflict together to 
respectfully hear each other’s experiences and emotions, agreeing on appropriate responses to 
their harm, training about living and working together, addressing conflict in various settings, 
and training people on issues of oppression and colonization to understand restorative justice.   
                                                          
13 Interview, 28-07-2016 
14 Interview, 10-06-2016 
15 The Mennonite Central Committee, a faith-based peacebuilding organization.   
123 
 
This work is geared towards raising awareness and moving to reconciliation.  For Amir Zulić, 
working with concentration camp survivors 
 “We try to contact as many people as we can, people who can get the magnitude 
of what happened to us.  Form psychotherapists, doctors and even people who can 
help us with food and the things that the government has not been able to do for 
us.  An organization that wants to help survivors and we do all this without the 
government’s help.”16   
He highlighted how as an organization they were often doing the work of the government, 
pressuring for legislation that supports victims, and lobbying for a victim’s law: 
 “We are fighting the government to recognize us as prisoners of war who suffered 
a lot of trauma.  The lack of laws makes us feel as if we have not existed in the 
last 20 years as if we have been forgotten and erased…We want compensation, 
but there is no money from the state and there are too many people who are in our 
same condition.  The problem goes deeper and it has to do with the legal system 
and the division between entities…There is always a problem with the law, a 
discrepancy on its application between the two entities and this is why we do not 
have a law for our recognition.”17   
He connects restorative justice with interethnic reconciliation:  
“There are no differences between us; we constantly share many things.  We get 
all these excuses regarding the law for our recognition and compensation.  In 
regards to reconciliation, we do work with Serbs and with Croats from Northern 
                                                          
16 Interview, 04-07-2016 (Supported by a translator member of the organization). 
17 Interview, 04-07-2016 (Supported by a translator member of the organization). 
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Herzegovina; we are a big union of people sending a message of peace.  We work 
with all of them…”18  
The International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP)19 takes another reparative 
approach, promoting legislation, fostering advocacy and technical support in locating and 
identifying the missing.  ICMP’s restorative approach is described in its public involvement 
strategy, encouraging “active participation of civil society and in particular families of the 
missing, through programs aimed at empowering them, through education and training... The 
provision of education programs for families of the missing and their active engagement is 
critical to mounting any effort to address the issue of missing persons.” (ICMP, N.D.)  
ICMP’s restoration seeks to educate families of the missing on their legal, social and 
economic rights and supporting their involvement in forensic procedures for identifying the 
missing.  Matthew Holiday highlighted that ICMP seeks a connection between state 
institution-development surrounding the missing and the ground realities of families of the 
disappeared.   Working with politics was vital:  
“you need to work with them to establish dedicated national institutions like the 
Missing Persons Institute to adopt legislation that enshrines rights of victims and 
obligations of the state, a law on missing persons...That is the kind of top-down 
approach but it doesn’t work if you don’t work from the bottom-up at the same 
time.   You need to work, if you are applying a modern scientific method using 
DNA testing, to reach out to families, to receive reference samples or without 
them we couldn’t identify any of the missing” 20.   
                                                          
18 Interview, 04-07-2016 
19 ICMP works with the State in institutional development for dealing with the missing., the establishment of an 
Institute for Missing Persons, a law on missing persons, the completion of the Central Records for Missing 
persons as well as establishing funds for the families of the missing are part of their restorative work. 
20 Interview,  01-09-2016  
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His statement refers to a technical necessity for including victims, yet elaborates on involving 
victims in top-down processes:   
“Families of the missing need to be empowered to claim their rights because they 
are a powerful driver of the process; they are the ones who need to lobby the 
authorities.  The ICMP works behind the scenes, we push, encourage and 
sometimes criticise the state but the families can make that vocal public voice, 
push the authorities to search and identify the missing.  We spend programs 
focused on not only building state capacity but also building and empowering the 
capacity of the families.  It is important to link them with the associations who can 
help and encourage them to form a legal identity and have a common voice.”21  
Reparative justice is claimed to contribute to relationship-building, placing reconciliation in a 
reparative process within the law and the ways in which legislation can help rebuild 
relationships.  Reparative processes seek to give victims social, political and economic power 
to leave views of victimhood, moving towards becoming empowered decision-makers of their 
own situation (Nordquist, 2006, p. 24).  Track Impunity Always (TRIAL) 22 adopts such 
vision by helping victims of international crimes, advocating for greater justice and training 
human rights defenders.  They offer comprehensive legal support to victims appearing before 
international legal organizations; accompaniment, listening to their accounts, gathering 
evidence and connecting this with retributive work.  Their restorative approach calls BiH 
authorities to put into practice court rulings in favor of victims, aligning national legislation 
with international human rights standards (TRIAL, N.D.).   For Adisa Fisić, TRIAL sees 
reconciliation as a long process that cannot be done in limited timeframes: “Our contribution 
to reconciliation as an international NGO is to fight for victims’ rights, so that they exercise 
                                                          
21 Interview,  01-09-2016 
22 TRIAL focuses on providing legal assistance to victims, litigates cases and develops local capacity for 
prosecutions. 
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rights which have been established internationally in treaties signed by Bosnia” 23.  She 
emphasized that this process was about justice, youth work, and support for victims of sexual 
violence, free legal aid and pushing for prosecutions of wartime sexual crime cases.  
Reparation comes through fighting for compensation:  
“...last year [2015] we got a big achievement in a judgment from BiH courts for 
victims in criminal proceedings.  Usually, victims were referred to civil 
proceedings for compensation and this would cause re-traumatization and added 
cost to victims as they had to go to another court system and many times, they 
simply could not afford this.  It is important that compensation claims are decided 
directly in criminal proceedings”24.   
Ms. Fisić’s view connects retributive and reparative justice: 
 “Transitional justice consists of judicial and non-judicial measures.  One 
measure is wartime case prosecution done via the ICTY and the Bosnian Courts.  
This step is important, as here is where facts need to be established.  However, 
we also need non-judicial measures; this is why we organize training for NGOs 
and lawyers on rights and war victims in BiH.  We need young generations to 
know what happened and accept the facts as we have independent sources to 
read about the war...”25 
Thin and thick in trauma-healing and restorative practices 
It is clear that “thick” trauma-healing together with “thin” state-building restorative justice 
identify victims as direct beneficiaries of reconciliation, helping them deal with traumatic 
pasts, offering psychosocial and political support that helps them relate to others through 
                                                          
23  Interview, 23-06-2016 
24 Interview, 23-06-2016 
25 Interview, 23-06-2016 
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healing.  This approach can connect thick and thin reconciliation in the move from individual 
to collective trauma-healing, opening individual experiences to bigger groups and audiences.   
Such move requires support from “thin” state-building justice: supporting victims within the 
criminal justice system, providing compensation and reparation at the state level, adopting 
legislation addressing victims’ needs.  It requires a functioning political environment for 
victims, who not only require psychosocial support for individual grievances but also 
providing socioeconomic justice that empowers them away from victimhood and towards 
active citizenry.  Linking thick (localised trauma-healing) and thin reconciliation (legislative 
and political changes for restoration) connects grassroots psycho-therapeutical work with 
victims and state-building work promoting justice geared towards establishing laws to protect 
victim and minority rights in BiH. 
Disconnections between practices bring questions about how probable is the move from 
individual to community and national reconciliation.  Victims need psychosocial support to 
overcome trauma, at least learn how to live with it, but it is difficult to move from individual 
perceptions to a collective or a national level.   By connecting trauma-healing with restorative 
justice, thick practices relate to high-level political and judicial processes.  Reparations 
schemes open questions about perpetrators and victims, making this a political choice 
(Hronešova, 2016). Establishing reparations creates hierarchies of victimhood; this requires 
sensitively designed reparations that connect with the reintegration and de-radicalization of 
combatants that can also help victims.  When governments offer material restitution to 
victims and alternatively offers monetary support to perpetrators, it creates grounds for 
invidious comparisons (Lerche, 2002).  In BiH, hierarchies of victimhood are perceived in the 
study of sexual violence.  Rape victims in BiH are distinguished by their ethnic or national 
identity, connecting them with a notion of an ideal or authentic victim subject (Simić, 2016, 
p. 108).   Simić explores this problem, stating that Bosniak experiences of rape were 
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appropriated for a national-building project as an authentic representation of collective 
trauma, making Serb women’s experiences something ignored, rejected and made 
insignificant. 
“Thin” processes advocating legislation and implementation of policies for reparations, 
rehabilitative measures, victim support and minority rights protection can be geared towards 
grassroots trauma-healing.  If organizations developing psychosocial support disconnect from 
political processes, they will be affected by lack of support and will from authorities at 
national, entity and local level in establishing legal and policy frames for restoring and 
repairing the damage done to war victims.   Connecting thick trauma-healing with thin justice 
creates a space for a comprehensive approach.  The socioeconomic character of violence 
should be a defining feature of transitional justice where the idea of dealing with the past can 
connect to reparation (Lai, 2016).  As socioeconomic injustice is present and rooted in war-
affected societies, ‘doing justice’ entails not only political but also economic restructuring 
processes. 
Storytelling and fact-finding:  paths towards different ‘truths’ 
“Truth” is a component of transitional justice and reconciliation. It seeks to acknowledge 
hidden parts of a society’s past, distinguishing between court testimonies and truth telling 
processes: to “tell one’s story to somebody who is interested, carrying an important part of a 
country’s and community’s common history” (Nordquist, 2006, p.23).  Different truths are 
present in post-conflict work: factual evidence, subjective accounts shaped by specific 
positions within a social system; versions of the truth change as social and historical 
circumstances shift over time (Christie, Wagner and Winter, 2001).  Truth requires reflection 
when linked to reconciliation: victims may be satisfied by facts but facts also heighten wishes 
of revenge (Van Zyl, 2005).  Through storytelling and testimony, people use narratives to 
make sense of themselves and their socio-historical context, making narratives central to self-
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perception and worldview (Christie, Wagner and Winter, 2001).  Truth telling often leads to 
controversy, inciting desires for revenge or become contrary to justice as pardoning 
perpetrators for telling the truth might imply impunity.  Fischer (2011, p. 410) warns against 
claims that official exposure to the truth provides immediate redress for victims and their 
social healing although acknowledges that nationalist myth-making (an effect of war) requires 
instrumentalizing facts to prevent reoccurrence of violence.   
Telling truths in practice 
Dealing with truths, and narratives of violent pasts are important elements within post-
conflict reconciliation, particularly in divided societies that rely on opposing and at times 
conflicting interpretations of motivations, dynamics, and effects of wartime violence.  Truth 
recovery implies covering objective and forensic truths, narrative truths, social, dialogical and 
restorative truths (Fischer, 2011, p. 411).    Such different approaches to post-conflict truths 
have been adopted by organizations in BiH under visions such as ‘dealing with the past’, 
projects for documenting interpretative truths, the pursuit of forensic ‘judicial’ truths that can 
lead to retributive processes and efforts towards establishing official truth commissions in the 
country.  Adnan Hasenbegović, from the Centre for Nonviolent Action, connects 
reconciliation, dealing with the past and truth telling;  
“Dealing with the past is a crucial component of reconciliation.  This requires a 
focus on the war period and on particular issues of war crimes and the process of 
transition from one era to the other.  This requires dealing with polarized 
perspectives as well as the mainstream nationalism that permeates our politics.” 26 
For Hasenbegović dealing with the past comes not only from recent wars but also from World 
War II issues surrounding national identities in the Western Balkans, focusing on the question 
                                                          
26 Interview, 25-04-2016 
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of ‘who is the enemy?’  Answers come with strong narratives leading to mistrust, explaining 
why CNA views a regional need to re-establish communication, engage in the humanization 
of the enemy, making people aware of how they become victims of manipulation.  For 
Hasenbegović, storytelling  
“Requires working with various narratives of the past…We talk about the facts 
and then on explanation and understandings of what happened.  Various actors 
produce different narratives of victimhood here in Bosnia so we have to include 
all stories in this process.  One thing is the facts that can be established through 
the Courts but our view of the truth is much wider, we work with interpretative 
truth.”27  
 For the interviewee, in BiH, there is no reconciliation as people have a polarized perception 
of the war:  
“via storytelling we present stories of individuals, via movies and publications, 
stories of refugees, of ordinary people who show through personal experience 
their process of reconciliation…this helps on our focus on empathy.  In 
reconciliation, it is key for people to see the suffering that occurred from the other 
side.”28 
CNA’s storytelling includes war veterans, a group traditionally sidelined in peacebuilding.  In 
“Four views”, a veteran-orientated truth telling project, stories are shared in public forums, 
bringing former combatants from BiH and neighbouring countries together to speak about 
their reasons for going to war, what motivated them and how they see it nowadays.  It seeks 
opening space for dialogue and deconstruction of enemy images (Franović, 2015).  By 
listening to veteran stories, audiences who normally boycott and protest peacebuilding 
                                                          
27 Interview, 25-04-2016 
28 Interview, 25-04-2016 
131 
 
forums, end up listening and respecting presenters, coming up with questions and expressing 
admiration for the speakers’ courage:  
“We needed it [the seminar] in order for the combatants to get to know each other 
better, to gain a better sense of their varying narratives, build mutual trust and thus 
become a source of support for each other and to empower them for public 
speaking.” (Franović, 2015, p.6).   
Although this adopts a psychosocial format, contribution comes when “we decided to listen 
closely and expand the circles of war veterans motivated to work on peacebuilding.  We 
expected that the initiated cross-border collaboration of former enemies would gain its own 
momentum and live beyond us and our guidance.” (Franović, 2015, p.6).   This resonates with 
Skaar’s (2013) transitional justice claim: truth telling contributing to the psychological 
healing of individual victims, promoting social healing and group reconciliation. 
Another approach is recollecting stories of the past, interpretative truth telling as a way of 
informally documenting truths.  Interpretative approaches are claimed to host elements of 
culture and identity, local ideas, knowledge, and structure that approach peacebuilding in a 
way that is inclusive of marginalized individuals, groups and communities (Canteh-Morgan, 
2005, p.72).   Leslie Woodward and Velma Sarić, NGO directors in Sarajevo adopt such 
approach.  For Woodward, reconciliation needs to go beyond encounters between victims, 
perpetrators, and processes of confession and forgiveness29.  “It is a process of internal 
healing but beyond this, it entails interethnic cooperation and mutual understanding, of people 
standing against what is wrong.”  She views this work as a web-weaver of reconciliation, 
building connections between international and local in amplifying the voices from all sides 
of the conflict.  Storytelling gives an opportunity for people to tell their side without blaming:  
                                                          
29 Interview, 24-04-2016 
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“Our approach is unofficial truth telling as there can be both official and 
unofficial processes that need one another.  Official truth telling is the work of the 
ICTY and ICMP as they work with concrete facts and data.  The unofficial side, 
what we do is all about documenting stories and points of view.  We are creating a 
record, a database of our rescuer stories so we can leave a legacy of stories of 
others, a sort of track record.”30  
 She was emphatic that truth is subjective and often up to the implementer to help interpret it, 
yet interpretive truths that bring people together, create a sense that interethnic cooperation is 
more frequent than people think: “big groups of friends that span the interethnic divide, we 
want to show that this is the norm rather than the exception.”31 Velma Sarić focused on 
theoretical/methodological frames underpinning Ordinary Heroes, a project telling stories of 
interethnic help during the war.  Her work is “base for local young people, directing them 
towards a working model of reconciliation to work with32.”    Ordinary Heroes emerged as 
visual exhibitions and conferences on survivor stories, initially displayed in Sarajevo for 
students and locals, later expanding to smaller communities, connecting with rural youth who 
were unable to travel.  This developed into workshop manuals, screenings and debates, 
mechanisms for measuring impact, competitions for stories of moral courage and establishing 
Balkan Diskurs, an online platform for reporting on local stories of reconciliation and youth 
relevant themes. 
Important for truth telling is fact-finding, discovering forensic ‘judicial’ truths, which relies 
on objective methods connected to retributive processes.  Fact-finding includes selecting 
relevant facts in trials, their legal characterization, assigning blame in courts and normative 
versions of events that contribute to forging a common historical memory of the recent past 
                                                          
30 Interview, 24-04-2016 
31 Interview, 24-04-2016 
32 Interview, 06-06-2017. 
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(Fijalwoski and Grose, 2015).  It is claimed that this type of truth provides information that 
can persuade perpetrators and victims to confront their own narratives of past events. The 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network’s (BIRN)33 takes this approach.  Vital to BIRN is 
Balkan Transitional Justice, a regional initiative seeking to improve the public’s 
understanding of transitional justice.34  Erna Maćkik explained the connection between truth 
telling and transitional justice: work begins with the establishment of the State Court and 
Prosecutor Office in Bosnia, the focus was reporting on War Crimes and the way state-level 
institutions were doing this work, as international justice left several sensitive topics 
unaddressed35.  BIRN’s evolution led to campaigns against media censorship on war crime 
verdicts, demanding indictments to disclose full names of war criminals, a practice banned by 
national legislation.  Maćkik sees BIRN’s website as a fact-finding achievement: a database 
of local and international war tribunal hearings.  BIRN reports on every hearing, using it as 
material for lessons learned on war crime prosecutions.  A particular focus on victims of 
wartime sexual violence made BIRN the first organization to report on how the Hague 
Tribunal was disposing of artefacts that served as evidence for sexual war crimes due to lack 
of storage space.  They make educational documentaries for victims and institutions, their 
screenings involve proceedings in missing person cases, with audiences made up of victim 
associations, judicial institutions, and the police.   Maćkik sees fact-finding as dealing with 
political issues:  
“Brings factual information into the public sphere.  In this way, victims can find a 
voice in the process.  We do not just bring one victim, from one side, we bring as 
many victims from all sides, from both entities, and through this, and we show 
                                                          
33 An international journalist organization promoting public debate around key issues in Balkan countries’ 
societies.  
34 BIRN sees Balkan Transitional Justice as provision of information about transitional justice to connect state 
with the public.   
35 Interview, 22-07-2016. 
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that victims are the same.  What we do is bring a different narrative from that of 
the politicians, a judicial narrative in order to bring these stories everywhere.”36   
Maćkik believes 
 “Reconciliation can mean a lot of things but in the context of Bosnian society, I 
don’t really know what it is because victims in different areas ask this question 
about reconciliation.  It can be about having all war criminals, from all sides 
prosecuted and sentenced.  Also, we have reparations and every pillar of 
transitional justice in theory but we do not have this effectively here in Bosnia.  
We have some war crime cases, we have some reparations but there is no state law 
on these issues or a law on torture.”37  
 She emphasized that “we do live together, victims from Prijedor, Srebrenica or Višegrad, 
they live together, and they communicate with their neighbours.  We have connections here 
on an everyday basis but we do not have a systematic reconciliation.”38  ‘Truth’ is a more 
constructive concept for her:  
“If you accept the truth then it really helps.  I do not think we are ready to accept 
the truth, here when dealing with the truth, you have very specific truths and we 
have three truths to deal with in Bosnia, a particularly hard issue.  All three groups 
have a truth and in that sense, question is whose truth will be accepted and by 
whom?  It is not the time to accept the truth here.  We bring what we can from 
factual truths to the public.  What we do is report on facts, something that is 
                                                          
36 Interview, 22-07-2016 
37 Interview, 22-07-2016 
38 Interview, 22-07-2016 
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undeniable, like the genocide on Srebrenica.  Hypothetically speaking this could 
be the starting point for a truth and reconciliation commission in Bosnia.”39 
Another route is via officially sanctioned truth commissions.  Such mechanisms have 
different goals from tribunals: to investigate the fates of individuals and the nation as a whole 
rather than to prosecute and punish (Huyse, 2001), including full disclosure of human rights 
abuses, ensuring that facts remain alive in the memory of a collectivity.  Dzenana Karup, 
advocate for RECOM40  was emphatic truth telling is a misused concept in the country.  Its 
aim is to achieve objective facts, an idea that originally came from civil society organizations 
in the region, followed by donors later incorporated into the program; “the idea is that we, 
ourselves, via regional cooperation, make reports based on objective facts that deal with war 
issues.”41   Karup sees as achievement how  
“RECOM has gathered victims from all different groups, from all sides, all in one 
place.  For instance, here in Bosnia, we began as a consultation process between 
victims from all three ethnic groups and this has grown to become a process for 
victims of all states that were part of the former Yugoslavia.  It is a process of 
establishing connections across ethnic divides.”42   
Reconciliation for RECOM is a term sustaining objective fact-finding:  
“The most important element of reconciliation is facing with the past, a process 
that has not been completed in Bosnia.  Even though the ICTY determined all of 
this, we cannot talk about reconciliation here, both in Bosnia and in the region 
                                                          
39 Interview, 22-07-2016 
40 On RECOM See Chapter 3 page 100.    
41 Interview,  03-07-2016 (Interpreted by Karup’s assistant Ada Hasanagić) 
42 Interview,  03-07-2016 
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without looking at a process for facing the past.  They are closely connected.  
Until all ethnic groups face past crimes, reconciliation will never be achieved.”43   
The Centre for Democracy and Transitional Justice (CDTJ), in Banja Luka, supports 
RECOM.44    Zlatana Gruhonjić stated that CDTJ adheres to RECOM’s focus on regional 
cooperation based on facing with the past and reconciliation.45   For her, transitional justice is 
a regional process because the issues being faced derive from different countries part of the 
former Yugoslavia.  Data collection regarding concentration camps is “something concrete to 
put in the hands of institutions, all facts collected and put into one place.  This is a tool for 
institutions for future attempts to do something.”46  Beyond institutional work, Zlatana sees 
that “what we do is try to provoke a talk, a debate about war crimes, detention places and 
about the people that were captured.” Her intention is to get the conversation going beyond 
the (shrinking) circle of NGOs working on dealing with the past and transitional justice, to 
get a political stance on the matter.   Zlatana views reconciliation as peaceful cohabitation.  
Her colleague Zoran Vuckovac understands it as a ”process where we try to balance between 
different ethnic groups in recognizing the crimes they did in the past, to arrive at a situation in 
which each ethnic groups not only talks about their own victims but also on the crimes 
committed in their name, to recognize and go further.”47 
Telling thin and thick truths 
Looking back at fact-finding and truth telling, it is evident that both approaches, one of 
finding thin, factual accurate “truths” that cannot be subject to denial and the other that 
identifies multiple grounded “thin” truths; seem to be either complementary or conflictive.  
                                                          
43 Interview,  03-07-2016 
44 CDTJ focuses on gathering factual data regarding detention camps, victims, reasons, conditions inside them 
and the type of mistreatment that was done. 
45 Interview, 14-10-2016 
46 Interview, 14-10-2016 
47 Interview, 14-10-2016 
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The recognition of formal and informal, thick and thin, approaches to dealing with “the truth” 
may imply a contradiction between facts obtained via judicial and technical means and the 
way interpretative forms of understanding the truth allow for documentaries, stories, films 
and other resources to be shared and discussed.  Focusing on victims requires dealing with 
difficult past truths.  Interviews show the need for an appropriate environment for discussing 
truths and for different sides not only to hear opposing narratives but also to be open to 
accepting atrocities committed on their behalf by members of their own ethnic group.   The 
enabling of such environment makes truth telling a political matter, affecting both types of 
work.   For thin, fact-finding, of objective, and accurate accounts of the past, the political 
challenge will be the level of acceptance from authorities of their findings and their 
“undeniable” truths.  For thick narratives dealing with multiple truths, the challenge has to do 
with society, on whether audiences are willing and open to hear and understand differing 
accounts and accept them as realities that may go according to their own ethnic stories and 
interpretations of what happened. 
Getting people to work together: cooperation  
Getting people from different backgrounds, with a history of antagonism to “work together” 
may be a pragmatic stance in peacebuilding but one that deals with the core of reconciliation: 
the (re)building of relationships.  Cooperation centers on finding common interests between 
individuals and communities, engaging in community building.  When ethnic cleansing 
occurs in a conflict, states face the difficult task of rebuilding normal communal relations and 
as such reconciliation often means “… creating a new partnership” (Jeong, 2000, p. 192).  For 
cooperation, it takes two to reconcile, the victim and the perpetrator, individual and 
community, group and nation.  Reconciliation becomes a political, relational concept 
providing tools for rebuilding relationships.  A structural concept useful in political contexts 
and not only in private settings, this structural capacity for building relationships makes 
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reconciliation relevant in political discourse (Nordquist, 2006, p.17).  The content of 
reconciliation is the nature of the relationship itself.  It occurs on the everyday contact with 
the other rather than in political commissions or criminal tribunals.  The purpose is to 
influence relationships at the level where they were before injustices started, in the everyday 
living of communities.  Relationship-building relies on cooperation: actions from separate 
individuals or organizations, which are not in pre-existing harmony, where they are brought 
into conformity with each other via negotiation, developing mutual conciliatory 
accommodation between antagonistic persons or groups (Lerche, 2002).   Cooperation is an 
active exercise in trust-building, to work together in common tasks, moving towards common 
goals people must trust each other in many respects (Govier and Verwoerd, 2002).  If people 
are able to cooperate as members of groups, groups should be confident in the trustworthiness 
of others to make working together possible, any suspicion on lacking credibility, motivation 
or competence makes cooperation difficult and uncomfortable.  
Cooperation practices 
Cooperation has both political and economic implications.  An approach insistent on the need 
for improved communications and a better understanding of groups, where greater 
cooperation and coexistence are shaped at the individual and political level (Hamber and Van 
Der Merwe, 1998).  It requires acknowledgment that intergroup relations require social and 
economic transformation on an unprecedented scale, calling on an entire social system that 
addresses pressing needs (Lerche, 2002).   For Kemal Salaca, director of the War Veterans 
Association -Juvenile Volunteers of War Canton Sarajevo48, due to the lack of a strategic plan 
to help war veterans, his organization focused on eliminating ethnic obstacles to getting 
people together. “Our work is based on building this multiethnic association as I had this idea 
of bringing people who were underage fighters during the war into one association in order to 
                                                          
48 This organization seeks to create a membership association of war veterans, minors recruited into the BiH 
Army, who have social, economic and health difficulties.  
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find a strategy to help them.”49  The goal is to reintegrate these veterans into society as this is 
a population that is commonly unemployed, whose high school education was interrupted by 
war and tend to face deep psychological traumas that led to alcohol and drug dependency.  
The association moved from gathering veterans and creating a supporting community to 
engaging in peacebuilding: as the project brought former underage fighters from all different 
sides and ethnicities, they began working on peace activities and projects, receiving 
UNICEF’s sponsorship.  Their project “From children of war to children of peace” organizes 
public speaking events for former veterans.  But different from other speaking events, in this 
one there is a commitment from veterans to live together as a community and plan public 
speakings together.  The goal is that they realize they have another choice different from the 
typical mono-ethnic status that marks life outside the main cities.  For Salaca success in 
cooperation comes from one rule: that people refrain from talking about politics within the 
association and to focus on a common goal, promoting peace.   Beyond the success of getting 
UNICEF supporting the association, “we want war veterans from the region to be able to 
work globally, making this a long-term plan.”50  Salaca sees underage fighters as particularly 
misunderstood in Bosnia, firmly believing that the idea of being forced into war is not 
accurate at all but rather that most children took arms voluntarily to protect their families, 
making many of these children volunteers for the different armies fighting a war.  For this 
reason, he states, “our goal and mission is to resolve this myth of the forced child soldiers and 
bring it down, making the international community more aware of the complexities that we 
had to face.” 
Cooperative work, dealing with citizen needs, often connects with community-building 
approaches that help collectivities on the ground to recover, to enable social cohesion and 
support and prosper after having faced atrocities.  Such approach is taken by the Center for 
                                                          
49 Interview, 22-07-2016 
50 Interview, 22-07-2016 
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Peacebuilding (CIM), in Sanski Most, focused on “mutual listening, understanding, and 
compassion through rebuilding relationships.”51   Mevludin Rahmanović, Imam and CIM’s 
founder, stated that as a religious leader he decided to do something about the issues of war 
and “show people through example and talk about what happened, not forcing people to 
forgive, but to understand that revenge and hate are not taught by religion.”52   Their first 
projects were only with Bosniaks in western Bosnia-Herzegovina, dealing with 
intercommunity conflicts, fostering reconciliation first within this community as a test to see 
how this work would move forward.  CIM moved to working with youth work across ethnic 
lines, working with groups from a Serb background, a personal challenge to its founders, 
being both former victims of Serb aggression, a very personal and challenging feat:  it took  
“Six or seven years to be able to bring religious leaders together, they would 
normally never sit together as there was this silent conflict between them.  We 
now have very nice communication with religious leaders, we organize receptions 
for Eid, Christmas and we have various receptions with religious leaders, they 
greet each other which is a huge step for us.”53   
This work evolved locally into an informal religious council within Sanski Most and through 
Iftar dinners, they promote an interreligious, intercultural event for Muslims and non-
Muslims.  Their aim is for the community to see them as partners, a group that they can 
cooperate with: “our goal is to involve the community in everything that we do.”54  Tamara 
Cvetković, CIM’s coordinator, and project manager views interethnic cooperation as dialogue 
and conversation within and between communities in order to promote positive change. This 
requires them “to be realistic and include all sides in our work.  I find that we are always 
talking about sides here and they should not exist.  We need to change our opinion, our 
                                                          
51CIM is dedicated to interethnic and religious dialogue, counseling and conflict-resolution skill building 
seminars.   
52 Interview,  19-06-2016 
53 Interview,  19-06-2016 
54 Interview,  19-06-2016 
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perception in the first place.” 55  CIM cooperates with the municipality and local citizens, 
leading to locals knowing the organization well.  “We do peace activities, peacebuilding, 
psychological work, change is done through us.  We make trust via dialogue to get solutions 
and this is a good step.”  Tamara recognized the importance of youth, and as a young person 
herself recognizes the impact that reconciliation practices can have on strengthening 
communities: “when we spend time together we see this need to talk.  This is the result of 
reconciliation, to be able to speak about everything, creating a safe space.  It is a long 
process…we need to learn together.”56 
A socioeconomic, transformative view of cooperation can be appreciated in Stefan Mueller’s 
vision, stating that GIZ57  develops an angle on reconciliation, despite focusing on economic 
development.  For him the Open Regional Funds, available for different sectors of the 
economy (trade, legal reform, public service development, EU integration, and biodiversity) 
work on the condition that they include the work of minimum three different countries of the 
region.  GIZ’s reconciliation is based on cooperation between different countries at different 
levels, for instance, the ‘Peaks of the Balkans’, a tourism project linking hiking trails between 
Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, leading to GIZ supporting talks about the regulations 
regarding border crossings between authorities of the three countries.  For Mueller, 
Reconciliation is “exchange and communication.  This is the first level of relationship-
building: communication and creating a benefit via joint action.” 58  The focus is improving 
the quality of life in communities, helping them gain income.    Cooperation is located at the 
highest political level.  Projects are done via intergovernmental negotiations, ensuring a 
diverse ethnic composition of the Open Regional Funds.  In Bosnia, there are various projects 
                                                          
55 Interview, 19-06-2016 
56 Interview, 19-06-2016 
57 An international cooperation agency, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.  Its expertise includes economic development, employment, energy, 
environment, peace, and security.  GIZ focuses on bilateral cooperation to promote regional cooperation 
between Southeast European countries. 
58 Interview, 27-05-2016 
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developing GIZ’s interethnic perspective: energy efficiency projects requiring action plans at 
the community level supported by the Ministry of Energy, promoting adult education that 
gathers learners from all ethnic groups to further their education, particularly for those who 
left school during the war.  Mueller emphasized two key cooperation projects: the 
strengthening of public institutions at the state level, a project concerned with power 
distribution, involving the Bosnian Central Bank, the Office of Statistics and public 
procurement agencies.  This project gets agencies to work together, an issue identified as a 
huge task due to corruption and nepotism in the Bosnian political system.  The other is local 
self-government and economic development.  Here, the agency establishes partnerships with 
local communities and connects them with networks of public support abroad.  By pairing 
communities in different countries for various development projects, GIZ seeks to support 
and promote community development in a way that crosses interethnic boundaries. 
Reconciliation via youthwork  
Approaching youth brings the prospective and forward-looking dimension of reconciliation 
into practice, involving youth in a critical understanding of the past, connecting communities 
in projects that attract young people’s interests and preparing future generations in social and 
political advocacy.  Youth exchanges and youth camps are viewed as processes that help 
build ‘together’ what was destroyed in the past (Theissen, 2004, p.9). 
Interviews identified the importance of youth work, getting young people, from different 
ethnic backgrounds to get together, know one another, eliminating ethnic and religion-based 
stereotypes and form common friendships, breaking social divisions in the country.  This is 
developed through youth camps and peace gatherings entailing interethnic encounters and 
cooperation.  Dina Vošanović, from Svitac59, said 
                                                          
59 A youth-orientated organization located in Brčko. 
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 “We try to forget this issue of identities and nationalities here yet it is not 
necessarily about forgetting the past.  It is more about working with the people 
and the creation of a neutral environment.  It is successful to have many people 
from different nationalities who are not aware of their differences.  When we 
make this happen, we see that there is no need to talk about the war anymore.”60   
One of Svitac’s most attractive youth activities is its summer camps,   established since 1999, 
offering youngsters a chance to travel and take part in cultural, artistic and educational 
activities where they meet people across the ethnic divide as well as volunteers from all over 
the world.  This expanded into integration activities inside and outside Brčko, extending its 
population’s reach.   For Vošanović, the acceptance of Svitac’s work in the local community 
means not only fostering interethnic cooperation between students and young people but also 
building trust with parents and the community at large: 
   “The work was focused on non-formal education and at the time of its 
foundation [1998] it seemed like a mission impossible to get the trust from parents 
in the local community but Svitac kept following its path and evolved, now we 
work with kids, youth in non-formal education programmes supported by the 
European Volunteer Service.  People come here and talk about other cultures, 
other countries and give local kids an outsider view so that they are open to new 
ideas and experiences.”  
 Jasmin Jasarević, director of the Association Proni Centre for Youth Development,61 sees 
this work based on “the idea…that people with the same interests can connect and work 
together in order to avoid this gap created by nationalism.”62  Proni’s model, developed out of 
a methodology from Swedish and Northern Irish organizations, began by opening two offices 
                                                          
60 Focus group, 09-09-2016 
61 Proni is a local organization that seeks to overcome interethnic barriers among young people in Brčko.  
62 Interview, 10-10-2016 
144 
 
(for Bosniak and Serb communities), to begin youth activities.   Starting with separate work 
to gain trust from the local youth and then moving to an interethnic group where young 
people could integrate and do educational and working placements in areas such as sports, 
arts and skills development.  Youth work connected with peacebuilding, talking about how to 
deal with the past and the future, Proni offered training on peace and reconciliation.  These 
would put three people together, developing planning inclusive of all sides.  For Jasarević 
success of this cooperative model led to political impact:  
“We even worked with the three presidents here in Brčko, we did training and 
supported development planning so that they could see what the people in local 
communities needed.  This all ended up in the creation of a law that defined the 
roles of the Brčko government and the management of the district.” 63  
Nansen Dialogue Center Prijedor (NDC)64  also approaches cooperation, viewing 
reconciliation as communication and dialogue, for participants to engage in understanding 
one another, breaking down images of the other and supporting processes for rebuilding 
relationships as well as exploring alternative solutions to joint challenges.  NDC presents 
dialogue as a practical tool, a communicational means to empower people in conflict 
situations (Savija-Valha and Šahić, 2015).  For NDC, dialogue is a two-folded task aimed at 
reconciliation of antagonistic ethnic groups and transforming the society and state into 
democratic ones.  Cooperative dialogue is a strategy of engagement for multi-ethnic social 
environments, characterized by antagonism and divisions, seeking co-existence between 
various political truths through practices that persuade people to broaden the range of their 
commitments to others, building inclusive communities.  Tanja Milovanović stated, “The 
essence of reconciliation is dialogue and communication and during the post-Tito era Bosnia 
                                                          
63 Interview, 10-10-2016 
64 NDC’s work is geared towards intercultural and interethnic dialogue processes at local, national and 
international levels, conflict prevention, reconciliation and peacebuilding.  For more, see http://www.nansen-
dialogue.net/index.php/en/who-are-we/vision-and-mission 
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has struggled to understand this, as a culture of dialogue was unknown to us.”65  She 
mentioned that in Bosnia people talk to persuade but not to understand one another, making 
communication a strategy for convincing.  NDC provides information to people on the 
benefits of dialogue, on shared beliefs and on information regarding the most pressing issues 
in the country.  Tanja explains that cooperation is an important focus in youth work to avoid 
the inter-generational passing of trauma;  
“Working with youth means to develop joint activities and get participants and 
various actors to work together.  We offer support for group engagement and they 
often continue to do activities without us, sometimes they get together and plan a 
project and find a way to get grants to be able to do more joint activities.”66   
The focus is dealing with prejudice and help people to overcome it: 
 “Whenever we have the opportunity to provide for spaces to deal with prejudice, 
and particularly in promoting the existence of multi-ethnic settings where 
different perspectives can engage in dialogue, this is what helps.  The step after 
this is for this dialogue and outcomes to move away from participants’ 
communities and find a way to reach other areas and other individuals.  We try to 
avoid for these processes to be stuck in the communities.”67 
Cooperating at top and bottom 
Cooperation in pursuit of common interests seems like a practical engagement within 
peacebuilding, an opportunity to connect thin high-level politics with thick, grounded 
practices of reconciliation.  Practices at both levels focus on solving immediate concerning 
issues.  Whether it is national projects that support sharing of resources, information and 
activities between countries, getting young people to encounter “the other”, destroying 
                                                          
65 Interview, 04-05-2016 
66 Interview, 04-05-2016 
67 Interview, 04-05-2016 
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stereotypes created via education and the inter-generational passing of trauma or simply 
discussing possibilities for joint projects and solutions to local problems, cooperation seems 
practical and forward-looking.   Interviewees interpret reconciliation as  
“An approach that not only tries to find a solution to the issues underlying the 
conflict but also to alter adversaries’ relationships from that of resentment and 
hostility to friendship and harmony.  For this to happen both parties must be 
equally invested intensively in the resolution process.” (Assefa, 2001, p.120) 
The question is to what extent these practices truly connect and if localised, thick, youth 
experiences of dialogue find active audiences at state levels where thin reconciliation is 
located.  Connections not made only through grants and projects but by turning local concerns 
part of the political agenda, producing policies responsive to the needs of the people who 
have actually “worked together”, overcoming differences and promoting a specific vision of 
change.  Youth engagement is important, asking the question of whether these localised, 
thick, interethnic encounters are enough to overcome prejudice.  Bearing in mind different 
sources for the intergenerational passing of trauma and stereotypes (media, parents, the 
education system, and politics), leads to questioning if thick projects are durable enough for 
young people to break stereotypes and work together.   
Punishing for reconciliation 
Retributive justice is a highly discussed and written about topic in reconciliation.   The 
reconciliation claim is that prosecutions have a cathartic role appeasing desires for vengeance, 
creating a sense of justice through prosecution (Betts, 2005).  Tribunals can contribute to 
peace, marginalizing nationalist politicians, potentially moving from violence to rule of law 
(Hoogenbom and Vieille, 2010, p. 189).   It also establishes deterrence, facilitating the 
creation of judicial structures.   The main retributive argument is that violent pasts need 
settling before a transition process to peace really begins, requiring retributive justice 
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(Eastmond, 2010, p.6) done via punishing perpetrators through criminal tribunals. The 
justification is that prosecutions individualize guilt, ending collective blaming.  Retributive 
justice punishes perpetrators of the old regime, reconstructs a morally just order, establishes a 
young democracy and helps heal wounds and repair private and public damage (Huyse, 
2001).   Prosecutions can comfort victims, reflect a new set of social norms and begin a trust-
building process between society and state institutions (Van Zyl, 2005).  Trials become 
expressions of societal desire for distribution and reaffirming essential norms and values that 
when violated give rise to sanctions.  Trials demonstrate to victims that state institutions will 
seek to protect rather than violate rights, restoring victims’ dignity and reduce desires for 
anger or grievances. 
Practicing retributive justice 
As mentioned in Chapter three, the main source of retributive justice in Bosnia is the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).   An ICTY promotional 
leaflet states: 
“Justice is an indispensable ingredient in the process of national reconciliation.  It 
is essential to the restoration of peaceful and normal relations between people who 
have had to live under a reign of terror.  It breaks the cycle of violence, hatred, and 
extrajudicial retribution.  Thus peace and justice of hand in hand.” 
Antonio Cassesse, former ICTY President. 
An anonymous ICTY-Outreach representative stated that both transitional justice and the 
ICTY had been given excessive expectations surrounding their work on the ground and 
particularly reconciliation:  “We have been the major actor of transitional process; we have 
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been partners with initiatives on the field and are trying to explain the limitation of the 
mandate.”68   
Transitional justice was 
 “A complex process that is not limited to the judicial component of it.  So many 
processes have not even started or are barely just starting.  We are talking about 
the right to truth, re-satisfaction of the victims of institutional reform issues.   The 
ICTY started the process by initiating war crime trials but people were misled into 
this idea that it would bring reconciliation or to go beyond its mandate which is 
simply to pursue war criminals.” 69   
For the interviewee, the ICTY contributed to dealing with the past and reconciliation via war 
crime trials.  Yet, there are other processes that need to go together (better engagement with 
the media, reforms in education, and support to political processes for reconciliation and truth 
finding), requiring local stakeholders rather than the international community:  
“We are fighting denial by the facts; we talk about judicial facts, established with 
high standards, beyond reasonable doubt.  When you talk with facts this is a 
powerful tool.  We do not go into political debates away from our mandate, when 
you face numbers with numbers and evidence it is hard to deny that.”70    
Although the ICTY maintains that its work helps establish a historical record of the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990’s, in political life it is in the interpretation of these given facts 
that is most important (Clark, 2010, p. 348).  Advocating for retributive justice is Elmina 
Kulasić from the Association for Transitional Justice and Remembrance (TJAR):  
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“In Bosnia, truth and reconciliation have many meanings for each group in Bosnia 
due to the aftermath of the war.  If we look at the ICTY, it was created in 1993 
and shaped the narrative in terms of how we reckon with the past and how we 
approach truth telling through legal means rather than working directly with 
survivors, and that has been the approach since 1993, focusing on perpetrators and 
doing fact-finding.” 71   
This approach shaped NGO work, influencing fact-finding activism.  For her the starting 
point has been a legal, case-related approach to atrocities in Bosnia, as it is the safest way of 
dealing with the past.  Kulasić deems problematic the ICTY’s initial lack of engagement with 
locals, leading to peacebuilding developing a local approach focused on victims, survivors 
and their views, as the legal system did not work directly with survivors.  She recognizes a 
gap between approaches, a legal approach with established processes and facts and a field in 
need of training on how to approach survivors, the human side of the process.  Reconciliation  
“Has to do with the acknowledgment of atrocities that took place.  There needs to 
be a starting point for this, as we cannot engage in reconciliation without a 
widespread acknowledgment of the committed crimes.  Recognizing that society 
needs to accept what happened, that there are victims and that we are still 
searching for remains.”72 
  BIRN also supports retributive justice, particularly war crime trials.  Erna Maćkik stated, 
“After so many years we have had a lot of experience not just on war crimes but also on other 
pillars of transitional justice.  We have connections with media, prosecutors, NGOs, victims 
associations.”   Maćkik explained the difficult process for establishing and maintaining 
positive relationships with the Bosnian judiciary, and how their work for monitoring 
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retributive justice started:  “We are constant, we go every day to the courtroom, we constantly 
do crime reporting, we have good relations with the Public Relations office in the State level 
Court, perhaps less with the Prosecutor’s office.  We are persistent.”73  BIRN actively works 
assessing Court reporting, looking for openness, transparency and less space for mistakes.  
This is balanced with their monitoring of Bosnian media’s war crime reporting.  There is 
space for factual mistakes in this line of work, which explains their training focused on how 
to conduct professionally when reporting legal issues, leading to a positive assessment of the 
evolving professionalization of war crime reporting.   
 “In the beginning [2007] prosecutors were quite angry at the media for making 
mistakes on reporting their work” as journalists often misunderstood the judicial 
process in Bosnia, and “we ended up doing a series of training to solve the 
training issue.  Two years later we saw the process and the relationship more 
positive although there was a tendency of reporters calling prosecutors directly at 
their homes of mobile phones to clarify things.”74   
What she sees now is judges and prosecutors being open to giving information via their 
website, a clear sign of progress.  Maćkik connects this to truth telling: “We need first a 
Bosnian commission rather than a regional commission, RECOM.   We need to start from 
here and move to the regional level and not the other way around…We also need laws at the 
state level, built into BiH for this and once this is achieved then we can focus on the region.  
We need to start locally.”75   
Judicial reform is important for transitional justice and retributive work, particularly 
strengthening judicial institutions that can continue dealing with the tasks of transitional 
justice.  In BiH, retributive justice moved from ICTY to strengthening and development of 
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75 Interview, 22-07-2016 
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the judiciary, a task supported by the Swiss Embassy’s Cooperation Agency through its 
“Political stability and effective democratic institutions” project.76  Haris Lokavić explained 
the embassy’s support of the judiciary via their “Human Security” programme, which 
includes demining and landmine awareness, assistance to justice in war crimes processing via 
training judiciary staff focused on judging properly and professionally.  This includes 
providing support to victims and witnesses as well as NGOs involved in the judicial process 
and supporting the judicial system by creating witness support offices at the institutional 
level.   Also, the embassy supports BIRN in the covering of war crime trials, and ICMP in 
identifying missing persons; supporting the drafting of the national transitional justice 
strategy, bringing in the UNDP and the Spanish Embassy for financial and technical support.  
For Lokavić, retributive work requires connections with other areas:   
“The translation of reconciliation in local languages is complex and conflictive; it 
is full of rhetorical questions, about how assistance to war crimes helps 
reconciliation.  Justice is a necessary tool but it does not help people reconcile in 
villages in the North of Bosnia for instance.  We need to initiate work in all levels, 
ministries, working together, employment offices of entities and local 
municipalities.  People know each other very well.  There are also small actions, 
contributions by organizations like summer camps, transitional justice schools, 
youth activism, and support for human rights discussions.  Attempts to bring 
people closer and cross borders.”77 
 The Norwegian Embassy also adopts a retributive line via the “Norwegian support to 
improving judicial efficiency”, a policy emphasizing constant support for projects to reform 
                                                          
76 Work guided by principles of governance, safety and security at the local level, strong civil society 
development and development in mine affected communities.  Key is the strengthening of the central state 
and its administration, support to judiciary reform and social inclusion.   
77 Interview, 22-10-2016. 
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the judiciary in Bosnia, channeling funds via the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of 
Bosnia (HJPC).  They recognize as challenging the complicated administrative and legislative 
organization of the country.  Anne Havnor, Deputy Head of Mission, clarified the Embassy’s 
retributive work: “reconciliation underpins what we do and is the basis for selecting our 
partner organizations; we demand from them an active approach that includes work that goes 
across ethnic and national lines in the country and the region.”78  In supporting transitional 
justice,  
“We are a major bilateral donor for judicial efficiency and capacity building 
processes here in Bosnia.  We are trusted partners with the High Judicial 
Prosecution Council.  Our gender and justice project, which we headed, led to 
cooperating with the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) and cooperation with 
the local office of the Atlantic Initiative on putting in practice Security Council 
Resolutions on women, peace, and security.”79 
  The project has three strands: judicial abilities surrounding cases of domestic violence 
against women, sexual harassment in the judiciary and gender bias.  Organizing these strands 
requires harmonious work and cooperation between organizations and the HJCP.  Havnor 
commented, “We work on this gender dimension to support women victims of domestic 
violence as well as survivors of wartime violence, and in this sense, we concentrate on the 
delivery of justice to both women and men victims of gender violence.”80   
A common concern with retributive work is the improvement of procedures in the justice 
system, both for transitional and ordinary processes.  In this sense, TRIAL supports judicial 
reform, monitoring criminal proceedings and improving procedures in retributive justice.  
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79 Interview, 31-08-2016 
80 Interview, 31-08-2016 
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TRIAL has been concerned with the non-implementation of existing legal framework for 
transitional justice.  They report that  
“Although the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides for 
a detailed legal framework for the exercising of rights of victims, including 
victims of war crimes, to compensation for the harm they suffered, in practice, 
there have been no known cases of decision making on property claims filed by 
such persons…What is mentioned as the cause of this problem is primarily 
judiciary practice, i.e. failure of prosecutor’s offices and courts to meet their 
obligations prescribed by law.” (TRIAL, 2016, p. 12).  
 Adisa Fisić stated their need to work closely on the legislative aspects of transitional justice, 
looking at the effects war crime proceedings have on victims. 
 “We work with the state, with various stakeholders such as judges and 
prosecutors.  Communication is positive, we do positive work with the judiciary.  
Unfortunately, the situation there develops not very quickly, the general 
administration here is very complicated so seeing changes in the law is a very 
long process.  You must be patient.  It took two years to change the BiH criminal 
law in order to define issues such as rape and wartime disappearances.” 81   
She highlighted areas of legal work TRIAL is dedicated to;  
“We do advocacy for changing the law on identity protection during criminal 
proceedings as well as the issue of moving from criminal to civil proceedings.  
Here many victims reveal their identity and this is a concrete problem we want to 
                                                          
81 Interview,  23-06-2016 
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change.  There are many issues surrounding victims we focus on, we need more 
implementations on decisions in favor of forced disappearance cases.”82  
 Also sponsoring transitional justice is the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE).83  The OSCE’s retributive role emerges in its Rule of Law approach: 
 “Monitor trials involving war crimes, hate crimes, and human trafficking, and 
documents the work of the judiciary.  It also administers the War Crimes 
Processing Project, an initiative to help the country’s justice sector expedite the 
fair and effective processing of war crimes cases…”  (OSCE, N.D.) 
Its priorities are justice sector, institutional and legislative reform. Samra Ramić and Nihad 
Gavranović explained  
“We realize that there are tons of actions that we work on that fit reconciliation.  
We work with the local community and reconciliation in the broader sense starts 
there.  You cannot work on reconciliation solely at the state level, you need it at 
the local level if you want to foster stability.  When we talk about stability for 
reconciliation, that means the provision of an environment conducive to 
employment, good governance, where citizens are involved in decision-making, 
working with marginalized groups, all these things that contribute to social 
cohesion and reconciliation.” 84   
For them, OSCE activities aim at building trust in the system, between the government and 
the people, which makes dissatisfaction with the government at the local level an essential 
issue to tackle.  Gavranović talked about three legacies for transitional justice that the OSCE 
tries to tackle; “inheritance of the previous governance system, an inadequate local system 
                                                          
82 Interview,  23-06-2016 
83 The OSCE’s mission is the promotion of reconciliation and assistance to Bosnian authorities in its path to 
political and socioeconomic integration.  
84Interview, 06-09-2016   
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unresponsive to the people and the constant need to build social cohesion.”85  The OSCE’s 
support focuses on making adequate local administrations to be more responsive to people, 
leaving aside bad past administrative practices and creating a better space for politics in BiH.  
Ramić complemented, transitional justice “is in all that we do: human rights, rule of law, 
education, good governance.  Removing discriminatory dispositions in education and in the 
laws in the different constitutions.”  Gavranović added “we work on removing discriminatory 
dispositions in legislation.  We gather people who can raise concern about the discriminatory 
dispositions and guide them into the process of raising awareness and creating change.”86   
Ramić focused on local ownership: 
 “We called the prime ministers of all the cantons in the Federation.  We focused 
on the constitutions of all the cantons, pointing to the discriminatory provisions.  
The Prime Minister’s recognized which constitutions were problematic.  Our 
ambassador then gave us political support and after this we moved to technical 
work, facilitating.  The result has been amendments to the constitution that do not 
have any discriminatory dispositions.  In this sense, the cantonal government did 
the job, not the OSCE.”87 
Needed connections between international and local in retributive justice 
These organizations’ retributive focus insists on how the legislative and judicial processes 
deal with war crimes processing, victims of sexual crimes, discrimination, and the need for an 
effective and transparent judicial process.  Activities are placed upon the state level, as thin 
reconciliation.  The ICTY’s role is highlighted by most actors as the initiator of transitional 
justice and guiding mechanism for judicial sector development in dealing with war crimes.  
This approach requires working directly with the Bosnian state, offering the opportunity of 
                                                          
85 Interview, 06-09-2016  
86 Interview, 06-09-2016  
87 Interview, 06-09-2016  
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bringing to its attention the justice needs of the population and particularly a focus on victims 
whose needs are to be prioritized by transitional justice and peacebuilding.  The dilemmas 
have to do with an excessive international focus disconnecting with victims, ignoring their 
realities, thin reconciliation disconnected from the realm of the thick.  This is an inherited 
legacy from the ICTY to organizations doing transitional justice who need constant outreach 
with locals, requiring engaging with victims, not only in explaining complicated, technical 
terms of transitional justice but involving them in the process, not only as witnesses and 
sources of evidence against perpetrators but as active influencers in the decision-making 
processes for legislative and judicial reform.   Regarding the ICTY’s view that they are 
creating an official ‘judicial’ truth, it is in the interpretation of the facts that truth telling takes 
place, and in the case of BiH, as different interpretative frameworks on the ground do not 
converge, then facts alone will not help form a shared past between communities (Clark, 
2010).  This is vital for connecting thin and thick reconciliation, requiring more prioritizing.   
The concern over transitional justice not only involves perpetrators or international 
jurisprudence but also with the acceptance and legitimation of such processes by locals and 
how transitional justice moves from pure legalistic views to addressing other forms of justice 
such as socioeconomic justice.   Arenhövel (2008, p. 581) warns that when integration of 
society as a whole is endangered, transitional justice needs to be seen as a prerequisite for 
democracy; with higher levels of societal mobilization and fragmentation, a higher need for 
transitional justice.  In this sense, the legitimacy gap in transitional justice is highly 
problematic for the democratization process in BiH. 
Peace education: teaching and learning reconciliation 
Education as a peacebuilding arena accepts socialization as a channel for reconciliation 
values.   Social change within education begins by conceiving education programmes as a 
way to begin understanding oneself, becoming aware of own approaches and behaviors.  
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Change moves towards becoming aware of one’s relations with other people, analyzing then 
and opening spaces for analyzing different forms of social relations (Zenzerović, 2007, p. 96).   
As education is vital in socializing young people, it potentially becomes space for interethnic 
cooperation and practical site of reconciliation ideas of tolerance, acceptance and 
“recognizing the other”.   Peace education connects to truth telling: creating credible accounts 
of human rights and spaces for learning the past to preventing future repetitions of atrocities 
(Mendeloff, 2004).  Education is a place for questioning and reshaping discourses at the 
political and societal level, helping overcome victimisation (Fischer, 2011, p. 419).  This sees 
reconciliation as a long-term process, combining factual truth with narrative-dialogical truths 
to avoid polarization.  Education becomes space for planning for security and peacebuilding, 
as curricula teachings and practices can reinforce ideological, racial, religious and political 
differences, a security issue in the form of peace education (Nelles, 2006).  
Delivering peace education 
BiH peace education practices adopt an informal pedagogical approach, outside the 
classroom, to address the past, looking critically at recent historical issues as well as looking 
for youth cooperation through the teaching of democratic values.  Connecting fact-finding 
and peace education is Fama’s work, developing multimedia projects focused on the siege of 
Sarajevo and the fall of Yugoslavia.  This collection serves as a virtual bank of knowledge 
bridging divides between remembrance and knowledge.88  Suada Kapić, Fama’s Executive 
Director responded online: “Our contribution to reconstruction is orientating at the 
methodology of laying down the facts, causes, and consequences of the fall of Yugoslavia…  
We believe that credible archives and formative multimedia projects have to serve the 
                                                          
88Fama’s work is seen as a “new approach to documenting facts and evidence and mapping-out root causes 
and consequences of events in a genre accessible to a wide-spectrum audience”.  (FAMA, N.D.)      
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alternative education of citizens and especially young people.”89   Reconciliation is 
“establishing normal, functional relations in society after war destruction of the very 
fundaments of the roots of society”90 and it particularly requires “education, unique 
educational platform about what happened and how it has happened without allowing any 
manipulation of facts so people can first accept and after accepting establish functional 
relationships.”91    For Kapić, Fama aims to establish factography (as opposed to the political 
manipulation of history, common in BiH’s political and educational systems), conceiving 
Fama as alternative education via media dissemination and special public lectures realized in 
collaboration with other organizations from the civil sector.  Fama’s future vision is to have a 
mass approach to education favoring younger generations. 
Youth leaders have a lot of input on the role of peace education in the country as most 
advocate such practices.   Aleksa Matić, from Banja Luka, recognizes that within society, 
there is high acceptance of the idea of reconciliation except when it comes to politics.   “We 
share a lot, we share a language, we share the same difficult economic situation and 
lifestyle…There is no real problem between us when it comes to communicating but when it 
comes to politics it gets difficult….”92  As a young leader recognizing the problematic politics 
in BiH, Matić created a peace education platform.  He participated in the Be a Man Club –
Banja Luka, a series of high school clubs that develop educational workshops where students 
connect with one another and work on gender awareness as well as sexual education.93    
Consequently, Matić got involved in projects with the Institute for Youth and Community 
Development:  
                                                          
89 E-mail correspondence dated 05-10-2016 
90 E-mail correspondence dated 05-10-2016 
91 E-mail correspondence dated 05-10-2016 
92 Interview, 17-10-2016 
93 See http://www.yeu-international.org/en/publications/newsmail/small-stories-that-can-change-the-
world/be-a-man-club-stop-violence-against-girls-and-women 
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“My role is as a volunteer peer educator.  The main project that we work on is 
called ‘react as a human’ focused on fighting against violence against 
women…We work on equality issues for women as these problems have become 
obvious over here.  Women may be recognized by the law but in practice aren’t as 
equal as men here.”94   
This work requires “do(ing) street actions, education campaigns like our “react as a human” 
campaign, whose mission is to make a platform to prevent violence.”95  As a result, form 
various pilot projects; Matić started doing high schools peer education in areas with high 
levels of violence.  This entailed raising awareness on social issues, coordinating youth 
programs on issues such as bullying and violence and the organization of workshops, field 
visits, and parent meetings.  This meant getting youngsters, involved in violence, to join 
programmes like the ‘Be a Man Club’.  As a step forward, the “coalition under the scope” 
was created, a group of young people engaged electoral monitoring in six different areas of 
BiH (two Croat, two Serb and two Bosniak).  The program’s objective has been peer 
education and training in the political and electoral processes in BiH, youth serving as 
watchdogs against electoral fraud and other irregularities in Bosnia’s electoral processes.   
Another young leader is Sabahudin Mujkić,96 for whom reconciliation is important in Bosnia 
to counter ongoing propaganda focused on ethnic divisions.  Reconciliation is “accepting 
others if people can live and work together in the cities why can’t they do it in the rural areas.  
That is why we need to address it more in the peripheral areas.” 97  Reconciliation work needs 
to start “in school, with classes to learn how to address this.  If radicalization is becoming a 
                                                          
94 Interview, 17-10-2016 
95 Interview, 17-10-2016 
96 Coordinator of the Erasmus Student Network (ESN). ESN assists national authorities, higher education 
institutions and educational stakeholders with the implementation of EU’s Erasmus+ activities, which seek an 
integration and cultural exchange between European students. 
97 Interview, 19-10-2016 
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serious problem, just like landmines and drugs, then we need to learn about it.”98  Sabahudin 
explained that despite opposition from different authorities,  
“ESN is trying to get sections for Erasmus in Banja Luka and in many areas of 
Republika Srpska, to counter the influence of nationalism in education.  ESN’s 
work not only focuses on promoting the Erasmus+ programme in Bosnia-
Herzegovina but in “promoting BiH internationally as well.  We go to conferences 
where we represent our country and promote views other than just the war.  We 
try to work with our Balkan neighbours in order to move social issues in the 
country, we try to work conjunctly.” 99  
Youth work practitioner Dijana Pegić100 replaces reconciliation with  coexistence; 
“reconciliation is deeper work than coexistence.  It is a term applicable to adults but not to 
children, for them reconciliation is not applicable as they do not have issues to reconcile with.  
What we focus on with children are values such as coexistence, tolerance and the need to not 
have prejudice.” 101  Genesis works with small communities, bringing children together, 
creating ethnically mixed groups to do peer education workshops, movie production projects 
and educational activities where children of different backgrounds meet and work together.  
Pegić told me Genesis’ story, an organization working for 20 years, which allowed them to be 
trusted locally despite its connections with international donors.  Key to Genesis’s work has 
been the establishment of a multi-ethnic team, uncommon during early post-war years where 
most teams worked mono-ethnically.  This sent a message of cooperative education work, 
“focused on children, not on ethnicities”.  Pegić stated,  
                                                          
98 Interview, 19-10-2016 
99 Interview, 19-10-2016 
100 Representing the Genesis project.  A local organization in Banja Luka developing an education platform for 
children that includes peaceful conflict prevention and resolution, landmine awareness, interactive education 
for children’s rights, gender equality, and peacebuilding.   
101 Interview, 13-10-2016 
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“We believe that working together is unavoidable and because of this belief, we 
were led to work not only in Republika Srpska but also in the Federation.  It took a 
while but this process was a result of an identification of the needs of children and 
our needs as an organization to work in various areas.  Politicians have made us 
doubt that coexistence is possible but when you work with children you can see 
how open-minded they are and how willingly they are to remove prejudices and 
stereotypes.  This is a population where you can see significant changes.”102 
The Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC) also engages in peace education, recognizing that 
because of war, ethnic divisions have found their way into ethnic groups and local 
communities and have ended up in the creation of a system of mono-ethnic schools within 
Bosnia’s educational system (Nansen Dialogue Center, N.D.).  High school segregation, 
mono-ethnic education and lack of contact between students increase ethnic divides for the 
future.  In Srebrenica and Bratunac, NDC engaged in seminars organized in high schools 
titled “Peace and Intercultural education in the High School Srebrenica” focused on 
integrative approaches to education in this geographical area.  NDC began extracurricular 
joint activities for Bosniak and Serb pupils in Kravica and Konjevic Polje viewed as spaces 
for interethnic dialogue and cooperation.    Other projects aim at increasing interaction 
between Croat and Bosniak pupils in Stolac, and a space for student and teacher dialogues on 
the school system and its prospects for reconciliation.  A key achievement for NDC was 
working with the OSCE on integrating human rights education and minority rights into the 
school system, a program focused on supporting minority returns processes into the school 
system.  Tanja Milovanović explained that youth work in BiH requires long-term 
engagement, at least of a 3-year framework per project.103  Most activities from NDC have to 
do with interethnic contact between different students and young people in BiH.  One key 
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area is working with high school teachers in planning and development of education focused 
on conflict resolution:  
“Working with teachers is vital, as often when you work with teachers who are 
interested in the development of joint activities, your work is already done by 
them in terms of organizing students and supporting them.  We try to include 
anyone who simply wants to be involved.”104  
   NDC’s approach to combating prejudice in BiH recognizes that “the issue is everyone has 
prejudice, we see it within us.  Our work is simply to help overcome it.  Whenever we have 
the opportunity to provide for these spaces, and particularly in promoting the engagement of 
different perspectives in dialogue, this is what helps.” Jasmin Hasić, HIA’s representative105, 
explained their one-month program in human rights, which usually involves groups of 20 
people: 10 Bosnians and 10 from the United States, who discuss human rights within the 
Bosnian context106.  HIA develops fellowships with Bosnian and international students, 
lectures on human rights and genocide issues, memorial tours, meeting with key decision 
makers and representatives of political institutions in the country.  HIA’s growth has led to 
the establishment of a network in different countries, sharing information and publishing on 
peace and reconciliation issues, enabling international cooperation between Bosnia and other 
countries.  Fellowship participants are expected to put together projects to highlight their 
learning; giving lectures at universities, fundraising events, media presentations and activities 
that benefit their future careers.  One of the most attractive benefits of HIA’s work is the 
promotion and implementation of projects that include grants, study trips, participation in 
international conferences and internship opportunities for Bosnian students. 
                                                          
104 Interview, 04-05-2016 
105 HIA focuses on establishing peace in Bosnia via education, networking and cooperation of youth and the 
study of cultural, religious and ethnic tolerance.   
106 Interview,  07-09-2016 
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For Hasić, key in the HIA’s work is its inclusive approach to students in Bosnia.  He says, 
“We work with all the cities. I cannot think of a region without a fellow here in 
Bosnia.  Most advertising happens within universities, for that reason cities with 
universities are the prime target as this is a university-led project…targeting 
happens at Universities but we do pay attention to regional representation apart 
from all the other [ethnic] representations that we need to take care of, as it is a 
constitutional matter that spills onto the NGO level.”107  
 HIA’s view allows for engagement with other organizations, seeking to break ethnic and 
regional divides.  This idea of extending networks via recruitment has led to HIA developing 
a program with the International Višegrad group, connecting Bosnia, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary in the teaching of holocaust studies in central Europe, creating a 
curriculum for Genocide and Holocaust Studies, trips to participating countries and joint 
lecturing from local professors.  HIA cooperates with BIRN in the screening of 
documentaries about the Rwandan genocide as well as working with Transparency 
International on educational projects, via connections established with former HIA fellows. 
Peace education: alternative versus mainstream 
Peace education gains space as an alternative, non-formal space promoting reconciliation, 
dealing with localised, community-focused, and thick reconciliation.  It attempts to engage 
students (from all levels), teachers and parents in promoting tolerance, combating prejudice 
and violence as well as techniques for conflict resolution and transformation.  It čings a 
pedagogical view of reconciliation, potentially bringing other approaches into education.  It 
connects with truth telling, bringing different perspectives of history and culture that combat 
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nationalist narratives separating youngsters via mono-ethnic and segregating educational 
practices.  It promotes crossing inter-ethnic boundaries, seeking contact between students and 
teachers from different ethnic backgrounds, leading to cooperation and mutual understanding, 
shaped by the promotion of values linked to positive conflict transformation. 
The dilemma is to what extent informal approaches counter mainstream practices promoting 
nationalist, separatist ideologies in the educational system.  The main challenge with NGO or 
informal models is often lack of coordination, communication and cooperation between non-
formal and formal education systems, obstructing the building of a holistic approach to peace 
education (Sommardahl, 2015, p. 421).  There are many opportunities within this informal 
system to promote reconciliation values, yet risk the peril of being not long-term enough to 
counter mono-ethnic or segregationist models of education.   This becomes worrying as 
young people in BiH have a higher chance of radicalization due to lacking memory of 
national unity that previous Yugoslav generations have.  Focusing on this concern, Nelles 
(2006, p.37) sees as a competing risk for NGO peace education projects, the existence of 
ethnically-based learning centres, churches and mosques sometimes supported by external 
resources.  This contributes to radicalization of adults and youth, inculcating xenophobic 
ideas that affect the rise of religious or ideological extremism on BiH via education.  
Youngsters are separated by their schools, media, and politics and in some cases parents.   
Peace education disconnects from thin reconciliation, the creation of education laws 
advocating changes in curricula, in models for mainstream schooling and for the teaching and 
learning practice in BiH.  NGOs in this approach are dedicated to working with local teachers 
and students, working against nationalist politics that use the education system as a structure 
that promotes ethnically based education and that uses school segregation an opportunity to 
keep people divided. 
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Summary 
This chapter presented five understandings of reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
highlighting meanings and forms of implementation, looking at how projects connect or 
disconnect high-level initiatives from grassroots work.     
Trauma-healing connected with restorative justice, not only places direct attention to victims 
as reconciliation beneficiaries but also potentially moves individual healing towards 
collective reconciliation.  This requires “thick” work with victims, dealing with needs and 
trauma, as well as “thin” work, providing legal structures for compensation, reparation, and 
support.  Grassroots psychotherapeutic practice requires support in legislative work, creating 
frameworks for supporting victims and minorities in BiH.  The establishment of a reparations 
process supportive of all war victims, from all sides, requires taking into consideration 
victims’ needs identified by therapeutic trauma-healing work. 
Dealing with the truth occurs via fact-finding and truth telling.  Both sources of truth, factual 
and subjective, are important for reconciliation and need to be uncovered and disseminated 
equally.  They risk conflict and confrontation, requiring strong connections between these 
thin and thick realms of truth, requiring a dialogue-prone environment that can come from a 
political process open to different versions of the truth.  This is challenging in two ways: in 
getting BiH authorities to accept objective accounts that contradict their own political and 
historical stances.  More difficult is getting society to listen and accept multiple truths, 
requiring accepting narratives where one’s own ethnic group may be responsible for past 
atrocities. 
Less controversial is cooperation, a more practical stance on reconciliation.  Pursuing 
common interest links reconciliation with citizen needs in areas of economic and social 
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development, dealing with pressing issues.  Of particular interest is working with young 
people, developing a forward-looking approach different from that of “dealing with the past”.   
Yet cooperation, whether done via political national dialogue and regional development 
projects or on the ground, gathering people from different ethnicities in everyday routines, 
requires connecting thick and thin practices, aiming at making local needs part of the policy 
process in BiH, where development projects that connect authorities reflect the needs of the 
reconciled citizens on the ground. 
Retributive justice, perpetrator-focused justice coupled with judicial reform emerges from 
international practice, supported by donors and the international community.  As a mainly 
thin type of reconciliation placed upon state/institution-building, it potentially establishes 
prosecutions to individualize responsibility for war crimes and avoid collective blaming.  Yet, 
in the traditionally distant language and practice of international justice is where 
disconnection with the “thin” emerges.  Not only is this related to criticisms of the ICTY as a 
(geographic and symbolic) distant justice, but also has implications for the development of 
the judicial sector of Bosnia, distant and expensive to access for many citizens. 
Finally, peace education is introduced as a creative approach promoting tolerance, 
acceptance, and coexistence among Bosnia’s youth.    It offers a wide array of spaces and 
opportunities to foster interethnic encounters, teaching practices of conflict transformation 
such as peer mediation, the study of human rights and genocide awareness together with more 
informal pedagogical practices.  This thick approach focused on teachers, students and 
parents on the ground necessitates connecting with state-building practices in education, in 
confronting and establishing a dialogue that deals with sources of tension and segregation in 
schools and universities.  Avoiding politics and focusing only on students and informal 
spaces risk the peril of not being a sustainable enough approach to counter segregation, 
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mono-ethnic education and the using of education as a tool for nationalist and separatist 
political practices. 
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CHAPTER 5 - EXPERIENCING RECONCILIATION: 
GROUND MEANINGS 
Introduction 
This chapter explores citizen understandings of reconciliation, looking at personal stories and 
meanings displaying everyday experiences.  Reconciliation stories reflect mind-sets different 
from peacebuilding projects; everyday sources are not necessarily grounded in technical 
frames but in what makes sense to people in their day-to-day lives.   Being a morally loaded 
concept, individual understandings of reconciliation show people’s sources for ideological 
bias to the subject, definitions are informed by their basic beliefs about the world (Hamber 
and Kelly, 2004).   Looking at citizens’ reconciliation experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BiH), views how these interpretations are connected or disconnected from peacebuilding 
constructions established previously. 
Stories come from conversations and semi-structured interviews with Bosnian citizens during 
fieldwork, focused on personal experiences, how interviewees lived reconciliation and what 
importance this concept has for them.  Interviewees come from cities and towns in Republika 
Srpska, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Brčko District, and people from different 
ethnic, social and working backgrounds.  Through recurring themes from personal narratives, 
eight reconciliation understandings can be identified: as forgiveness, as youth engagement, as 
a form of learning, as an external imposition, as an everyday practice, as communication, as 
economic prosperity, and as a pre-war state of affairs. 
 
 
 
169 
 
“Forgive, never forget”: acknowledgment, remembrance, and recognition 
 “Forgive, never forget” appears written on walls throughout BiH, referring to the 
memorialization of Srebrenica, genocide in Prijedor, concentration camps, and atrocities 
contested between communities.  The phrase illustrates dilemmas of forgiveness in 
reconciliation: should there be a policy for forgiveness in postconflict contexts?  Can one 
demand forgiveness for those who experienced extreme violence and calamity? 
Forgiveness and recognition are transitional justice issues with implications for rebuilding 
relationships between former adversaries.  Forgiveness is “a transaction between the forgiver 
and the forgiven, a shared acknowledgment of past wrongdoing, an acknowledgment of 
appropriate punishment and a demonstration that contrition and repentance have been met by 
mercy” (Newman, 2002, p. 35).   Forgiveness constitutes thick reconciliation together with 
apologies, contrition, and mercy (Fischer 2011, Skaar, 2013).  It entails relationship-building 
between forgiver and forgiven at the individual level (Nordquist, 2006, p.16).  At societal 
levels, reconciliation implies changing attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships 
towards sustainable peace (Skaar, 2013).  Although indispensable for reconciliation (Schaap 
2004, Huyse 2001, Christie, Wagner and Winter 2001), forgiveness and recognition can 
trigger conflict as the desire for recognition of one group can provide the basis for an 
entrenched vision of politics, leaving out possible encounters with the other (Schaap, 2004).  
Nonetheless, acknowledging wrongdoing and responsibility and taking the initiative to restore 
a relationship can bridge gaps with those who were hurt, increasing societal trust (Govier and 
Verwoerd, 2002).  
Some interviewees defined reconciliation as forgiveness and remembrance: acknowledging 
what happened, apologizing for what was done, repairing harms and being open to 
forgiveness.   Forgiveness is linked to ways of dealing with hate and desires of revenge within 
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victim communities.  For Adnan Hasenbegović, living in Sarajevo, reconciliation “means 
forgiveness, it is when people can forgive perpetrators for what was done in the past, to move 
forward, a space for victims.”108  Similarly, university student Emina Sabljaković views 
forgiveness to bridge the gap between generations:   
“After the war, well we cannot forget.  We must try and forgive.  The younger 
generations, we had nothing to do with the war.  I am sad for what happened, and 
we should try to reconcile.  If we reconcile it does not mean to forget 
everything.  It’s just to make sure it does not happen again.   For newer 
generations, so that they do not feel the same and try to improve things in this 
country.   This is not forgetting, reconciliation is not forgetting.  These are two 
different things.”109 
Both quotes refer to remembrance, memory and the possibility of forgiveness for what 
happened in the past.  Forgiveness turns reconciliation into a relational concept, leaving aside 
individual understandings: it takes two to forgive and reconcile (Nordquist, 2006, p.16).  
Reconciliation becomes a delicate political act that can end up as an imposition on 
individuals, going against the nature of reconciliation.  For Aleksa Vućen, a Prijedor teacher, 
forgiveness requires additional elements when working at individual and group levels: victim 
acknowledgment, their inclusion into the community and public apologies seem to be vital in 
Prijedor due to the glorification of war criminals as heroes of Republika Srpska, a barrier to 
forgiveness:   
 “I would focus on 4 pillars:  confrontation, acceptance, apology, and 
forgiveness.  In Prijedor, a town of 9700 inhabitants there were 53% Muslims 
before the war according to our Census in 1991, now it has gone down to around 
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2000 Muslims here.  Ethnic cleansing has occurred here, there are allegations of 
around 3000 people executed by Serb forces, of Croat and Muslim 
descent.  Nothing has been said.  We have a monument of the defenders of 
Prijedor.  These were Serb soldiers.  When you put yourself in the position of 
Croats or Muslims here it is horrendous: if you are a Bosnian who returned to 
Prijedor you do not have a recognition of the atrocities committed against you yet 
you see a monument for your killers which is o.k. in here.  How can you integrate 
here with this?”110  
 Integration rises as the outcome of forgiveness, supporting the building of a relationship 
between forgiver and forgiven.  Sarajevan schoolteacher Kenan Ćengić is also concerned 
about this possibility of integration, due to constant reminders of the past, often politicised in 
BiH.  Forgiveness implies getting rid of divisions imposed by war, emphasized during the 
post-war era.  He is concerned with ongoing political practices of division that inhibit 
dialogue towards reconciliation:   
“We need to unlearn the things that the war taught us.  Let go of hate born in the 
war, all that resentment.  We have to learn how to forgive.  For instance, in 
regards to Srebrenica, every year we have a big event and every year its 
commemoration becomes a very big deal.  Srebrenica did happen, but its 
politicisation gives many a reason to hate.   Their logic [victims] is that I am 
fighting through my hate because of what was done to me during the war.  This is 
a victim syndrome that happens over here, it happens to people and leads to a 
constant state of judgment because of fear, many Bosniaks suffer from this 
syndrome.”111   
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This last response reflects a particular problem with remembrance in BiH, related to an 
overload of information regarding the war, making citizens tired of commemorations, of 
remembrance practices and of what seems to be a never-ending discussion about the war.  In 
this regard, Hodzić writes on BiH memorialization  
“I think people do not see the point because we evidently have an overload of 
information about the war…regardless of how much you are affected by it and are 
personally concerned, you will in time get bored and tired with it.  What 
determines this discourse of discussing the past is that the past is still being used 
for the purpose of hatred, the purpose of reheating the fear, the purpose of 
deepening the divides and people are fed up with it.” (Hodzić, 2007, p. 146).   
 In their study of monuments as practice of remembrance in BiH, Franović and Vukosavijević 
(2016, p. 221) state that the overall impression is that it is more important to remember who 
the enemy is than who the victims were.  This turns enemies, whole ethnic groups, into 
shapeless frightening masses.  The diversity within ethnic groups is ignored; those who 
warned and opposed warmongering politics are ignored and categorized within the mass that 
should be feared.  What BiH remembrance avoids is the suffering of others, mentioned only 
as enemies. 
Forgiveness and recognition are deemed vital for intergroup reconciliation in BiH; 
forgiveness can become a marker for political reconciliation, as a willingness to reconcile 
signifies a political context in which an idea of justice can be staged (Schaap, 2008).   
Although reconciliation can bring spaces for forgiveness these should not pressure victims 
into forgiving.  This happens at their discretion (Bloomfield, 2006, Hamber and Kelly, 2004).   
Franović and Vukosavijević (2016, p. 226) warn that as reconciliation in BiH is equated to 
forgiveness this makes it a very unpopular term.  They highlight tensions between dealing 
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constructively with the past and the idea that reconciliation will lead to forgiveness.  The 
tension requires attention to understanding reconciliation as a process of learning how to live 
with the memory of crimes part of BiH’s history and identity as well as a liberation from the 
ethnopolitical narratives that citizens were exposed to during the war.   Key to permitting a 
space for alleviating this tension is the underlying need for reparations, apologies and 
constitutional recognition towards reconciliation.  Recognition takes on primordial political 
importance (Assefa, 2001); what needs to be recognized is not just victims’ suffering but their 
sense of being equal rights bearers as citizens.  Transitional justice requires recognized victim 
protection, engaging in modes of redress that diminish their suffering and restore rights 
violated in the past (De Greiff, 2012).  Acknowledgment recognizes the significance and 
value of persons as individuals, citizens, and victims, requiring a sense of justice through 
prosecutions combined with appropriate reparations that demonstrate a government’s 
commitment to seeing victims as beneficiaries.  Unfortunately, as discussed later, lack of 
reparations in BiH has led to double-victimization, reducing the window of opportunity for 
political forgiveness. 
Youth engagement: forward-looking reconciliation  
A contemporary question in transitional justice is how to effectively and meaningfully 
include youth in outreach activities.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the delays in establishing 
effective outreach for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
are denounced as its failure, affecting its local legitimacy (Clark 2009a, Sriram 2010).   
Outreach is defined as “a set of tools that transitional justice measures put in place to build 
direct channels of communication with affected communities, in order to raise awareness of 
the justice process and promote understanding of its work” (Ramírez Barat, 2012, p. 2).  As 
children and youth are highly vulnerable groups in society, this has led to their recognition as 
important stakeholders in transitional justice, yet in practice, they tend to be left out due to 
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their age and social status (Ramírez-Barat, 2012).  Two key transitional justice activities are 
the inclusion of the perspectives of youth within transitional justice mechanisms, and the need 
for developing creative engagement strategies that facilitate the genuine participation of youth 
in the process whilst also protecting them from harm (Ladisch, 2012).  This entails a paradox 
in striking a balance between effective participation and protection against the harm of youth 
and children in transitional justice. 
Various interviewees call for youth participation in reconciliation processes to help 
youngsters deal with the intergenerational passing of trauma.    Part of peacebuilding are 
inter-generational reconciliation processes dealing with individuals and groups who have to 
come to grips with prejudices, memories and have had to grow up in polarized societies due 
to past grievances and divisions (Nordquist, 2006, p.13).  Despite not having a recollection of 
wartime events, youngsters are at times, forcefully influenced by parents, the political system, 
ethnic peers, and schools to accept the trauma that was inflicted upon previous generations 
who lived the war.  Ada Hassanagić, in Sarajevo, mentioned: “we can see in the children born 
after the war, elsewhere (outside Sarajevo) you can really see kids having this accumulated 
hate from their parents and from society.  In these cases, it is very common to see their 
parents belonging to a political party.”112  This shows how history can become a new reason 
for conflict and an individual and social challenge in postconflict settings, requiring inter-
generational reconciliation (Nordquist, 2006, p.13).   In BiH, hate can be passed down from 
parents to children and teachers to students: Muslim kids learn that Serbs joined Croats in a 
great aggression and Serb kids taught to blame Serb-hating criminals and terrorists (Nelles, 
2006).   Filmmaker Emir Kapetanović, in Sarajevo, evidences this: 
 “There is this case of students in Mostar who wanted to go to Sarajevo as they 
were tired of the same school trips to Split in Croatia but the teachers were 
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reluctant to approve this.  You can see how someone always works systematically 
to divide kids.  The older generation has a united past but people now work on 
dividing kids and we have the risk that their goal of a divided society will be 
fulfilled.”113   
Interviewees linked reconciliation to the idea of ‘not being made guilty’ of what previous 
generations, also insisting on participating in political processes derived from peacebuilding 
so that these consider their needs.  Interviews show concerns with a lack of connection with 
young people in transitional justice, youth problematized as an age with little agency, subject 
to divisions from a war they had nothing to do with.  Sarajevan Emina Sabljaković expresses 
frustration with the lack of opportunities for young people in reconciliation:   
“Young people do not have an opportunity to decide.  I cannot decide much apart 
from voting but that does not change anything.  We all try to do what we can.  
This is not just young people.  All people who come here who want to do 
something positive with the country.  However, if we do not give opportunities to 
young people then, what can we do?  We cannot keep electing the same 
thing…People do not have many opportunities to change things.  At least young 
people should be given an opportunity.”114   
Amina Isaković, also from Sarajevo, is equally concerned with polarization caused by 
ethnopolitics: 
  “I do not see these differences in people; people my age were not involved in this 
war as aggressors.  Now you see it on T.V. this year during elections as Dodik 
talks a lot about his referendum.  This creates new problems for younger 
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generations, creating hate.  They want to separate us but we will not let this 
happen.  They must stop spreading this hate.”115   
 Lejla Crnkić, a Sarajevan University student, denounces the unavoidable impact of the 
dividing mentality on Bosnian youth:    
“We don’t need so many parties, or three presidents to represent us, maybe one 
day we will have just one.  We do not need this system that turns schools into one 
roof.    We have been talking about the past for twenty years and in order to fight 
you need two sides so that is why I switch off.  We must stop this fighting and this 
constant talking about who was the one who started the war.”116 
The disconnection between the thin and thick can be appreciated in the fact that most 
opinions reflect a complete indifference from high-level politics and peacebuilding with the 
issues of youth yet recognize the value of grassroots projects that seek to integrate young 
people.  Two clashing interview responses reflect this.  For Kemal Salaca, working with 
former underage fighters and a former underage fighter himself during the war, concern with 
how youth is ignored in transitional justice is accentuated:  
“…bear in mind that we had between seven and ten thousand underage fighters 
during the war here in Bosnia, no organization, domestic or international, saw us 
doing the war.  All of this was an ignored issue back then.  I believe it is a myth 
that child volunteers are all forced, the truth, and particularly here in Bosnia, most 
of the children fighting took arms voluntarily to protect their family.  Mainly 
children were volunteers.” 117  
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 In contrast, Aleksandra Kuljanin’s story shows evidence of reconciliation efforts that can 
affect children and youth:  
 “Three years ago I was working for this NGO, Youth Sports Game; it travels 
around Bosnia doing competitions for children... In 2014, we were in Livno, this 
western town in the middle of nowhere…We were on a playground, kids playing 
football.  When Bosnia was playing in the World Cup, this team had half-Croatian 
and half-Bosnian jerseys.  There were two best friends, one Croat, one Bosnian 
and one with a Bosnian player on his jersey and the other with a Croat 
player.  They hugged.  Their name was the Fire-dragons.  This came as a 
combination as Croatian is known to be “fuelled by fire” and Bosnians are known 
as the Dragons.  They had their identities, their favorite players but they were 
together as friends, playing together.  That’s reconciliation, be what you want to 
be and respect the others whatever they are.”118 
Transitional justice, as social reconstruction, is said to be both backward and forward-looking 
(Van Zyl, 2005, Hoogenbom and Vieille, 2010).  It deals with the past and looks towards the 
construction of spaces for peaceful cohabitation and cooperation for future generations, as 
with the football story.  Interviewee calls for forward-looking reconciliation require giving 
youth a space in Bosnian politics free form ethnic divisions, manipulations from politics and 
concerned with their future prosperity.  The contrast between Kemal Salaca’s insistence on 
how youth has been ignored in transitional justice and the positive turn in Alexandra 
Kuljanin’s experience means that youth remains a critical population for engagement for 
peacebuilding and that approaching youth in peacebuilding creates the ground for connecting 
the top-down and the bottom-up.   As hinted in the quotes, the entrenchment in ethnic 
cleavages and promotion of ethnopolitics will particularly affect young people’s chances for 
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prosperity in BiH, leading to a “youth drain” in the country, a problem addressed in the 
following chapter. 
Linking past with future: learning about reconciliation 
Including education practices in reconciliation means promoting pedagogies that enhance 
communal learning among youth groups, fostering interethnic bonds through mutual learning 
and participation in education.  It requires opening up spaces that allow listening and 
disseminating narratives of the past that lead young people to discussions about what 
happened and how that situates them in society.  Education is conceived as a primary vehicle 
for re-humanizing and trust-building processes to take place (Clark, 2010, p. 346) 
Placing education as a channel for reconciliation recognizes its potential for truth telling and 
remembrance that promotes interethnic encounters between students.  Education can 
institutionalize remembrance, creating historical records of past violence and shared history 
of groups in conflict, opening possibilities for future reconciliation (Subotić, 2016, p.122).  
By contributing to credible accounts of past violence, post-conflict education can help 
demystify contested pasts.  Comprehensive educational reforms are critical steps towards 
justice based on trust, respect, and dignity, requiring profound political change (Subotić, 
2016, p.122).  Education reform is a mechanism that can contribute to transforming 
relationships between people, bringing opposing sides together and promoting reconciliation 
(Jones, 2016, p.193).  Yet, educational reform can fail in this potential when structured by 
universal frameworks underpinning human rights and citizenship that ignore the complexities 
of everyday lives of children in post-war contexts. 
Reconciliation, by seeking a forward-looking perspective, necessitates embedding in 
educational practices that take into account realities experienced by students.  For 
interviewees, this means having a schooling experience that encounters the other, not only by 
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breaking ethnic boundaries by meeting the other but by actually learning and living together 
with other communities.   They insist on more exposure to complex concepts like transitional 
justice, reconciliation and the work of the international community, not only to bring 
awareness of what has been going on in the country but also to encourage a critical mindset 
that can challenge divisions arising from ethnopolitics in the country.  Education was 
prompted as key for promoting reconciliation, yet deemed as a concern by many 
interviewees.  Aleksandra Kuljanin in Sarajevo mentioned   “For reconciliation we need 
education, we need to change our textbooks, make them universal.  This takes many years as 
education has degraded.   I received a better education in the nineties than the education that 
kids have nowadays.”119  Sabahudin Mujkić, a university leader promoting cultural exchanges 
between Bosnia and other European countries, also insists that education should address the 
dividing issues in the country.  Concerned about youth radicalization in the country, he 
believes that to achieve reconciliation,    
“We need to start in school, with classes to learn how to address this.  I remember 
we used to have classes about landmines and awareness of them, about drugs and 
youth.  Therefore, if radicalization is becoming a serious problem, just like mines 
and drugs, then we need to learn about it.  Young minds are getting attracted by 
quick money and there are always these rumors running around of how joining the 
Wahhabis in the country pays.”120   
The potential in education for establishing interethnic bonds between young people, 
countering ethnic, social and political divisions, is present in Nejra Kadić’s story about 
moving from a segregated school in Gornji Vakuf, where students from different ethnic 
groups study in separate classrooms, with different teachers and curricula.  She transferred to 
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an international school in Mostar, which provides interethnic and international student 
environments:  
“I went to high school in Mostar.  And when I arrived there, I thought I was a very 
open-minded individual mainly because of the suffocation that came from 
studying in a two schools under one roof system.  By going to Mostar and meeting 
so many others, not even just Croats and Serbs but other students, this made me 
aware of how biased I was, that I was not really that objective.  I was so ready to 
integrate with all of these people, but when I got there, I saw how one-sided things 
were for me.  I noticed it.  I reached this level of understanding of who I am and 
how long that route was.  Spending time with Serbs and Croats and realize all the 
stories about their victims and their stories made me feel this reconciliation.  We 
ignore so much about their atrocities.  We build so much on issues like Srebrenica 
and the guilt of the Serbs that we forget that they have their own episodes, their 
own atrocities, and their own tragedies.  In Mostar, I was able to break out from 
all of this.”121 
An innovating space for change is the education system, where ideas and concepts can be 
promoted in a democratic and peaceful manner.  To overcome victimisation, societies need 
multi-level approaches geared towards questioning and shaping discourses at political and 
societal level through education (Fischer, 2011, p. 419).  An example of this is Nevena 
Medic’s story; a youth leader in Srebrenica promoting rescuer stories in schools confronts 
different narratives on history present in high school students’ minds: 
 “…we had a positive experience with high school students with ordinary heroes’ 
projection, discussion afterward were fruitful.  I thought high school students in 
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Bosnia are not encouraged to talk a lot, it is a system where the teacher holds a lot 
of authority and you are not allowed to speak a lot.   The teacher is telling his 
thoughts to the class and in that moment I saw the students so open and 
emotionally engaged.  I did not know this, as all the things we hear in media is 
that Serbs are genocidal or that this is the only one who is to blame is the people 
where I grew up.  And I see that there is a different perspective and that it is not 
presented in education or media, that people did not want that war that we had 
positive examples of people helping each other, being friends in this area with this 
constant understanding of why we should not be friends with each other.”122 
Post-war education can potentially promote truth telling, allowing dialogue amongst students.  
Inclusive education can help peacebuilding by promoting encounters with students from 
different backgrounds, as long as it acknowledges the complex realities faced outside the 
classroom.  Interviews show concerns with the influence of ethnicity in Bosnian education, 
perpetuating divisions for future generations.  They also reflect practices that work in 
facilitating student encounters and understandings of how the other lives and understands 
reality.  In between, is a discussion of segregationist trends in Bosnian education promoted by 
policies focused on divided curricula, institutions, textbooks and pedagogical practices, an 
issue addressed in the following chapter. 
Reconciliation: An imported, imposed term without local meaning 
Bosnian transitional justice has been externally led, raising questions about legitimacy and 
relevance for intervened societies.  Scholars question international peacebuilding for failing 
to affect local dynamics of conflict and meaning for locals (Sriram 2010, Eastmond 2010, 
Andrieu, 2010, Shaw and Waldorf, 2010).   Forged by western liberalism, from perspectives 
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located outside areas where violent conflict occurs, transitional justice is accused of 
producing subjects and truths blind to gender and social injustice (Nagy, 2008, p. 275).  
Scholarship criticises inclusion of transitional justice mechanisms into strategies of externally 
built peacebuilding projects resulting in a primary focus on legal accountability, individual 
rights and responsibilities, which might not be seen as just in societies focused on collective 
community identity (Kostić, 2012, p.651).  The existence of a global discourse on 
reconciliation, serving as a master narrative that offers a remedy to harm done and healing in 
post-war societies, often ignores local contexts, leaving out conditions, uncertainties and 
power asymmetries in the process (Eastmond, 2010, p.4).  Kurtović (2015) explains that after 
the war’s foreign sanctioned stalemate, many Bosnians treated inter-national reconciliation as 
a western-imposed idea; some saw it as desirable in principle yet others had no wish for 
future co-existence in a state called Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Unsurprisingly, for some interviewees, reconciliation is an external term, difficult to translate 
into Bosnian languages and cultural understandings.   Reconciliation is alien not only for its 
external imposition but because it clashes with the political and cultural interests that caused 
the war, entrenched in the country’s political system.    The problem begins with a semantic 
issue highlighting the problematic diffusion of ‘reconciliation’.  The term reconciliation 
indicates a restorative moment, reconstruction of a past situation.  The term ‘Pomirenje’ in 
BiH evokes peaceful acceptance rather than mobilization or action (Jansen, 2013, p. 236).  
The word in English has a rich cultural history derived from its birth in theology, philosophy, 
law, history, and psychology, differing somewhat from its correlates in other languages 
(Komesaroff, 2016).  The term’s broad scope (in English) raises the question of whether it is 
too far-reaching and diffuse to be put into action.  Sladjana Milunović in Sarajevo explained:  
“In Bosnian reconciliation is translated as ‘Izmirenje’ or ‘Pomirenje’ which mean 
closeness.  This is why the word is hardly accepted in the country, as ethnic 
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groups do not believe in the closeness of their relations.  What is being sought is 
coexistence, being able to live together, but not necessarily in a close 
relationship.”123   
The interpretation and translation of reconciliation from English to local languages has an 
important political impact, as expressed Sinisa Sagević in Sarajevo:  
“For many the term reconciliation (closeness) as a word may feel like an offense, 
they can tell you that ‘if we did not fight why do we have to reconcile’.  It is a 
term that does not affect you.  You find this at the municipal level where people 
say they do not need reconciliation, people think that they do not have a problem 
yet they ignore the bigger picture, the social process.”124   
For Sarajevan Aida Murtić, reconciliation’s external, linguistic nature is problematic:  
 “When I hear these buzzwords I constantly try to translate them into my 
language, but when I cannot translate them properly I think there is a problem, 
they are a foreign concept.  I cannot find a translation for reconciliation; it is a 
term that is part of a foreign agenda so our language cannot grasp it… I do not 
know if we have these concepts present here.  We did not achieve justice in the 
way we wanted it but we did get a cooperation in everyday reality.  People 
exchange goods and meet with each other.   But in regards to justice, what is 
justice?  It is not fair; I did not get justice for my lost childhood.  Justice isn’t 
there, agendas change so much over here; there have been so many changes when 
it comes to justice issues.” 125  
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Understandings of reconciliation between older generations facing war, identifying the need 
to reconcile with their neighbours, differ from younger generations’ perceptions who may not 
see the need to reconcile if they had no major role in the war.  For Boris Predić, a young 
citizen in Prijedor reconciliation is a fake, opportunistic term:  “People were forced to 
reconcile by the United Nations.  It is a business.  The peace thing is imposed.  You see 
people working together only because there is profit, only because there is some interest.  In 
reality, the presidents of the three ethnicities run the whole show.”  Anja Kresojević, in 
Mostar, believes reconciliation is not only alien but also imposed between generations 
“This word is problematic.  Many have used it and abused it particularly NGOs, it 
is all done for money and projects.  What is it? We lived together before and then 
we had wars.  This made everything bloodier.  To use the word reconciliation is 
like what are you talking about?  There are obstacles placed to this from war.  
How would you feel if your neighbour shot you?  What about people who lost 
their families?  You cannot force reconciliation on them.  They remember what 
happened; they were backstabbed by their own neighbour.  Before the war, you 
had your life and war came and you lost everything, which makes you hate the 
new system…Reconciliation does not make sense, you just have to accept that 
there will be things that will not pass.  There is mistrust, from the war, stuff you 
hear, stuff you saw.  For the younger generation, reconciliation doesn’t make 
sense either…There is no physical danger or threat.”126 
The term has been interpreted either as an unfair ethnic blaming or as a way of hiding the 
challenging priorities in political and economic arenas in BiH.   In this regard, national 
reconciliation projects, by assuming a health and trauma-healing discourse make violence and 
the issue of rights, disappear from the narrative of reconciliation, dealing with the effects of 
                                                          
126 Interview, 06-10-2016 
185 
 
violence but often ignoring its causes (Humphrey, 2005 p. 204).  Such is Slobodanka Sodić’s 
interpretation, a schoolteacher in Prijedor and Banja Luka, who resists reconciliation, 
denouncing the concept’s imposition, stigmatizing Bosnian-Serbs within her own community 
and the nearby Bosniak community of Sanski Most:   
 “We don’t need reconciliation here.  It was all just money to be spent really all 
these reconciliation projects.  As students do not have a real problem with 
this.  Students here have friends from various backgrounds, and out of those 
projects our kids did not change and Sanski Most kids didn’t change either.  I have 
had enough of living with this bad impression of Prijedor.  No one talks about how 
there are no Serbs in Sarajevo or Sanski Most for that matter.  In Banja Luka, 
there are no Muslims but here in Prijedor is the best place in this sense.  Serbs in 
Prijedor get this reputation because of what happened in the 1990s.   My 
neighbour helped me and we helped them in times of crisis and that is how it 
works over here.”127  
In addition, Nejra Neimarlija in Sarajevo sees reconciliation as learned from the outside, 
losing its appeal in the country:  
 “As a citizen, it makes me think that we had to be taught about it from the 
international community.  In our situation, with a bad economy it does not have a 
priority.  It should be done but not directly…  Reconciliation was needed five to 
ten years ago, but now, twenty years after the war, in order for there to be 
reconciliation we need to build trust, we need to admit, to recognize crimes 
between ethnic crimes.  You cannot have reconciliation during Srebrenica’s mass 
graves issues; with victims present see how nationalist groups in RS keep singing 
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songs during the war and being proud.     Reconciliation is not done by external 
support, this needs to be done by us.   We need to build peace, reconciliation is a 
very hard topic, in the context of this people that lost their families, it is hard to 
talk to them about it, and this is something that can be dealt with easier with 
young people as the future of the country.”128 
Denouncing reconciliation as a foreign term shows locals’ dissatisfaction with peacebuilding.  
Interviewees insisted there was no real need to reconcile, as people seemed to work well 
together.   For others reconciliation needs to occur between politicians striving to separate 
people in BiH.   Jansen (2013, p. 233) also encounters in his study Bosnian citizens who 
treated inter-national reconciliation as a western-imposed idea, arguing that if it should be 
implemented in the country, it should be  preceded by apologies, punishment and 
compensation.  Contesting reconciliation reflects disappointment with what happened in BiH 
after the war: economic stagnation, high levels of corruption and entrenched ethnopolitics.  
The concern with politics as barrier to reconciliation becomes a marker for the distance 
between ordinary citizens and those working for international peacebuilding agencies.  The 
impossibility in reducing ethnic and nationalistic stances in political discourse and decision-
making in BiH mark this disillusionment with international intervention and its insistence on 
reconciliation, which seems at odds with what has been the main unintended product of years 
of international state-building: ethnopolitics.  
Reconciliation: everyday neighbourly practices 
In contrast with the previous section, some hint at an organic, everyday reconciliation.  As 
reconciliation focuses on rebuilding broken relationships after violence, it is logical to locate 
it at the community level, in mixed areas, where everyday interests lead to people meeting up, 
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finding organic ways to relate again, and pursuing common needs.  Reconciliation becomes a 
search for common ground on key terms (Kelly and Hammer, 2005).  A major aim of 
reconciliation is to influence relationships at the level where they were before injustices 
started (Nordquist, 2006, p.19).  Local communities are the spaces for reconciliation, as some 
interviewees often understand the Bosnian war as a war between neighbours.  This bottom-up 
perspective hints at reconciliation being developed among those who have suffered the most, 
not just between political elites, calling for an integration of broad layers of the population 
into a timely process.  Thick, community-led processes can occur outside or in absence of 
state-wide legitimacy (Bloomfield, 2006, p.26).  This resonates with Hamber and Van der 
Merwe’s (1998) reconciliation as local community building, concerned with coexistence, 
recognizing that harms of the past have broken down the network of interdependent relations 
in communities.  This shapes reconciliation as clearing up mistrust and rebuilding personal 
bonds at the local level.  In BiH, due to the mono-ethnic formations established after Dayton, 
developing local spaces for the creation of shared interests among persons of different ethnic 
backgrounds is accentuated in practice (Pickering, 2006).  Localised reconciliation is geared 
towards building trust levels rather than a complete agreement or harmony in relationships.  A 
realistic goal is to sustain a relationship with enough closeness and trust to handle conflicts 
and problems due to arise in the course of time (Govier and Verwoerd, 2002). 
Reconciliation is grounded in neighbour experiences, everyday encounters marking citizen 
routines in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Despite over-emphasis on ethnic divisions, blaming and 
victimization, some interviewees see reconciliation in the normality of relations with people 
around them, from other ethnic groups and occupations.    This shows a contrast between 
international initiatives for reconciliation aimed at merely allowing people to cross the 
boundaries between sides, rendering them slightly less opposed and a reconciliation simply 
understood as a practical dimension of everyday life (Jansen, 2013).  The post-war interaction 
188 
 
between ‘sides’ did not disappear during the 1990’s although it had been drastically reduced 
because of the war, which saw the imposition of a national matrix onto life practices.  
Although there is recognition that seeing neighbours and “the other” as simple human beings 
takes a lot of effort (due to unaddressed pasts, ethnic rhetoric, and messages from media 
outlets), daily spaces for socialization can lead to reconciling and accepting the other as a part 
of the community and as fellow human beings.  In Goran Djurić’s vision, a young citizen of 
Tuzla, his city is an example of everyday reconciliation:  
“Reconciliation requires people to socialize more, reducing the boundaries 
between us.  Moving away from all these stories of shooting.  People are now 
moving around and meeting one another.   Our hatred against politicians, I guess 
that unites us for sure, this hatred brings us closer…let me make one thing clear. 
Tuzla was very different place during the war, we did not have these ethnic 
differences and they did not affect us as much.  We were together.  We were all 
protesting together before the war.”129  
 Masa Nurkić, in Sarajevo, illustrates common ordinary forms of reconciliation, without 
politics.  Reconciliation:  
“…means being at peace with what has happened.  To leave the past behind and 
to move on with your life…There are many tasks to be done, and I remember in 
Srebrenica knowing about two guys, an Orthodox and a Muslim, they do not see 
differences between them and they work for the welfare of their city.  This is what 
is needed; we need to live together harmoniously… Here in Sarajevo, it is 
different, people can be friends with one another.  There are still mixed marriages 
although much lesser than during the war.   In terms of reconciliation, I see in 
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today’s children a chance of mixing and being together, kids who simply do not 
see these ethnic differences.”130  
 In addition, Selma Hodzic, a Mostar photographer, describes instances of natural 
reconciliation that can side-line imposed divisions from ethnopolitics, referring to the 2014 
floods in Bosnia where citizens helped one another without any regard for ethnic 
backgrounds:  
“When there were problems in Bosnia, with the floods, people helped one 
another.  No one went around asking who were the ones being affected.  Now in 
this election [2016 local elections], for instance in Stolac, it is key to see who is 
who.  We are not fighting but politics are separating us, here its two schools, two 
hospitals, two universities for everything, but normal people still talk to one 
another.”131  
 Pointing towards natural normalization of relations between citizens and organic forgiveness 
is Slatan Zubić’s story, a schoolteacher in Sarajevo who used to be a soldier during the war.  
He reconnected with the people he used to shoot at, insisting that it is politics and not 
ethnicity, which divides people:   
“I was a soldier in this brigade called the special force.  As part of my work, I had 
to attack a village by order of my commander.  When the war was over, I thought 
about what I had done, I was shooting at people I did not know.  As a soldier, I 
had to listen to my general.  But when the war was over, through Dayton, I just 
said well it is over, it is O.K. those people are my friends.  I went to Lukovica and 
sat down with people I used to shoot at.  We played, drank together as I knew the 
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war was not a good thing but a way for politicians to get rich and normal people to 
get poor.”132  
 In addition, Tatjana Milovanović, a young Bosnian-Serb law student in Brčko, exemplifies 
how people can organically encounter reconciliation in a youth-gathering environment:   
“The first thing that comes to mind was Kemal’s story.  He lost his mom and lost 
his leg.  When he met me, he had never before ever met a Serb.  He only knew 
that Serbs killed his mom.  We spent three days together in the mountains.  I saw 
this change in him.  It seemed unreal.  His attitude towards me was of reservation 
but as we talked about silly things, he changed and by the end, he was dancing 
with us.  We ended up hanging out together”133 
Stories show everyday encounters where relationships are rebuilt at the community, 
neighbourhood level.  The processes of socializing and meeting others, of bringing support as 
in the 2014 floods, or even discussing naturally painful events can imply a recognition of the 
other and the need to pursue common aims.  Such narratives point to an organic, Bosnian-
made reconciliation that challenges the idea that reconciliation is simply an externally 
imposed conception or a process that requires operationalizing in technical projects and NGO 
frameworks.  Face to face encounters across ethnic boundaries occur (yet may not be made 
visible to others) trespassing the harsh divisions in politics.   In BiH, there is a deep-seated 
cultural knowledge of living with difference and competence for managing potential conflict 
in interpersonal relations (Eastmond, 2010, p.9), which is often avoided by media, education 
and politics.  Non-violent coexistence can be interpreted as achievement, yet the scale of 
wartime violence, complicates its potential to guarantee peaceful relations.  Cooperation, the 
development of shared aims and projects that help locals find solutions to possible conflicts 
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arising from the future may be a complementary avenue. (Govier and Verwoerde, 2002).  
These interpretations of everyday reconciliation, of neighbour relations suggest a possibility 
of such a move, in times where it is recognized that political cooperation and social 
integration in Bosnia is hampered by hatred, mistrust and fear among members of each ethno-
communal group (Yordán, 2003, p.64). 
Telling necessary truths: inter-ethnic communication  
Reconciliation requires dealing with past narratives.  Whether it is consolidating official 
versions of what happened or dialogue between different versions of the past, the truth is pre-
condition for reconciliation.   However, different from documenting and disseminating truths, 
locals see reconciliation as opening up communication channels with neighbours, groups, and 
ethnicities.  It is not about accountability or rule of law but communicating again with the 
other to coexist and cohabitate towards the future. 
Transitional justice advocates promote truth telling as an alternative to tribunals and 
dilemmas between truth, justice, and reconciliation.  In addition, there is interest in 
understanding truth telling as spaces for dialogue, beyond institutions and closer to normal 
communication between human beings.  Deeply divided societies are marked by an absence 
of dialogue as a source of conflict.  Communication is presented as an antidote, reflexive 
dialogue that allows disputants to articulate to each other and discover meeting points towards 
reconciliation (Christie, Wagner and Winter, 2001).  If reconciliation seeks to bridge divides, 
it requires improved communication and better intergroup understanding that allows 
cooperation and coexistence at individual and political levels (Hamber and Van der Merwe, 
1998).  Sustainable peace requires taking into account the worldviews from which local 
practices draw meaning and moral force, implying face-to-face interactions across ethnic 
boundaries that emphasize what is shared rather than what is divisive (Eastmond, 2010, p.9).  
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Communication is understood as receiving and exchanging information in a meaningful way 
that contributes to building trust (Govier and Verwoerde, 2002) crucial to bridging the 
credibility gap between former adversaries. 
Interviewees see reconciliation as communication channels between ethnic groups, organic 
means natural to their ordinary conduction of their lives.  This may imply hearing stories and 
truths that go against their ethnic understanding of the past.   The goal is to be able to talk 
about the past, face different truths without the need for a nationalist and ethnic frame.   For 
architect Aida Murtić, truth and fact-finding are separated but important in interethnic 
communication:  
“For me personally, truth can be rewritten and reinterpreted.  There may be 
several truths so let us hear them out.  We do not need a monument to the absolute 
truth.  When it comes to truth as proof, well there is the war tribunal in The 
Hague…  In order to have a truth there must be a process for accepting facts, a 
process of cultural sensitivity.  This means not to question these facts, which is 
something that we have a problem with, people and politicians challenging these 
facts.  Let us accept it, take it and go, to keep things smooth.  You can have your 
own personal truths but do not challenge the facts.  I need to have facts and build 
from them.”134   
Daniel Jovanović in Prijedor, also advocates for reigniting interethnic communication that 
reduces the tendency to blame each other for the past:   
 “(Reconciliation) is people communicating between each other.  Being aware of 
conflict and letting it go.  It also means a lack of this pettiness and stubbornness 
when talking about war.  Stop talking about the bad guy.  It is true that if we forget 
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what happened it can happen again and it will.  It is talking about the truth with 
information and assuming your personal responsibilities when talking about it. 
You communicate with others this way.  I do not think we are even close to 
that.”135 
In BiH, due to difficulties arising from lack of accountability, denial and corruption, 
communication serves as a needed tool for groups to unite and claim against the elite.   There 
is a mundane reliability in communication: each group must be able to tell the truth to the 
other to fulfil commitments, act according to agreed timelines and competently perform 
expected tasks (Govier and Wervoerd, 2002).  For interviewees, one vital task is to avoid 
youth co-option from ethnopolitics.  This is Sara Velaga’s case, in Jajce, identifying potential 
in interethnic communication to unite people against the political attempts to separate them.  
Her town has recently been the focus of media attention for a controversial decision to turn a 
multi-ethnic school into a “two schools under one roof” institution, separating Bosnian-Croats 
and Bosniak students:  
 “Reconciliation is very important, especially with what is happening in this 
school in Jajce.    You have this society in small places where you can see the real 
situation of divisions here in Bosnia.  So reconciliation should be to accept every 
story from the war, accept that being a victim it’s just being a victim, we should 
not be targeting our victims and we separate people by the colour of their skin and 
nationality and reconciliation should be open minded and getting ready to accept 
our mistakes and accept apologies form other sides.”136   
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Ms. Velaga’s idea of connecting with victims from the other side, listening to their stories and 
understanding their needs appears in Tanja Milovanović account of working in North-western 
BiH:   
“When I was working for the ICRC I visited prisoners of concentration camps and 
the talks and briefings done with them prior to their release.  I was present in their 
locations and heard of all the bad things they had faced.   We had communication 
with torture victims and their families.  It was here where the importance of 
reconciliation was a natural thing to see and something that needed to be 
done.  The question was on how to do it and how to deal with such sensitive 
issues.  It was hard and challenging to speak to victims of concentration camps.  In 
the briefings and follow up it was very hard to listen to different stories, from 
different people. I am convinced that we need to speak about the things that 
happen in our society.”137 
This exposure to other truths seems to be constant in the life stories of various citizens who 
ended up interested in peace initiatives in the country.  Although this blurs the line between 
being citizens and peacebuilders, it is the acknowledgement of reconciliation, transforming it 
into a driver of change, which matters for these interviewees.  Safet Sarić, from Kladanj, 
encountered differing narratives in learning about the ICTY in Bosnia:  
 “I come from a mono-ethnic background.  My city is 90% Muslim.  Coming from 
there, I only heard one narrative of the war.  In my studies and following the ICTY 
trial and fieldwork, I realized that there is more to these stories.  In my family, we 
did not discuss things… Coming from such context, I did not have a chance to talk 
to other communities.  I realized that there is more to history than what I had 
learned in school.  For me, this moment of reconciliation was when I realized that 
                                                          
137 Interview, 04-05-2016 
195 
 
all suffering is the same on all sides.  I was working on our first documentary and 
I hear stories from all three sides, and from different generations, older victims 
and then youth, people born after the war.  We realized that war has influenced 
everybody.  Regardless of the victims’ background.” 138  
Similar is Adnan Hasenbegović’s story, moving from wartime soldier to post-war peace 
activist:  
 “I went to war.  So, I have memories of Yugoslavia, this multi-ethnic place, and 
what a Yugoslav I was.  But in the 90s all this changed.  I became a soldier, and 
somehow I was connected with all this ideology, I did not know how it all 
happened.  I was shocked, then this nationalist politics arrived…After the war, I 
met with peace activists from different backgrounds.  And I had the opportunity to 
see different forms of work.  Through this, my identity finally became one; I had 
found comrades in Bosnia, comrades from the Former Yugoslavia engaged in 
peace work.  After the war, I became related to peacebuilding trainings and moved 
via different networks of political activism.  Here I created a space for influence 
that even managed to connect me with politicians.”139 
Citizen views on truth telling point to communication as a basic pre-requisite for 
reconciliation, giving a different dimension to truth telling and fact-finding from views of 
truth-orientated organizations seeking official, documented versions of the past or that 
promote past narratives to younger audiences to dispel myths about ethnic divisions.  This 
communicative truth telling means encouraging natural discussions about the past that are not 
mediated by politics, nationalist discourses or ethnic frames.  Reconciliation is about natural 
interactions and dialogue that communicate one’s grievances against the actions of the 
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adversary and imply self-reflection about one’s own role and behaviour in the dynamics of 
conflict (Assefa, 2001). 
Communicating with the other requires dialogue between narratives that allows space for 
moving from victimization, blaming and separation towards mutual understanding, 
acceptance and visualizing a possible future together (that desired forward-looking 
component of transitional justice).   As presented in the following chapter, the ethnic framing 
of the past and political dismissal of bottom-up and top-down projects for establishing truth 
commissions in Bosnia will make it difficult for communicative truth telling to create spaces. 
Dealing with pressing needs: “economic” reconciliation 
If reconciliation projects are to have a local impact, they require taking into account citizens’ 
needs and concerns.  In BiH, concerns about economic prospects and particularly youth, 
together with economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment are pressing issues for 
reconciliation, as “economic relations have just reflected the current divisions and not been 
able to change the overall picture after all the desolate economic situation worsens the 
prospects for reconciliation.” (Fischer, 2016b, p. 254).  Transitional justice requires a socio-
economic perspective, improving living conditions and dealing with citizen necessities.  This 
includes thinking how reparative justice can be re-interpreted as social justice for the benefits 
of victims and citizens overall.  From an everyday life perspective, reconciliation with former 
enemies takes second place after insecurities about the future, as employment opportunities 
remain scarce in BiH (Eastmond, 2010, p.11). 
Economic reconciliation requires a reparative perspective supporting socioeconomic needs of 
victims affected by war as well as addressing economic needs of society to deal with root 
causes of conflict and avoid re-emerging violence.  Adopting a reparative angle on 
transitional justice focuses away from fighters in war into changing attitudes and 
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socioeconomic circumstances of ordinary people that can build bridges between them 
(Lambourne, 2004, p.4).  Reconciliation must address economic and infrastructural problems 
that can precipitate an outbreak of violence, promoting the rebuilding of economic life as a 
peacebuilding measure (Francis, 2002, Blagojević, 2007).   An economic dimension of 
peacebuilding implies getting adversaries to work together, ensuring they benefit equally 
from development policies and practices (Blagojević, 2007, p.558).  When integrated into the 
economic perspective of peacebuilding, reconciliation entails measures that allow equal 
opportunity and access to societal resources for all ethnic groups.   
In BiH, where reconstruction has not provided economic prosperity and effective 
employment for the population, it has lacked the development of an economic angle on 
reconciliation, addressing sources of poverty and inequality affects prospects for sustainable 
peace.  Post-war redistribution of wealth created in BiH a new class structure comprised of a 
small wealthy elite, a large pool of unemployed and increasingly impoverished citizens and 
an insecure middle class largely employed in the public sector, the remaining privatized and 
semi-privatized firms and international as well as non-governmental organizations (Kurtović, 
2015, p. 645).  Access to middle-class jobs depends on people’s willingness to participate in 
clientelist networks forged through family and party connections.  Minimal employment is a 
barrier to minority returns as it is linked to ethnic discrimination: absence of jobs exacerbates 
divisions, impending integration, reconciliation and sustainable returns (Haider, 2009).  Dire 
employment prospects precipitate comfort with one’s own ethnic group and negative views 
towards the other.  Preoccupation with immediate economic needs often leads to lack of 
interest in addressing societal divisions.   In BiH, insecurities about the future remain as 
economic reforms towards marketization have undermined economic and political 
reconstruction, job development has not been a priority of economic reforms, making 
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employment opportunities scarce, forcing Bosnians to rely on an informal market (Eastmond, 
2010, p.11). 
For interviewees, the need to improve the economy, particularly unemployment, is an 
important requirement for reconciliation.  Lack of economic opportunities mixed with 
increased levels of poverty and unemployment become sources for renewed tensions between 
ethnic groups who, through ethnopolitics, find in “the other” the culprit for their own 
economic difficulties.  The lack of support and government inaction is a formula for 
grievances and clashes between ethnic communities, stirred during electoral campaigns to 
blame one another.  This is evident in Sarajevan Alma Imamović’s views:   
“…if we could develop an economy and become stable people then we would 
forget this nonsense about nationalism.  We are tired of being poor but then again 
it is so easy to manipulate people.  I think that the economy can solve anything.  If 
people could develop then they would forget all about this.  If we could be a 
stable state and a developed economy then it would all be OK.  But everything 
here has been forced, like our flag.  Normal people would forget about it if life 
was o.k.”140 
The divide between relatively prosperous urban areas and deprived poor areas may constitute 
a marker of where it is easier or harder for reconciliation to occur.  This was expressed by 
Emir Kapetanović, a Bosnian filmmaker reflecting on the social divisions of youth in urban 
and rural BiH: 
 “Wherever there is industry, where people work and make money you do not 
have issues with reconciliation.  It is the poor areas that have issues of 
reconciliation, these areas where people do not want to invest in.  You can see 
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how people in Sarajevo and Banja Luka travel and meet one another and want to 
work, work connects us, survival brings our interests together.”141  
 For Kapetanović, reconciliation means 
 “To stop talking and start working.  When people are not hungry and have culture they think 
more, see different perspectives and they can work on reconciliation.  The best is hard work; 
the only way to bring this is through reconciliation.  Lack of food and poverty helps bring 
conflict and blaming back I think.”142 
  In his interview, he was insistent on how politics places barriers to reconciliation as political 
campaigns focus more on the fears derived from the war than on pressing issues for people 
such as building streets, getting electricity to work and other reconstruction issues at the rural 
level.  This problem of how ethnopolitical divisions affect reconciliation underlies Prijedor’s 
Aleksa Vućen’s story in North-Eastern BiH:  
 “There is this guy that my mom met, a Bosniak from Kozarac near Prijedor, an 
area decimated during the war.  This man was working for an organization, 
rebuilding homes and building around refugee areas.  He started working for a 
company that made the safety nets that you put around building sites.  He wanted 
to start a business.  The venture took off.  His employment policy is very simple; 
he does not care about any ethnic backgrounds.  This is great.  But personally, he 
has problems in Kozarac for employing Serbs as Kozarac has a high 
unemployment rate.  Yet, he follows his own criteria and point of view despite 
how it brings him problems.  He is not welcome in some areas of Kozarac for 
being a collaborator with the Serbs.”143 
                                                          
141 Interview, 25-10-2016 
142 Interview, 25-10-2016 
143 Interview, 18-06-2016 
200 
 
Restorative justice approaches including socioeconomic needs broaden prospects of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding in approaching reconciliation.   On one hand, citizen 
calls for dealing with pressing economic needs implies a social justice approach to 
peacebuilding.  This necessitates both economic redistributions via reparations for victims as 
well as social welfare provisions for those who live in poverty and who end up being double-
victimized (Hronešova, 2016).  Including this reparative approach to transitional justice 
provides added space for including public voices into transitional justice debates.  Adopting a 
comprehensive approach to justice and reconciliation requires looking at sources of 
socioeconomic injustice rooted in the political and economic structure of Bosnian society, 
leading to exploitation, marginalization, and deprivation (Lai, 2016).  Reconciliation and 
justice entail both political and economic restructuring.  As mentioned in “forgiveness” 
discussions (in the previous chapter) reparations have not developed a sense of 
socioeconomic justice amongst the population and as will be presented in the next chapter 
despite the promotion of economic integration into the EU, the Bosnian economy has 
sustained its dependency on aid and its problematic unemployment levels. 
Yugonostalgia: reference for reconciliation 
The rise of Yugonostalgia, remembering life under Tito’s rule, is not only a reminiscent look 
at the past but a critical reflection on the contemporary problems of the Western Balkan 
countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina included.  Yugonostalgia keeps growing as Bosnia’s ethnic, 
political and socioeconomic problems worsen (Spaic, 2017).    Expectations about normal 
life, established during socialism still shape people’s perception of the post-war period, as the 
central point of comparison for post-war transformation remains the iconic post Second 
World War reconstruction led by the Yugoslav communists (Kurtović, 2015, p. 645).  What 
older generations remember is not authoritarianism or political repression but rather how 
“everyone had free education, a job for life after leaving school, housing, decent salaries, and 
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pensions, plus a passport that allowed them to travel most parts of the world without a visa.” 
(Spaic, 2017).  Fond memories of older generations become an unbelievable fairy-tale of 
multi-ethnic unity for those born after the war.  In a focus group with international NGO-
volunteers in Brĉko, I was told, “In Sarajevo I met this girl telling me about Yugoslavia and 
this idealism around Tito and how he unified it all, but now young people don’t relate to that 
as they all want to leave, all this no future feeling amongst them.”144 
There are two things to take from Yugonostalgia’s popularity in BiH.  One is the 
remembrance of older generations of the times where all ethnic groups cooperated and mixed 
without any tension or violence, aiming at cultural elements that contribute to reconciliation.  
Second is the critical view of citizens in who, “faced with the present-day realities of rampant 
unemployment, social dislocation, and weak states marked by widespread corruption—(view) 
any existence might appear better than the present.” (Lindstrom, 2005, p. 235). 
Some interviewees see reconciliation as going back to the way things were before the war, 
reminiscing about a harmonious cohabitation between different ethnic neighbours during the 
Yugoslav era.  Yugonostalgia implies the feeling that a sense of social justice and equality 
was better achieved during the socialist era than in the current democratic and liberal-
orientated Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This nostalgic remembrance reflects citizen discontent with 
the current state of affairs in the country, where nothing seems to move forward and crisis 
seems to be the constant scenario.   For Anja Kresojević, in Mostar, “the Yugoslavian 
generation had a very different set of values, no capitalism, Tito was the main figure and 
many were proud of the Yugoslav National Army.”145 For Emir Dzino, a Sarajevan 
filmmaker, the transition to capitalism is a big barrier to reconciliation, recalling Yugoslavia’s 
stability:  
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“Reconciliation is trying to get into the old times, when people were not afraid, a 
time of social security, where there were no problems with jobs, social security.  I 
may be nostalgic about socialism but it was definitely a time where the state was 
involved in the economy and helped us.  The capitalist economy changed the 
ways of this country.  The biggest fear of the people is around social and 
economic stability that is what we really need.  If you do not have jobs, you 
cannot have any steps towards stability.  If we do not help people and particularly 
young people, we will be at risk of losing control of the population.”146  
 Seada Velić, a 30-year-old tour guide in Sarajevo, idealizes Yugoslavian life as 
reconciliation model in the country:  
 “Life was beautiful before the war but unfortunately parents and grandparents 
remember this, you know the life under Tito, they talk so much about it.  No one 
cared back then about who you were, or the origin of your name.  Everyone had a 
job; even people with lousy jobs had holidays and could live properly.  Back then, 
it was all much better than nowadays.  Now we are individuals, we are not the 
same, so it all has just crashed.  Reconciliation is going to that Yugoslavian unity 
but all of that is now impossible.  We need that feeling everywhere, to be more 
inclusive, but no one is satisfied here and that is the problem, the same happens 
with the government in Serbia, the same situation with jobs, politics, and 
government, it is a save yourself context.”147    
Nevena Medic, in Bratunac, recalls the Tito era as a time of interethnic cooperation yet is 
critical about how significant this cooperation really was:  “Peaceful coexistence.  For 
instance, I can say that the former Yugoslav republic is an example of peaceful coexistence 
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and there is a lot of things that under Tito era were under the carpet and were not addressed 
properly and society suffered because of it.”148 
The idea expressed by interviewees of returning to how life used to be points to the current 
difficulties lived by citizens, victims of unemployment, corruption, divisions and low life 
quality, all affecting reconciliation.  The fact that young people are “Yugonostalgic” hints at a 
form of inter-generational reconciliation, where young people yearn for a socialist Bosnia 
romanticised by previous generations.  This brings concerns for the present and future of the 
country:  “People may have had dreams and ambitions that once seemed possible in 
Yugoslavia, but now, these still unrealized dreams seem absolutely unattainable.  There is not 
the possibility of fulfilment that there once was.” (Bancroft, 2009, p. 5).  What is concerning 
from the rise of Yugonostalgia in recent years is the feeling of uncertainty, lack of prosperity 
and progress that mark the opinions of many Bosnians and particularly young people.  As will 
be presented in the next chapter, this constitutes an obstacle for reconciliation relying on 
future generations to bridge the gap. 
Summary 
Opinions and stories in this chapter reflect on what makes sense to people when 
contemplating the importance of reconciliation.  The eight themes show understandings of 
reconciliation that are natural to people in their ordinary lives.  Categories such as youth 
engagement, learning, communication and economic reconciliation may overlap with 
organizational views of reconciliation such as peace education, storytelling and fact-finding 
and cooperation presented in the previous chapter yet show the dimension of the problems 
that, according to interviewees, are still left unaddressed by peacebuilding.  Categories such 
as forgiveness and the critique of reconciliation as an imposed value, on one hand, reflect 
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avenues that are still undeveloped in Bosnia-Herzegovina (as is the case with an effective 
reparations programme, official truth telling initiatives, youth-orientated government policies 
and a clear strategy for fighting unemployment).  On the other hand, it reflects 
disappointment and concern with the current state of affairs of the country, its reluctance to 
leave nationalist and ethnic strategies in politics, a dissatisfaction with international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations often perceived as money-grabbers and 
profiteers, and the idea that life under a socialist regime is preferred over the current 
democracy. 
Identifying forgiveness and recognition as reconciliation bring to attention the necessary steps 
needed to allow these to be possible for victims.  Processes for a public apology, recognition 
of the importance of victims and their groups as right bearers in the country, its entities, 
cantons and municipalities, and the establishment of reparation schemes that effectively 
redress past wrongs are all conditions that need to be met in Bosnia-Herzegovina, requiring 
effective mechanisms responsive to victim needs. 
Recognizing youth engagement and in particular education as forward-looking expressions of 
reconciliation and transitional justice implies listening to the concerns of the young.  
Interviewees are unsure about how stable their future is or how serious they are being taken 
by the political system that seems more concerned with ethnic rhetoric and nationalist 
interpretations of the past than with youth problems such as quality education, prospects or 
the economy and spaces for the professional and personal development of young people.   
Concerning is the penetration of ethnopolitics in the education system, as the stories 
presented here show how segregation and divisions in the education system (from textbooks 
and classrooms to the way language, religion and history are being taught), maintain 
communities in a latent state of tension and confrontation. 
205 
 
The contrast between views that reject reconciliation as an imposed, unnatural term to Bosnia, 
and those that see it as an organic, everyday process shows how international intervention has 
negatively affected the population.  Some reject western ideas of how citizens should engage 
with their past and reconcile and others state that there is an alternative to reconciliation 
projects which has to do with neighbour relations and common practices that have little to do 
with official discourses on justice and peacebuilding.  Contesting reconciliation shows more 
the disappointment and betrayal of the promises from international peacebuilding rather than 
a rejection of the term itself.  Episodes of extreme urgency, like the 2014 floods, where 
people naturally come together, without the need for projects and organizations, shows how 
citizens engage in reconciliation practices as long as they are free from either the ethnic 
frames of politics or the international standards imposed in the logic of projects and initiatives 
at the ground level.  
This idea of an organic, Bosnian made, reconciliation is palpable in conversations about 
communication as means for reconciliation.  People are more concerned with everyday 
dialogue that allows them to live, work and cooperate with neighbours than with political 
dialogue within the political system to deal with the past or face current obstacles in the 
integration of the country.   People live next door to neighbours and need spaces that give 
them such opportunities, at community and neighbourhood levels.  These spaces require 
protection from nationalist and ethnic-focused discourses prevalent in mainstream politics.  
Communication requires talking about everyday problems and finding ways to achieve joint 
solutions rather than engaging in ethnic blaming of the other as the culprit for one’s own 
troubles. 
If there is one angle of reconciliation where citizens demand state reform and action, it is in 
the economy.  Interviews reflect a concern with how rising unemployment and economic 
stagnation leaves a gap generally filled with ethnic divisions and nationalist politics.  The lack 
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of projects that bring job opportunities for most citizens, the lack of policies that tackle 
unemployment lead to citizens wishing for a better country, or reminiscing of more 
prosperous times during Tito’s regime.  The ideas of a youth exodus from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, of citizen desperation from the current situation and the exhaustion in people 
from repetitive ethnic discourses that have permeated Bosnia-Herzegovina since the war, 
create a distance from politics, international agents, and civil society organizations.  Such 
distance becomes visible in processes of protest and discontent, described in the following 
chapter presenting concerns about further divisions in the country and the risks of future 
unrest in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
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CHAPTER 6 - LIMITING RECONCILIATION:  
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND 
CITIZENS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Introduction 
This chapter maps connections and separations between international, civil society actors and 
citizens through identified obstacles to reconciliation.  It begins by analysing politics as a 
barrier to reconciliation: concerns about Dayton cementing ethnic divisions, the dominance of 
ethno-nationalist politics and obstacles faced by citizens, a consequence of Dayton’s 
identitarian matrix.   Following this, the chapter studies the education system and media as 
structures perpetuating divisions for future generations: mono-ethnic and segregationist 
practices in education and politicised media.  It follows with observations on the lack of 
economic prosperity and stagnation affecting citizens, exploring divergences between the 
intervention’s promotions of capitalist practices and pressing citizen needs.  As deadlock 
influences the economy, derived social protest and self-organization during catastrophe are 
discussed.  The fourth barrier is youth radicalization as a new concern for reconciliation; how 
radical views, expressions of terrorism and influential external ideologies warn of re-
emerging violence.  The chapter concludes with a section on legitimacy, focusing on how 
perceptions between international, civil society and citizens establish connection and 
separation. 
Politika: reconciliation’s antithesis 
Divisions that benefit ethno-nationalist practices often characterize the world of Bosnian 
politics.  This affects international and civil society organizations’ work, having also 
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everyday impact on citizens.  Politics is seen as corrupt, dirty and manipulative.  A space 
thriving on ethnic divisions, perpetuating rhetoric and beliefs opposing reconciliation.  For 
people in BiH, the word ‘Politika’ expresses a universal disgust with corruption and cynical 
hunger for power on individual politicians.   Additionally, there is a difficulty of discerning 
any alternatives to ‘Politika’ or reclaiming political debate as something far beyond self-
interest (Jansen, 2010).   In this regard, Stefanie Kappler states, “the formal political real is 
dissociative, it does not resonate with everyday lives and fails to connect to people’s needs 
and priorities.  Elites and their internationally mandated institutions lack legitimacy in the 
eyes of everyday folk…” (Kappler, 2013, p. 11).  This becomes a converging concern among 
interviewees who constantly point towards the political system inscribed into Dayton and its 
oversized state.   As Dayton established a complex excessive bureaucracy, ethno-nationalist 
practices gradually increased.  By relying on mistrust and fear of the ethnic other, dominant 
parties, counteract reconciliation via ethno-propaganda regarding the past, promoting hate 
speech.  The identitarian matrix, the idea of Dayton’s constituent peoples, influences social 
relations between citizens, affecting how they approach the government, the economy, and 
their everyday lives. 
Dayton: a barrier to reconciliation? 
A shared concern between internationals, NGOs and citizens is the divisions cemented 
through Dayton: “The Post-Dayton structure of the state and political system itself are the 
greatest obstacles to successful dealing with the past, which will gush as a torrent with the 
first more significant revision of the Dayton Agreement, currently impossible to imagine by 
many.” (Božicević, 2007, p. 127).  Dayton is identified as enabling religious, ethnic and 
national differences as salient state-building features, constraining reforms in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) (Majstorović et al, 2015, p. 661, McMahon and Western, 2009, p.72), 
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ushering in an order of inequality and dispossession of the means of dignified livelihood 
(Gilbert and Mujanović, 2015, p. 605). 
Dayton’s reification of ethnicity opposes relationship-building, favouring divisions.  Bosnia’s 
public sphere has become increasingly divided as entity structures organize rights and 
benefits along ethnic lines (Kappler, 2013, p. 11), and ethnic separatism and party politics 
obstruct state institutions (Englbrecht, 2011, p. 18).   NGO coordinator Diana Pegić highlights 
Dayton’s challenges for NGOs: 
 “We are divided into so many cantons, it is a nightmare.  It is exhausting to do so 
much paperwork, organizing talks with different authorities, meeting local 
councils.  Cantons are like little countries and have nothing to do with the 
Federation, completely independent.”149   
For Aida Murtić, a Sarajevo citizen, Dayton is a “dystopian project meant to stop the war but 
where all of our problems were written in.  Dayton created a bigger division by 
institutionalizing and cementing divisions.”150  “How to go beyond the structure of Dayton 
and beyond this political system for ending the war, as it was not aimed at Bosnian 
constitutional reform?”151 Asks NGO leader Elmina Kulasić.  For her, Dayton established a 
political system where “parties are ethnically-orientated with a nationalistic rhetoric, 
particularly around elections.”  “The same political elites, warlords, have stayed in the 
political arena and their agenda was and is still active, affecting reconciliation”152, explained 
practitioner Mervan Miroscija.  
Ethno-nationalism, emergent before Dayton and increasing during post-war, brought political 
and socioeconomic stagnation.   For Parent (2016) due to the constant ethnic divisions in the 
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political system, the convergence of policies between parties is restrained ending in a 
perpetual stagnation of slow political decision-making, institutional impairment, and legal 
sabotage.  Matthew Holiday, from the International Commission for Missing Persons, 
questions how nationalists are voted into power under ‘national interest’:  “this trumps 
everything, regardless of the socio-economic situation in Bosnia.  Massive unemployment, no 
investment and low income, it does not matter.  Their protection of national interest trumps 
everything.”153  Stagnation comes from entity-strengthening politics reliant on the “letter of 
Dayton”, confirmed by an international representative:  
“Bosnia is stagnating.  We focused on state-building and the April package of 
constitutional reforms [see chapter 3], a step forward in making Bosnia more 
functional. It did not materialize once Dodik got into power.  Republika Srpska 
(RS) started to build its autonomy within BiH, block state level, openly proposing 
a referendum for independence.  There are no serious reforms in the country, no 
positive development in EU, NATO integration and state level institutions are 
intentionally blocked by RS.”154   
Similar is the view from Aleksa Vućen, a Prijedor citizen: “The mechanism for accession for 
BiH into the EU were signed by all political leaders as a coordination mechanism to negotiate 
entry into the EU, yet this has been stalled as if it is not in Dayton then it is not real, this is the 
excuse that politicians use”.155 
Political stagnation trumps legal implementation, affecting transitional justice measures.   
Lack of coherence and cooperation in the justice sector results from the complicated 
administrative system, political interference, and corruption (Nansen Dialogue Center and 
Saferworld, 2012).  For Amir Zulić, promoter of proposals for a compensation law for victims 
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in BiH, “the delay and lack of laws makes us feel as if we have not existed in the last twenty 
years, forgotten and erased.  Politicians have lied to us telling us that there is no space in the 
state for a victim’s law for us.”156  Government advocacy and formulation of human rights 
legislation has been deficient, to the point that it was civil society organizations who 
contributed to human rights protection for women and children’s rights, issues unresolved 
after the war.  This was expressed by Leyla Sinjancević, working in advocacy for protecting 
victims of sexual and domestic violence.  For her, 
 “NGOs were the ones doing legal advocacy, working with the police who had no 
idea how to enforce laws to protect victims of domestic violence.  The problem is 
that even after the law was established, there has been very low capacity for its 
implementation.  The law prescribes protective measures for victims but many are 
delayed and not put into practice.”157   
Daniel Jovanović, a Prijedor lawyer explains, “The application of laws is poor, there is a lack 
of will.  The real problem is the political relations between the two entities.  Everyone pulls 
for their own side, there is no compromise between the different nationalities’ politicians and 
it simply does not work.”158  Peacebuilder Judith Brand frames clearly the problematic legacy 
of state-building for reconciliation –focused initiatives: 
 “The ideas come from the grassroots level and the civil society organizations.  
The critical organizations push for legislation constantly but what we have is a 
blockage in the decision-making process of this country, we are simply stuck.  For 
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instance, the transitional justice strategy that begun at the state level, that one is 
stuck.”159 
Legal stagnation complicates dealing with the past as victimhood; political profit and 
inhibiting dealing with the past are connected.  “Victimhood is the core of the system 
developed by Dayton, as we do not have big changes in people’s perceptions of victimhood 
this has allowed ethnic divisions used by politicians to maintain themselves active, making it 
difficult to promote processes for dealing with the past”160 states practitioner Zoran 
Vuckovac.  “Dayton is a state of three peoples.  To exercise rights people need to be defined 
in ethnic categories, narratives reinforced by the political system.  This is difficult for 
effectively dealing with the past,”161 agrees Judith Brand from ForumZFD.  As Dayton is 
perceived as an obstacle to progress and reconciliation, constitutional reform is often 
suggested.  Gilbert and Mujanović (2015) question this: a new arrangement would have to be 
negotiated by parties benefitting from Dayton, who now have little motivation to change it.  
There is no agreement on what should be changed.  Constant blaming on institutions and 
legal arrangements ignore dynamics prevalent in political parties and voters’ behaviour.   
Ethno-politics’ reach: rejecting reconciliation   
Ethno-political groups and their anti-reconciliation rhetoric increased as ‘local ownership’ 
approaches dominated international engagement.  The starting point was 2005:  international 
actors in BiH begin to reduce the footprint of their executive capacities whilst Milorad 
Dodik’s rise makes cooperation from Republika Srpska halt notoriously (Azinović, 
Bassuener, and Weber, 2011)   Hate speech has become common in politics together with 
ethnically-focused propaganda.  As the state is BiH’s biggest employer, this encourages 
corruption benefitting from lack of accountability.  This presents a challenge for 
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reconciliation; calls for inter-party cooperation are not taken seriously and ethnic divisions 
and entity separation discourage strategies for working together. 
Dominant political parties increased their nationalist stance, messages of ethnic representation 
and fearing the other.  Ideological platforms of prominent parties are identical regardless of 
their respective ethnicities, comprising of both ethnonationalism and ethno-capitalism 
(Mujkić, 2015, p. 627).  For Lana Prlić, in Sarajevo “centre-right political parties are focused 
only on working with one nationality while nationalists are calling for the unity of one ethnic 
group which they claim to represent.”162  Youth leader Aleksa Matić explained, “Serb 
political leadership in RS is geared towards independence whereas Croat leadership, sharing 
the Federation with Bosniaks, feels that they did not get a good deal as they lack their own 
entity, pushing for this against Bosniak will.”163  In addition, “The strongest nationalist 
parties benefit from the status quo, Bosniak parties talk about the need for political unity of 
Bosniaks and constantly oppose other parties”164 stated Kenan Cengić in Sarajevo.   
Ethno-nationalists use hate speech and genocide denial, opposing reconciliation.  An 
anonymous international representative stated that political parties “portray themselves as 
defenders of their own ethnic group but do not compromise at state, entity, canton or 
municipal level, simply benefitting from ethnic tensions during elections”165.   Prior to 
elections, political parties tend to reflectively turn to ethnic-nationalist appeals, activate 
citizen mistrust yet settle into government pledging to pass reforms but ultimately reneging 
on agreed principles of reform, interpreting reform specifics as anti-thetical to ethnic interests 
‘under threat’ (NDI, 2009). For an ICTY-Outreach interviewee, parties promote “a culture of 
denial that affects reconciliation, where politicians deny genocide, sending the wrong 
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message to society, inhibiting change in the field”166, reflected in electoral rhetoric focused on 
fear of the other as a threat to one’s existence.  This concerns local leader, Mevludin 
Rahmanović: “whenever we have polls, we immediately have hate speech, political parties 
talking about others and demonizing people during funerals and commemorations, opposing 
to the idea of making all sides equal.”167 
Besides trumping reconciliation, separatist strategies avoid pressing issues such as 
unemployment and poverty.  The absence of questions of redistribution in policy-making and 
public discourse indicate how the insistence on the identitarian matrix renders invisible other 
inequalities (Jansen, 2013, p. 237).  Various NGO leaders commented on this.  For Mervan 
Miroscija, ethnopolitics’ impact everyday life: “we are a state captured by political elites; 
ordinary citizens affected by daily problems (unemployment, poverty, bad health system, 
education) do not have the opportunity to think about the problems and leaders just repeat the 
same story since the 1990’s.”168  For Goran Bubalo: “during elections, there is no discussion 
about the economy and development problems of Bosnia, we are still discussing politics 
focused on national ethnic issues. “169   In addition, for transitional justice advocate Zlatica 
Grujonić: “people swap seats and swap sides when it comes to politics, just for power.  When 
Dodik talks about a secession referendum for RS, the opposition party kept quiet, there is no 
counter-argument as Dodik dictates this process.”170 
This rejection of political tactics is shared with citizens expressing discontent, feeling 
immensely affected by corruption.  Vesna Vidaković, in Sarajevo, believes that “there is 
always space for manipulation with three presidents in the country, and with the OHR as well.  
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After Dayton, everyone began pulling for their own side.”171  Slobodanka Sodic, in Prijedor, 
stated,  
“The political problem is lack of money.  Politicians do not have anything to give 
people in order to buy their votes; they do this with stories of nationalism.  
Politicians are constantly lying as the only card they have is nationalism, yet 
hospitals have nothing, no doctors, no resources, our people do not have pensions 
anymore.”172   
 Slatan Zubić in Sarajevo insisted: “Politicians need to make jobs, but they do not want to as 
every four years they rely on this rhetoric of ‘they will kill us’.  Kids here are without a job, 
they are leaving to Germany and Dubai, and we don’t have Bosnian people to work with,”173  
Ethno-political strategies oppose reconciliation: community-building, truth telling, and 
transitional justice are interpreted as competing agendas.   Reconciliation initiatives seeking 
to reverse ethnic cleansing run counter to the goal of local politicians: keep ethnically pure 
areas to maintain political and economic dominance (Englbrecht, 2011, p.18).  NGO 
representatives denounce this.  For Mevludin Rahmanović, as his peacebuilding work focuses 
on dealing with truth and war crimes, his organization is perceived as a local contender 
against political parties.  Goran Bubalo denounces how political parties have developed youth 
groups; political academies that train children to speak the traditional nationalist rhetoric of 
elections, making youngsters tell the same stories as political leaders tell voters.  Dzenana 
Karup criticises how “politicians from RS do not want to hear about the [RECOM] initiative, 
they are the ones that do not accept it and without the support of politics, RECOM cannot be 
formed.”174  Jasmin Jasarević, in Brĉko states, “We get less support now for reconciliation 
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work yet nationalist organizations get money supporting political campaigns.  We are not 
welcome here anymore; our ideas of reconciliation are not supported as we are not an ethnic 
or religious organization.”175  Peacebuilder Judith Brand encapsulates clearly how politics 
becomes an obstacle to the connection of state-building and reconciliation work in BiH:  
“What we need is to engage in intra and inter-community work.  We need a 
framework for doing this but there is a lack of political will in order to get support 
for this.  If we do not get support from politics, this framework ends interpreted as 
going against society, organizations who engage in reconciliation work have to 
face this diverse society and they simply cannot keep working against the political 
will.   There needs to be a political will on creating a society, regardless of entities 
and ethnicities.”176 
Ethno-political strategies oppose reconciliation and rely on creating ethnic enclaves, mono-
ethnic structures and strengthening entity and cantonal structures.  Political parties based on 
ethnic interests and quotas; establish their rule depending on clear ethnic majorities (Mujkić, 
2015).   Their strategies, reliant on hate speech and genocide denial, directly oppose 
reconciliation, yet they are distant from citizens, disappointed with stagnation.  This requires 
exploring how citizens, disempowered by party dominance, perceive ethnic insistence. 
Ethnic affiliation: the problem with “others” 
As politics in Bosnia relies on ethnic representation, citizens face imposed ways of 
identifying themselves.  Affiliation becomes enforced by ethno-politicians; an obligatory 
identification with an ethnic/religious group aligns citizens with political parties.  As 
citizenship is to both entity and state, many feel strongly that ethnic identity is an obstacle to 
meeting basic needs (ICG, 2014).  This reductionist definition of ‘sides’ into Bosnia’s 
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identitarian matrix is the ultimate achievement of the nationalist hegemonizing project of the 
1990’s (Jansen, 2013, p. 232).  Dayton’s consociational package established Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosniaks as constituent peoples, relegating those who did not or could not identify into 
these groups to second-class status (Kurtović, 2015, p. 662).177  Consociationalism also 
affects members of the three constituent peoples, as Serbs resident in the Federation and 
Bosniaks or Croats living in RS are excluded from being elected to the Presidency, as entity 
populations have to vote for ‘their’ respective candidates (Fischer and Petrović-Ziemer, 2015, 
p. 12). 
Declaring oneself “Bosnian” or “Other” is an option excluding citizens from Dayton’s 
economic, political and social system.  Establishing the ‘three constituent peoples’ relegated 
those who did not identify with such a matrix to second-class status, barring them from 
political and socioeconomic life (Majstorović et al, 2015, p.662, Cooley and Mujanović, 
2016)  Post-war identification connects nationality and religion for administrative, political 
and economic purposes, invading social relations.  Aida Murtić, in Sarajevo, expressed “as I 
grew up there was this imposed identity, I was very aware of it and rejected this.  When 
people ask me about this identity it is to figure out what they should say to me.  For some this 
category is important, like being a stakeholder in the state.”178  Nejra Kadić, from Gornji 
Vakuf, explained, “My identity here is ethnic and religious, which I hate.  It is a group 
identity forming a personal identity.”179    Anja Kresojević in Mostar, states that identities 
“tend to create a polarity in political views.  All of us go by ethnic identities and are 
connected to religion whether we like it or not.  Religion and ethnicity go hand in hand, if you 
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are a Catholic then you are Croat, and if you are a Muslim you are Bosniak.”180  Damir 
Ugljen from Mostar expressed the view that “I do not have an ethnic identity as such but here 
most people identify themselves with religion and nationality issues, I do not want to declare 
myself that way.”181 
This last response illustrates reactions to Dayton’s identification.  Some citizens use 
categories like “Others”, “Yugoslavian” and “Bosnian-Herzegovinian”, resisting the Bosniak-
Croat-Serb labels.  This is citizen usage of politics, the withdrawal from using ethnic 
stereotypes and resistance to the dominance of ethnic identities created by war and violence; a 
way of blaming politicians, rather than ethnicities, for the country’s problems (Torsten, 2008, 
p.125).   Masa Nurkić, in Sarajevo, commented:  “For the census, I had to declare my identity 
within the constitution’s three constituent people.  I am Bosnian.  My religion has nothing to 
do with my nationality; I am not practicing my religion.  For me this is crazy and it is 
Dayton’s fault.”182  For Aleksandra Kuljanin, also from Sarajevo, “Identifying as a Bosnian is 
a political statement for me and for young people who do not fit into the categories that end 
up stereotyping people.”183  In addition, Zoran Vuckovac, from Banja Luka, believes that 
“others” is  
“A form of resistance to the system and its ridiculous levels.  People are saying 
that nationalities are a social construct that needs to be depoliticised.  The three 
identities are the way to be political, by saying that you belong to ‘Others’ puts 
people on the outside of this system.”184    
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Aleksandra Kuljanin realized “how people were divided into three groups led and 
manipulated by our political leaders.  I started declaring myself as a Bosnian and I focus a lot 
on that, I am a Bosnian although many people see me as a Serb.” 
Identifying as “Others” and “Bosnian” may signify resisting Dayton’s identities but also 
facing discrimination through affiliation.  Prijedor’s Aleksa Vućen’s response reflects this: 
 “BiH is a construct that forbids my personal identity.  You are not a citizen; you 
are a Bosniak, a Serb or a Croat.  I am not ethnically defined as a Serb, which 
brings its problems.  There is an ethnic quota for local government work which is 
supposed to guarantee an amount of ethnic representation in local assemblies, 
leading to manipulation during elections.”185   
For Anja Kresojević in Mostar “in terms of public administration, there is not much you can 
do, we just have three options based on ethnicity.  Either you identify as belonging to RS or 
the Federation which limits you a lot, there is a lack of recognition of others (Jews, Roma) 
which is highly problematic.”186  For Goran Djurić from Tuzla: “when you apply for jobs in 
the state sector [identity] becomes a condition and getting the job really depends on your 
ethnicity.”187  Damir Ugljen, in Mostar, states that identity “affects my job hunting process 
directly and also at the institutional level as people who are inside institutions declare 
themselves within these three options and operate accordingly.”188  “Everything in Bosnia 
especially when applying for a job is connected to a national key”189, says Zlatan Velagić 
from Zenica. 
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Identity is utilized in education to classify students into ethnic cohorts, complicating 
reconciliation between Bosnian youth.  Kenan Cengić, in Sarajevo, expresses “I am defined 
by the government when I go to college and fill out application forms.”190   Leila Crnkić, also 
from Sarajevo, identifies as ‘Bosnian’ in university forms, feeling singled out: “If you are 
Bosnian, professors think that you are not a real Bosniak, that you are not Muslim, that you 
are not good enough.”191  For Tatjana Milovanović, in Brĉko (outside the Federation and RS), 
registration is problematic: “During my first years I was afraid of writing that I was Bosnian 
as my faculty was located in RS.  I had constant problems with teachers because of what I do 
(youth reconciliation projects).  In the last years, I declared as a Bosnian which is always a 
problem, ending up identified as a Serb [in administrative forms at university] because of my 
surname.”192 
Citizens avoiding Dayton’s identitary matrix see this as resisting ethnopolitics, criticising 
dominant nationalism.  Looking into the impact of the Bosnian/Others identity implies 
observing discrimination featured in the “constituent peoples” provision and how separatist 
tactics invade everyday life via everyday sources of separation: media and education. 
Everyday constraints: the dividing power of (ethnic) education and media 
As ethnonationalism dominates politics, education and media have become platforms 
perpetuating divisions and politicised versions of the past.   Ethno-nationalists have 
constantly expanded the array of national issues and problems to preserve their grip on power 
(Mujkić, 2015, p. 629).  Politicians maintain social divisions by developing networks of 
“ideological state apparatuses” via education and media.   The education system is a platform 
for politicised pasts.  Students receive different versions of history, making it hard to establish 
consensus about the past.  Without reconciling competing versions of the truth it is extremely 
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difficult to rebuild human relations (Clark, 2010, p. 348)    Education is affected by the 
administrative confusion from the different layers of governance and by the effects of ethnic 
cleansing, bringing in mono-ethnic and segregationist practices,  impeding reconciliation, 
contributing to low quality education which affects youth employment.  The media is deemed 
as politically controlled, characterized by negative reporting that ignores reconciliation-prone 
initiatives typical of transitional justice.  It promotes genocide denial and hate speech rather 
than relevant information for citizens, illustrating Sriram’s (2007) concern with how broad 
liberalisation within an internationalist approach sees free media promoting conflict through 
hate speech. 
Mono-ethnic and segregation practices: impeding future reconciliation 
Post-Dayton politics combined with the aftermath of ethnic cleansing contribute to mono-
ethnic and segregationist practices.   Dayton’s framework made little reference to education 
when considering national reconstruction, barely acknowledging the right to education and 
devolving educational policy authority to entities and the three ethnocultural groups (Nelles, 
2006).   The Constitution of FBiH, in article three clearly states that each canton “can 
delegate its jurisdiction in relation to education, and it is obligatory to do so towards the 
municipalities in which the majority population, based on the national structure, is not the 
population that makes the majority in the canton as a whole” (Parliament FBiH) 
By decentralizing decision-making, separate powers to govern education were given to RS 
and the Federation.  Segregationist practices result from two interdependent forces: 
politicization and fragmentation of education (Bozić, 2006, p. 319).  The two aim at 
reinforcing national consciousness of ethnic belonging linked to a specific territory and 
excluding the other from education.  Transitional justice advocate, Elmina Kulasić pointed 
out that BiH “has twelve ministries of education, each divided at the entity and cantonal level 
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plus the two schools under one roof [two schools], a policy originally designed by the 
OSCE”193, creating a segregating setup in education.  For an anonymous international 
representative, the education system “was captured by political parties whose goal has been to 
bring up voters”194.  This interviewee’s main concern is lack of political will to eliminate 
segregation practices such as two schools, as “[politicians] are concerned about losing 
political influence and voters and so on.”   In this regard, Clark (2010) is concerned with how 
delays in implementing reforms affect the prospect of reconciliation in education.  She 
observes how BiH is the most complicated case in the Balkans in its history teaching and 
curriculum development.  Despite agreements in 1999 and 2000 for the removal of 
objectionable material from textbooks and the establishment of some intermittent political 
agreements at national and local levels, progress remained slow.  This serves as evidence of 
how the ministries of education and BiH authorities have not been seriously interested in 
implementing reform, mainly in the absence of international community pressure, which risks 
stalling the process.  An interviewee from the EU delegation in Bosnia viewed obstacle in 
“lack of political agreement in education, as three out of the ten cantons do not agree with the 
educational policy of the other cantons.  Lack of state education strategy leads to everything 
depending on the entity level and its particular line.”  This affects NGOs youth approach as 
exemplified by Velma Sarić, who commented how screening peace documentaries was 
“constantly blocked by the system and its structure, a result of Dayton.”195  Due to constant 
administrative hassle, she organizes screenings with partner NGOs, “taking a grassroots 
approach, pulling interested kids from schools and showing this as alternative education.” 196  
Wartime genocide established either ethnically clean areas, or areas with a political contest 
between a majority and minority group, which influenced education.  Segregated schooling in 
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Bosnia resulted from ethnic cleansing and political attempts to ‘unmix’ the Bosnian 
population (Hadziristić, 2017).  As Bosnia’s nationalist leaders undermined visions of a 
multi-ethnic state, the education system became a political tool for reinforcing identity and 
division, seeking an ethnically disaggregated electorate (Cardais, 2012).  Peacebuilder Goran 
Bubalo explained, “Now we have completely divided communities, many ethnically cleansed 
by a nationality.  They have their own education perspectives, which is catastrophic.  The 
education system is characterized by ethnic divisions without any opportunities to learn about 
the other.”197  Zlatan Velagić, a teacher in Zenica added that  
“Mono-ethnic schools and ‘two schools’ are signs of what happened with 
reconciliation: children are raised to be separated from their neighbours, stressing 
divisions to the point that young people [referring to non-Bosniaks] in Bosnia 
believe that Bosniaks are Arabs.”198    
The OSCE’s two schools policy, devised to encourage minority returns: “became a status 
quo, a permanent policy as we now have physical separation in schools that affect future 
generations,”199 commented NGO representative Elmina Kulasić.  “Young people are more 
divided than the previous generations, they don’t know people from other communities, nor 
cross ethnic boundaries”200 commented an OSCE interviewee regarding ‘two schools’.  The 
underlying aim of segregated schooling is the reification of supposedly irreconcilable 
identities, evidenced in “two schools” in Mostar: while Bosniak students learn Bosnian 
history, Croat students are taught the history of Croatia (Hadziristić, 2017). 
These segregationist practices negatively impact reconciliation, particularly its prospective 
aspect: youth. An education system keeping young people divided fuels prejudice and 
                                                          
197 Interview, 13-04-2016 
198 Interview, 13-09-2016 
199 Interview,15-07-2016 
200 Interview, 22-07-2016 
224 
 
stereotypes, becoming an obstacle to reconciliation (Clark, 2010, p.346).  Segregationist 
practices, via the teaching of history, religion and the three local languages (Serbian, Croatian 
and Bosnian) create their own ways of dealing with the past and truth telling.  Various 
practitioners shared this concern.  Mevludin Rahmanović explained, “If you are in RS you 
will be learning history that is not inclusive.  In Prijedor, all you learn about war is about 
Muslims attacking ‘us’ and Serbs defending the country.  In Sanski Most, history is about 
‘Serbs coming here to conquer us with the idea of a greater Serbia.”201  A Sarajevo 
practitioner stated “we have here three histories taught in general, this is how we deal with the 
war”, highlighting the clash between NGOs alternative education approach focused on 
examples of coexistence and the nationalistic optic taught in schools.  For Maja Kapo: 
“education is also affected by these informal education projects in peacebuilding.  They give 
out these qualifications and diplomas but do not really change the system.  It ends supporting 
divisions in the formal education and no change is really occurring.”202   These opinions 
reflect how education created a continuity of social and political divisions where generations 
are turned into subjects of a highly divided system with little incentive for interaction or 
development of a unified society (Čustović, 2014). 
Segregationist practices constrain youth employment.  This is of concern to many citizens 
experiencing a low-quality education, leading to difficulties in acquiring long-term 
employment.  According to Nansen Dialogue Center and Saferworld (2012) although high 
unemployment is explained by general lack of jobs, there are two main concerns: young 
people with no qualification are most affected by unemployment, and labour-force 
qualifications are of poor quality, deemed as low education, creating graduate profiles that do 
not match the needs of the market.  For Sabahjudin Mujkić in Sarajevo, “in high school we 
didn’t get much understanding of things, teachers didn’t help us much as they always had 
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their own ethnic side.”203  For Emina Sabljaković, also from Sarajevo, poor quality is 
evidenced in lack of practical education: “schools don’t have materials for chemistry, if you 
practice sports you are missing equipment, there is never money to send students to 
competitions, and it is always like that.”204  Aleksandra Kuljanin remembers how at 
university “we ended up having three-hundred students for one teacher.  Sometimes we were 
taught only by teaching assistants as our teachers were politicians themselves doing work in 
parliament.”205  Anja Kresojević, in Mostar, states, “the high school level is all wrong, they 
teach useless facts that don’t benefit you nor allow you to understand the world.”206  Selma 
Hodzic shared this: “education here [Mostar] does not produce a person to have vocational 
skills, so you have to learn these by yourself.”207  Teacher Zlatan Zubić’s assessment reflects 
these concerns with Bosnia’s low-quality education: 
“The problem is that schools are not the best place to prepare kids for the 
economy.  Pupils do not study anything applicable in the real world.  We do not 
have any offer to the economy in contrast with other European systems where 
students get work experience; learn vocational skills and ideas about jobs.  In 
Bosnia, this does not exist.”208 
As low-quality education affects citizens, it also lacks educational provisions for minorities, 
despite efforts encouraging minority returns.  As ethnopolitical elites motivate ethnoterritorial 
homogenization, areas with significant returnee rates often see education for minorities 
particularly limited (Savija-Valha and Sahić, 2015).  Post-Dayton education policies, 
curricula, and textbooks restrict access to schools for minority returnees by underpinning 
ethnic divisions.  The system ends discriminating against either minority returnee children (by 
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not providing any provisions that can include their own cultural learning) or students who do 
not belong to the three constituent groups (e.g. Roma) (Nelles, 2006).  In the case of Roma 
youth, they have always been more disadvantaged than other Bosnians and as their 
perspectives are usually not incorporated in discussions on educational reform in BiH, this 
affects their inclusion into the system (Nelles, 2006, p. 235).  Ivona Celebićić, educational 
researcher in BiH, explained how the power distribution between one dominant majority 
group and a smaller minority group in many areas affects multicultural practices in schools, 
opposing legal dispositions for inclusive education.  An international representative 
commented: “In the RS and Federation there is the problem of minorities having no access to 
some subjects in school (history, language, social studies, and religion) which are a basis to 
preserve their identity.  There are issues for Serbs in the Federation, Croats in RS and 
wherever you have a physical minority you will have a problem with their education 
provision.”209  Community leader Mevludin Rahmanović told how “In RS you will be 
learning history that is not inclusive, Bosniaks do not have the right to learn their own 
language in various areas.”210  His concern reflects the impact of mono-ethnic practices in 
schools and their exclusion of Bosniak minorities in RS.  Various citizens mentioned this: 
Aleksa Vućen stated, “In Prijedor, Serb majority schools rely only on Serb literature for 
teaching, how can a Bosniak student study this?”211  Such provisions allow teachers to 
actively influence students’ political affiliations: “I saw faculty professors associating 
themselves with these political parties, imposing their views in class and influencing people 
to choose a party”212, says Aleksandra Kuljanin.   Dragana Sredić, in Prijedor, remembers 
how “in schools teachers forced us to write only in Cyrillic.  People in Serbia speak a little bit 
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differently and tried to force us to speak like that“213, and Leijla Crnkić studying IT in 
Sarajevo noticed “that every professor and their teaching assistants are members of this one 
political party, the SDA, so there is always this constant talk about religion in class, they have 
all this official Islamic stance.”214   Dragana and Lejla’s views reflect Bozic’s (2006, p. 323) 
concern with education becoming a mechanism for translating confessionalism into 
nationalism, where each group (Bosniaks and Serbs in her study) strive to establish primacy 
in the two main entities. 
Politicised media: promoting divisions, ignoring reconciliation 
Politician’s grip over media also unites international and Bosnian civil society organizations, 
deeming it a device promoting ethnopolitical agendas on citizens. The media’s lack of 
independence contributes to accountability issues in BiH, avoiding questioning the intentions 
of nationalist parties.   Mainstream media outlets in Bosnia appeal to narrow ethnic audiences 
and neglect substantive investigative reporting (Freedom House, 2015).  In the case of 
reconciliation, media that promotes genocide denial, hate speech and negative reporting 
encourages ethnic blaming and separation.  
The main concern for internationals, NGOs and citizens alike is how media is politically 
influenced and managed.  The European Commission (2014) is concerned with government 
financing of media, as public broadcasters not part of the public broadcasting system are 
financed from municipal and cantonal budgets, remaining under strong political influence.  In 
RS, authorities funds both public and private media, which adds to the problems of lack of 
transparency and clear criteria in distributing subsidies to media corporations.  Velma Sarić, 
founder of an NGO media outlet, sees media as a channel for stability and reconciliation, 
recognizing the international community’s attempts at supporting independent media.  Yet, 
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based on experience, “political power has owned media, turning it into satellites for 
manipulation.   Media lives for sensationalism and do not have an agenda to help 
reconciliation.  It is on the budgets of politicians as the main broadcasters are part of the 
budgets of governments.”215  Peacebuilder Goran Bubalo, promoting his Network for 
Peacebuilding, recognizes “much money invested in media after the war, T.V. and radio 
stations, newspapers, [was] a complete failure.”216  In his view, the outcome has been 
political parties controlling media, publishing what politicians dictate, becoming the 
mainstream.   An international representative, recognizing early post-war efforts towards 
media development, expressed “media are part of the problem, not the solution.  They are the 
ones that help politicians address a certain group, spreading the messages and voices of their 
political masters.”217 
Political domination of Bosnian media constantly challenges civil society and international 
actors’ work.  A characteristic of politicised media work is negative reporting; promoting 
information that sustains divisions, fearing others and a portrayal of the past opposite to 
reconciliation.  Selective and biased reporting result from ethnic control in the media.  Inter-
ethnic incidents are particularly exaggerated by media to perpetuate the division and 
segregation that characterizes Bosnian society (Nansen Dialogue Center and Saferworld, 
2010).   According to the ICTY-outreach office, the issue is lack of power to deal with 
politicians, as expressed anonymously:  
“The problem is the sphere of influence, if you control media and you speak 
through it, there is nothing we can do.  Politicians control media, we just have our 
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projects and our means to share information but we cannot deal with politicians 
who engage in denial of what we do.”218 
 Community leader Mevludin Rahmanović is concerned with the disregard of local media for 
any work that brings people together or peacebuilding efforts: 
 “They come and ask us for interviews searching for negative news as good, 
positive news are not important.  Their first pages are all about killings and ethnic 
violence.  Half of the newspapers are all about black chronicles, ten pages of 
negative views, on T.V. is the same.”219  
 His colleague Wahidin Ohmanović stated, “Most media in BiH is being misused to create 
divisions between people and should also be judged as they are responsible for the tensions in 
the country.”220  An OSCE interviewee illustrated how politicised media operates:  
“We had the Patria incident, focused on a video broadcasted recently by media 
where Serbs are singing chants near Srebrenica, yelling ‘This is Serbia’ against a 
Bosniak group of citizens and Bosniaks reacting against this.  The video was from 
2009 but media presented it as latest news [in 2014].”221  
 The interviewee concluded that media’s open manipulation required the OSCE focusing on 
media responsibility with media workers, often requiring difficult interethnic cooperation. 
As politicized media challenges peacebuilding, counter-projects created a contest for Bosnian 
audiences between media’s negative reporting and civil society efforts for promoting 
reconciliation and transitional justice information.  Velma Sarić spoke about her NGO’s 
efforts to create news platforms for young people as checks and balances towards the 
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government:  
“Our Balkan Diskurs and our Blogging for the Future projects seek to establish a 
platform to address issues such as sexual harassment, corruption in the healthcare 
system and problems that affect young people.  We want to create something 
independent where you can address issues without bias.  We report on the 
manipulation of victims from politicians for example.”222   
 
An OSCE interviewee mentioned reliance on social media and hate speech diagnostic tools to 
help group cohesion and outreach with the support of local radio and T.V. stations, contrasted 
to the lack of reporting from mainstream media of public condemnations over hate speech 
acts, focusing solely on messages sent out by politicians.   NGO coordinator Tanja 
Milovanović, is critical of media’s lack of independence, deeming it “profit-oriented 
organizations who live off of producing conflict.”  In her organization “we spread a lot of 
information through social media and meeting with directors in chief of media outlets.”223  
She recognizes that doing this work leads to people taking risks in promoting information due 
to the tendency in BiH of harassment of journalists.  Journalists are constantly targets of death 
threats and pressure on editorial boards to revise their statements.  Human Rights Watch 
(2015) reports that in BiH during the first 7 months of 2014 around 20 cases of attacks and 
threats on journalists were reported, 14 cases of intimidation and one death threat, a 
phenomenon in BiH and other Balkan states. 
This contest between politicised media and peacebuilding points towards public outreach and 
its reception by citizens.  NGO leader Elmina Kulasic highlights the innovation from 
multimedia projects that do reckoning with the past and the promotion of documentaries, 
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short stories and social media for transitional justice.  Still, she warns, “Working with media 
in Bosnia is a constant challenge and organizations have to be very careful with the way they 
spread information”224.  Velma Sarić’s Balkan Diskurs deals with reconciliation stories for 
young people, turning young people into reporters about local problems: “this is our work 
with local communities.”225  Despite many projects, from photography and digital media to 
online platforms and media networks, the concern is with lack of reach with Bosnian 
audiences.  Citizens are aware of media’s politicization and are often distrustful of any 
reporting from media, as Bosnians perceive this negative role, perpetuating fear through the 
way it reports events (Nansen Dialogue Centre and Saferworld, 2010).  Peacebuilder Goran 
Bubalo believes that NGO media outlets “are never read by ordinary people, so they do not 
have any audience.  Ordinary people watch mainstream news, controlled by political parties 
and not these independent sources.”226  An international representative recognizes citizen 
dismissal of any type of media, which in turn has made it “difficult for any NGO to get some 
positive space in BiH media.”227  Also for the OSCE interviewee: “citizens are used to 
reading sensationalist-type headings on negative incidents and this is what they choose to 
focus on.”228  
Education provisions maintaining young generations divided and mistrustful of the ethnic 
other, together with media’s ongoing push for ethno-nationalist messages that encourage 
division and persistent negative perceptions have contributed to eroding citizen trust in the 
state and its agents.   This dangerous gap between state and society, through the effects of 
ethnonationalism, encounters in economic concerns surrounding corruption, unemployment 
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and citizen dissatisfaction, sparks of resistance, showing new possibilities for political 
activism and reconciliation. 
Solving pressing needs: vital pre-conditions for reconciliation 
Although there is an undoubted consensus about the importance of fostering a healthy 
economy in BiH to move towards reconciliation, the distance between supporting capitalist 
practices and the growing citizen needs for employment, stability, and prosperity, marks a 
concerning space for resistance and rejection of peacebuilding.  The ethno-nationalist grip on 
the economy, the entrenchment of nepotism, patronage networks, and clientelism have 
affected citizens to the point that they have found unification, not under reconciliation efforts 
from international or civil society actors, but rather through anti-government protests and 
neighbourly support after devastating floods.  
The economy as (stagnant) site for reconciliation 
A common agreement between interviewees is the idea that reconciliation requires improving 
the economy.  Economic prosperity is viewed as an indicator for peace and development, 
opposed to BiH’s corruption, unemployment, and stagnation.  Yet, a divergence exists 
between transiting to neoliberal market capitalism and problems derived from ethno-capitalist 
practices.  
Linking economic prosperity and reconciliation is an idea sponsored by international agencies 
in BiH.  For Stefan Mueller, from GIZ, projects for economic development are underpinned 
by the principle that dealing with nepotism and corruption, investing in local community 
support and bringing in foreign partners to work with local stakeholders brings different 
institutions together to solve economic issues.  Haris Lokavić from the Swiss Cooperation 
agency, states that his organization focuses on improving employment centres, reforming job-
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training programs and including vocational training in education, all areas for encouraging 
reconciliation.  An interviewee explained that an area for supporting the OSCE’s 
reconciliation-focused mission is employment, which includes youth, self and women’s 
employment, promotion of enterprise creation, the rebuilding of industry and the 
establishment of funding partnerships.  This person concluded that getting people working 
together and establishing a healthy economy could help decrease ethnically motivated crimes. 
For an international representative, the organization works supporting the financial sector, 
economic administration, and budget management, monitoring in particular the government 
budgeting process.  
Although prosperity is presented as a pre-condition for reconciliation, there is an evident 
recognition that reconstruction has not brought expected results.  A constantly reported 
problem is Bosnia’s corruption and lack of transparency stemming from its complex, over-
bureaucratic political system.  In a survey made by Transparency International’s (2014), 34% 
of respondents stated that corruption increased in the two previous years and that 63% believe 
that corruption is a serious problem in the country.   The report identifies the political system 
as a source of corruption, regarding it as excessively complex, dysfunctional and ineffective.  
Its complexity allows patronage dynamics in the appointment of public sector officials and 
excessive red tape, affecting business creation.   Particularly worrying is Bosnia’s youth 
unemployment rate, the rate in the Federation is higher than in any EU member states (67.1% 
contrasted to EU youth unemployment rate of 44.4%) (Halimić et. al, 2014).  This crisis 
relates to ethnopolitics: “the issue here is that one group of people [politicians] hold 
everything, businesses, they keep people on a short leash.  The economy is an artificial 
situation they made in order to make money out of it” stated Zenko229 a pensioner in 
Sarajevo.   Slobodanka Sodić, in Prijedor, believes that “international organizations did a lot 
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of work for them, politicians, but not us.  All these investments are not useful for us.”230  
“The international community via agencies and donors made a big mistake, building 
separated businesses according to ethnic groups”231 stated an OSCE interviewee who sees in 
state-building the gateway for ethnically based corruption.  Community leader Mevludin 
Rahmanović explains how “our politicians use ethnicity as the reason why we are poor.  In 
RS, it is always about blaming the others for the economy.  When you don’t have money you 
need someone to blame.” He blames Bosnia’s massive state as a cause for stagnation: “we 
have more than one hundred and forty prime ministers and its crazy, it is killing us, and this 
country cannot afford that.”232 
The vast number of layers of national, entity, cantonal and municipal governments, together 
with the preponderance of ethnicity in politics support corrupt practices, affecting 
employment.  For Freedom House (2015) unemployment is caused by a large informal 
economy, outdated labour regulations and government gridlock preventing implementation of 
economic reforms.  The report mentions the economic effect of ethnic polarisation: 
individuals facing discrimination in employment, housing, and social services when they 
reside in regions not dominated by their ethnic group.  Prijedor’s Boris Predić mentions this: 
“to get a job you need to belong to a political party.  The Major needs to approve local jobs so 
you must have political connections in order to be employed.  This goes for all nationalities in 
Bosnia.”233   Masa Nurkić, in Sarajevo, experiences the same:  
“Here you either need to be politically connected or pay a lot of money to get a 
job, most of the times without social security or without a guarantee that you are 
going to keep that job.  The problem with this political connectedness is that one 
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day you have a boss who belongs to a specific political party and then once the 
party in power changes, all people change.”234 
 This phenomenon is given meaning under the colloquial term ‘štela’: a connection that one 
needs in order to access public goods or services, such as acceptance to a school or a 
university, healthcare, access to authorities and services and visas (Koutkova, 2013)   It 
represents a practice, an exchange, an informal institution that regulates employment in BiH.  
For this reason, Bosnians can ‘have a štela (a connection in the government or with 
internationals), ‘have someone do a štela’ (a transaction for a public good or service) or ‘be 
part of a štela (the informal system in public administration or within international circles).   
Sarajevan Aleksandra Kuljanin defined the concept of štela: 
 “we use this word here, štela, it is linked to corruption.  Štela is when you have 
someone to get to your workplace, a contact, a connection.  You cannot get into 
university if you do not have a štela, nor can you get a job.  People are sick of 
that.  Štela comes from this idea of joining a political party or associating yourself 
with these imposed categories [ethnic identities].    It does not matter what your 
level of expertise is or how great your qualifications are, without štela you just 
cannot move forward.” 235 
In employment issues, the political connectedness of the job market puts people in survival 
mode, fostering pessimism about the future: “without money here it is very hard and you 
always need connections.  The negative impact is obvious, you see people looking for food in 
the garbage, and you constantly fight for your own jobs.  We are all surviving, working many 
jobs to make ends meet, sometimes you rely on loans”236 said Mustafa Niksić in Sarajevo.  
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“People take loans to bribe politicians to get low-level jobs in administration.  They see this 
as a way of achieving security without having to work hard”237, states Sretčko Latal, a civil 
society leader. 
A sense of failure and disbelief in prosperity promises explain citizens’ bleak views about 
Bosnia’s future and the belief that it is up to them to survive as politicians, civil society and 
internationals ignore pressing needs.   Mujanović (2013) mentions how slow growth and 
insufficient job creation occurred in BiH after the 2008 financial crisis, mainly caused by 
Bosnia’s dependency on the economy of developed European countries and foreign aid.  
NGO leader Goran Bubalo mentions this: “we are a failed country; we survive on money 
from donors and diaspora when we work with municipalities they keep promising that when 
we have a good economy we will reach reconciliation.”238  Diaspora remittances contribute to 
Bosnia’s development; yet contribute to lack of accountability, as expressed in Allen Dindić’s 
comment: “In my town, Sanski Most, you see clean streets and development but it isn’t the 
government who did this, it was diaspora, it is their money.  Half of the Bosnian money 
comes from diaspora directly to the people as the government does not give support to 
this.”239   During 2015 Bosnian diaspora sent more than 1.8 billion euros in remittances and 
charity donations, significantly influencing the country’s economy, yet state institutions are 
known to be reluctant in providing investment opportunities for diaspora (Kureljusić 2016).  
The lack of solid economic connections between state institutions and diaspora is commonly 
seen as a missed opportunity for development.  “The other source of income comes from our 
diaspora and what they spend in the country.  What we all want is for us to go outside [leave 
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the country] and for our parents to stay, [for us] to come once or twice, all people do the same 
thing”240 said Slobodanka Sodic in Prijedor.    
This last quote shows how citizen drain becomes a survival strategy, putting at risk future 
reconciliation.  According to Nansen Dialogue Center and Saferworld (2010), the ‘economic 
situation’ is the main immediate concern for most people as high unemployment and social 
frustration lead to public unrest, identified as risk and a potential conflict trigger.  The current 
aspiration of many Bosnians is to leave the country in search for a better future, leading to the 
question of who will be left to reconcile with?  For Hadrovich (2014) the youth 
unemployment crisis undermines educational reforms and opportunities for innovation and 
prosperity, creating a brain drain for young people.  Employers find themselves at odds with 
the market, as they do not have a viable population of qualified individuals, as young people 
move to the west, tired not only of the economy but also of the imbalanced political system 
established in Bosnia.   “There are people who want to leave because of the economy, and 
politicians just talk and do nothing,”241 says Sarajevan Masa Nurkić.  She is worried that 
Bosnia will be left with “incompetent people, those who can be manipulated.  In high 
positions, you find very incompetent individuals as in this country if you are intelligent this is 
when you have problems.”  For Sanski Most’s Allen Dindić, citizen drain exemplifies social 
stagnation: “I graduated with a class of thirty people from university, now there are only three 
people left in the country.  Those of us still here live in this constant fear of the economy, 
what the future will be like for children, fear that is breeding ground for radicals.”242  
Azinović and Jusić (2015), writing about foreign fighters, explain how youth unemployment 
influences Bosnians’ departure towards Iraq and Syria as many foreign fighters come from 
geographic, social and economic margins, lacking an adequate income.  As many lack 
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marketable skills or work experience, they are encouraged by radical organizations’ offers to 
acquire abandoned houses from Syrians who fled from the war.  An extra incentive is the 
offer of incomes higher than those in BiH. 
Facing pressing needs: Bosnian solidarity during protests and catastrophe 
As unemployment and social crisis took their toll, citizen unity emerged via protests and 
relief efforts.  Anti-government protests and responses to catastrophic floods in 2014 
presented a glimpse of unity and cooperation.  Despite these circumstances, as ethnopolitical 
manipulation took its course, the reconciliation momentum was lost. 
Despair from unemployment and stagnation fuelled the 2014 “Bosnian Spring”.   
Demonstrations born out of street protests saw the strongest expression in the Federation, 
burdened by the huge administrative apparatus and levels of government (Kurtović, 2015).  
The protests represented a unified rebellion against nationalist political elites whose goals are 
viewed as contrary to citizen wellbeing (Demhaja and Peci, 2014).  Demands were clear: 
unemployment, rising poverty, and favouritism that placed dominant parties at the centre of 
patronage systems.  NGO leader Sretcko Latal described the moment’s build-up: “protests 
began in 2008 after the murder of a minor and led to a slow build-up of the movement, the 
peak was a demonstration focused on politics, demanding resignations in Parliament.”243  The 
first spark occurred in 2013: “the issue was that babies could not get an identity number of 
passport due to lack of agreement between politicians in the parliament.  A few babies had 
diseases that could not be treated in BiH and died as they could not leave the country,”244 
stated Vesna Vidaković in Sarajevo.  This process saw people protesting in Parliament, 
leading to a political agreement between politicians favouring a law for identity cards.  For 
Gilbert and Mujanović (2015) and Majstorović et al (2015), these episodes belie the image of 
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BiH’s population as ethnically divided, passive and defeated.  Ethno-national rhetoric was 
perceived less successful at demobilizing political opposition, giving rise to possible new 
areas of activism, different from traditional requests for updating Dayton.  The protests 
temporarily suspended hegemonical ethnocultural narratives, briefly opening spaces for social 
justice demands (Mujkić, 2015). 
In February 2014, protests began in Tuzla, spreading to various Federation cities.  Safet Sarić, 
from Kladanj, comments: “the people of BiH, many fed up with how the political system 
leads to the dire economic situation, erupted into resistance.  The protests in Tuzla were 
mainly economically driven.”245  Goran Djurić stated “Tuzla is a common place for protests, 
we have been let down by politicians and private business owners.  It is a place with so much 
corruption so it made sense for protests to begin here.”246   Protests presented Bosnians as 
politically active citizens, which came as surprise to local, national and international actors 
convinced of the political apathy of locals (Kappler, 2015).  The protests rebutted the notion 
of the apathetic local and a reversal in the representation of citizens.  Amazed by the 
momentum generated by the protests, Emina Sabljakovic remembers that “in these protests, 
nobody identified themselves as Croats, Muslims or Serbs, they all said ‘we are the people of 
Bosnia, we are citizens and we are going to change things.”247  For Mustafa Niksić, in 
Sarajevo “it was a glimpse of hope, I was happy about this, this spark, but then quickly came 
the disappointment.”248 
Disappointment is explained by political manipulation and emergence of violence during the 
protests.  Political manipulation is a common explanation: for Vesna Vidaković, who rejected 
the protests: “in the end, they didn’t achieve anything, people crashed everything and news 
                                                          
245 Interview, 01-06-2016 
246 Interview, 01-09-2016 
247 Interview, 07-08-2016 
248 Interview, 21-06-2016 
240 
 
showed how we were destroying the country.  This was a space for manipulation by media 
and NGOs owned by the big people.”249  For Brĉko-based Tatjana Milovanović  
“Protests were poorly organized which was a benefit for politicians.  In the first 
days of the protests they [politicians] were scared but as they were faceless and 
without structure, politicians used them to their advantage and this is why 
vandalism was inserted into them.”250   
NGO leader Sretčko Latal also suspects political manipulation: “violence was used for one 
reason: to kill the idea of future protests.  There seems to be links to some parties and leaders 
with these violent disruptions.”251  “There was this narrative of people from RS coming here 
and damaging the protests.  This is a huge lie,”252 comments Amina Isaković. 
An important distinction is needed: whereas the Federation saw the majority of protests and 
violence, in the RS these went almost unnoticed.  Aleksa Matić, in Banja Luka explained: 
“people [in RS] were sceptical of protests because they come from politics from the other 
side.  Protests came from Sarajevo and people didn’t trust them, so no one protested here as it 
was perceived as a threat from the Federation.”253  For Zoran Vuckovac, also from Banja 
Luka: “protests did not take place here because our power structures are highly centralized.  
There were some issues in outskirt areas but they were diminished by media and no one could 
learn about them.”254  OSCE’s Samra Ramić also commented, “Federation people reacted 
with protests whereas in RS people behaved as if it wasn’t a problem.  In RS, as a more 
centralized entity, there is a high level of fear; as the Federation is decentralized, people tend 
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to react more freely.”255   It is important to mention that, as public sector workers have been 
dependent on the support of political structures put in place, low-level employees have been 
politically vulnerable as authorities threaten with job loss and firing to quiet criticism and 
dissent (Kurtović, 2015, p. 645).   
Democratic plenums established during protests were seen as innovative mechanisms 
demanding political accountability but altered by ethnopolitics.  These were a series of open 
meeting points where citizens were allowed to speak for two minutes and formulate demands 
(ICG, 2014), focusing on the privileges of political elites, corruption, transparency, social 
welfare and government resignations (Lai, 2016).  Lai adds that demands were concerned 
with the socioeconomic wellbeing of society and accountability of political elites responsible 
for mismanaging resources.   Mostar-based Damir Ugljen remembers arriving in BiH during 
protests: “I found something positive, people were organizing plenums to criticise corrupt 
politicians, people talking about politics but this did not last long.”256   International 
practitioner Valery Perry explains: 
 “The plenums show the waiting for a paradigm shift in Bosnia, but simply that, 
waiting.  It was everything done at once, with many expectations but it collapsed.  
The lack of checks and balances in Bosnia makes it easy for political parties to 
capture the state no matter what.”257  
 Social leader Sretcko Latal remembers: 
 “Plenums seemed useful for about two days and then people just left.  These 
developments seemed to offer a sort of message that went ignored, one aimed at 
local civil society as protesters stayed away from opposition parties and from 
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NGOs which have a reputation among people for doing nothing, seen as detached 
from the local population.”258   
“The plenums were open to everyone, evident in social media, which was an open call for 
anyone to join, yet the response of NGOs was that they were not asked to join.  They could 
have worked on issues of transparency as they were best suited for the issue but the big ones 
simply did not show up,”259 stated Valery Perry.  Although plenums raised citizen concerns, 
the process did not develop into a broader power to change the political situation, creating the 
risk that the long-lasting political deadlock and citizens’ lack of trust in institutions increase 
the widespread sense of despair (Fischer, 2016a, p.8). 
Shortly after the protests, floods devastated towns of the Federation and RS, leading to people 
from all ethnic groups uniting, supporting victims.   This catastrophe showed again the 
corruption and ineptitude of the government’s poor response, leading to citizen self-
organization and grassroots humanitarian work crossing ethnoterritorial boundaries 
(Majstorović et. al, 2015).  Citizens, mistrustful of the mismanagement of aid money by 
institutions, supported and established charities to circumvent bureaucracy and avoid the 
difficulties that NGOs often struggle with (Gordy, 2016).   Sarajevan Najra Krvavac 
remembers, “There was us, a group of actors who organized relief efforts by ourselves. We 
got organized simply as the state was not doing anything, we shared resources and we were 
on the field for one whole month.”260  Emir Kapetanović, in Sarajevo, reflected: 
 “With the floods, we could see how easy it was to be a good citizen, in Bosnia we 
are united when there is a common threat.  People after floods were more led to 
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fighting the floods together.  No one asked questions about ethnicities and people 
connected across entity and ethnic boundaries.”261  
For Sarajevan Mustafa Niksić: “This was surprising, people helping each other.  But only in a 
very critical situation does this happen.”262  Seada Velić, in Livno, remembers:  “people 
helped with food and clothes but others were stealing all of this, taking it for themselves.  I 
wanted to help but not through any organization because they will just take the donations for 
themselves.”263 
Both floods and protests show possible Bosnian solidarity into new forms of political 
activism but also illustrate how ethnopolitics manipulates and misdirects citizen initiatives.   
The wave of protests in 2014 showed signs of different modes of political organization and 
action possible in BiH’s ethnically divided society; during the protests the hegemony of the 
ethnocultural justice narratives were temporarily suspended, opening the space for the 
emergence of social justice demands across the ethnic spectrum (Mujkić, 2015, p. 627).  The 
protests showed Bosnians becoming politically active, politicians forced to make concessions 
and some even resigning.  All issues that surprised many local, national and international 
actors who had previously agreed on the political apathy of citizens (Kappler, 2015).  This 
emergence of a civic movement in BiH contrasts with the twenty years of intervention that 
has not achieved the construction of locally owned, accountable democratic structures.  
Kappler (2015) emphasises that this episode reflects the need to reconsider labels of local 
identity and an understanding of politics that is less binary in nature, responding to contextual 
challenges posed by the socio-political environment of both BiH and the region.  Protests and 
response to the floods are evidence of the growing concern with the lack of progress and the 
deadlock of the economy.  Particularly concerning are the expressions of violence erupting 
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from the protests and how their relation to political interests represent a warning for peace 
efforts in the country.  To explore this in-depth it is important to address extremism, 
radicalization and terrorist violence as new challenges to reconciliation. 
Extremism and youth radicalization: new challenges to reconciliation 
A current worry for internationals, civil society and citizens is radicalization in Bosnia, 
particularly amongst youth.  The rise of youth radicalization, together with the impact of 
terrorism, expressed in the departure of Bosnian citizens as foreign fighters together with the 
emergence of local extremist groups, are connected with the divisions characterizing society 
together with unaddressed issues of the past.  Equally problematic is the lack of agreement in 
dealing with these problems.  Different responses between the Federation and RS pave way 
for separatism and prospects for re-emergent violence in the country. 
As elections, media, education, and politicians have fostered divisions in BiH, young people 
are identified as the next challenge for reconciliation and at the peril of radicalization.   The 
erosion of pre-war social, moral values and norms has led to an increased involvement of 
young citizens in violence and adoption of radical ideologies, understood as the only ways to 
affirm and protect individuals or a community in BiH (Azinović and Jusić, 2015).  The 
deadlock between the two main entities, constant stagnation, and rising unemployment have 
become decisive factors in the flow of recruits to extremist groups, including ISIS (Borger, 
2015, De Borja, Tcherneva and Wesslau, 2016).  The persistence of narratives around the 
war, passed from generation to generation, create a sense of anger and mistrust amongst 
youth.   As younger generations have no recollection of a peaceful coexistence in Bosnia, 
their interpretation of past events as narrated by relatives, added to ethnopolitical rhetoric, 
nationalist propaganda and a segregated education system have led some young people to 
mistrust other ethnicities, of believing that Bosnia is on the brink of another war, mobilizing 
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towards ethnonationalism.  Regarding young people, Sarajevan Najra Krvavac stated, “Many 
of them are indolent and geared towards politics.  With them, we will not see any mixed 
marriages, as they are all nationally aware.  They have no identity outside ethnicity, no real 
sense of belonging.”264  This perception is reflected in Halimić et al (2014) surveying young 
Bosnian’s attitudes towards a wide array of issues.  In regards to youth identity, the study 
concludes: “Youth in BiH feel a stronger attachment to religion than people or state they 
belong to.”  (Halimić et. al, 2014, p. 90)  This is particularly accurate when describing how 
rural youth are tied strongly to nationality and religiousness.  Through her work with young 
people, practitioner Diana Pegić identifies how “in thirteen-year-olds you can start seeing the 
influence of national tensions.  This is a result of their social situation, of media and news 
which often leads to developing radical attitudes.”265  “Young people live their whole life 
without seeing people from another group.  This is scary,”266 says Sarajevan Amela Puljek-
Shank.  Zlatan Velagić in Zenica is concerned with how “children are not immune to radical 
ideas.  A skilled orator can easily pull them to its circle, especially in our society which lacks 
in education.”267  For Emina Sabljaković, the use of derogatory terms among youth is 
concerning “I can tell you that when you hear young kids calling themselves chetniks and 
ustašas.268  This comes from their parents, their home, people who are bitter about what 
happened.”269  Nansen Dialogue Center and Saferworld’s survey (2010) highlights this 
concern: a visible respondents’ concern is with youth expressing ethno-nationalist views, 
becoming perpetrators of inter-ethnic incidents, a ‘second generation nationalism’: teenagers 
                                                          
264 Interview, 20-05-2016 
265 Interview, 13-10-2016 
266 Interview, 11-10-2016 
267 Interview, 13-09-2016 
268 Derogatory terms, used in BiH to refer to nationalistic intolerance, linked to an outdated historical ideal.  
The term Chetnik became “synonymous with radical nationalism and, in many communities, with Serbian-
perpetrated genocide.” (Manisera, 2016)  Ustaša is used as a reference for Croats in BiH, a term linked to the 
Ustaša-Croatian Revolutionary Organization, a Croat nationalist organization during World War II (Mulaj, 2008). 
269 Interview, 07-08-2016 
246 
 
exhibiting ethno-nationalist behaviour and using slogans and derogatory expressions from the 
past.  
 The emergence of radicalization, together with practices linked to extremist violence is a 
consequence of unaddressed pasts, political separatism and lack of secure employment 
prospects amongst youth.    Apart from ethnicity permeating education, local actors (parents, 
faith leaders, teachers) avoid encouraging positive interethnic interaction, which means that 
fears and negative attitudes towards the other are communicated by parents and media, 
contributing to radicalization (Nansen Dialogue Center and Saferworld, 2010).  Researcher 
Majda Halilović explains that issues of radicalization and terrorism in BiH come from “a 
combination of war injustices, disillusionment with politics and this need of belonging via 
different identities.”270  Peacebuilder Goran Bubalo explains, “Lack of economic progress, 
the growing dividing rhetoric against other religious groups and issues such as the proposals 
for a separation referendum, the ongoing issue about our separate languages, all of these are 
spaces for further radicalization.”271  Youth leader Jasmin Jasarević thinks, “People are taught 
to go back to their nationalist groups.  There are no genuine, organic Brĉko political parties 
but affiliations of those parties in Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Mostar.  They insist on fighting 
and dividing, cheating and promoting hate speech.”272  The wartime push for ethnically clean 
spaces sponsors radicalization as explained by Mostar’s Damien Ugljen: “Ethnically pure 
towns are fertile grounds for terrorism.  Here in Mostar, there are some closed groups where 
you are not allowed to talk with or discuss things with.  If you are part of them you stick with 
them and do not go out of them.”273  Ethno-national divisions also encounter new spaces via 
foreign interests in the country. Anne Havnor, of the Norwegian embassy in Bosnia, 
explained  
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“Increasing polarization among ethnic lines has influence over the vulnerability 
for radicalization as this feeling of marginalized communities is used for 
Wahhabis to influence here in Bosnia, but also keeping in mind the influence of 
Saudi Arabia as well as Turkey in that matter.”274    
This was researched by De Borja, Tcherneva and Wesslau (2016), reporting how Russia, 
Turkey and to a minor degree Arab Gulf states are increasing their influence in the Balkans: 
Moscow tries to undermine western influence and promote an anti-EU message within 
governments in the region, whilst BiH, balances political responses between the West and 
these powers. 
The combination of different complex issues found in radicalization new forms of violence.  
Bosnian researcher Majda Halilović highlighted the appearance of a radical discourse in BiH, 
which may not be immediately synonymous with terrorism but shows the “recent challenges 
to the BiH way of life, people trying to ‘purify’ us and change society.  Concerning is the way 
women are particularly treated in certain communities, children, all of which leads to an 
excluded way of life.”275   This emerging radical discourse has become a particular social and 
political problem via the expansion of Salafism in BiH, with three implications: First, Salafi 
interpretations of Islam do not accept the secular notion of the state, challenging provisions in 
the BiH constitution referent to family, gender equality and the right to education.  Second, 
most foreign fighters recruited for Syria and Iraq are recruited from the BiH Salafi 
community and third, the spread of Salafism introduces a new division into the fractured 
Bosnian society that further erodes the secularity of the state and reinforces stereotypes about 
Islam among Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs (Bećirević, 2016).  Amela Puljek Shank, in 
Sarajevo, expressed “we are divided into chetniks, ustasas, and Bosniak radicals.  They breed 
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families to hate each other with fundamental views depending on religion that go back to 
ideas of ancient hatreds.  Added we have this Islamization that came in the 90’s as we got 
help from mujahedeen”276  The OSCE’s Samra Ramić is concerned with expressions of youth 
radicalization that are not all necessarily “done on a religious basis.  We have football 
hooligans who are also radicals, this is a serious issue.”  She explained how there was a 
“chetnik forum” in the city of Višegrad, an NGO registered at entity level that “[was] 
proclaiming serious hate messages and concerning ideas.  Radical groups involving 20-year-
olds.”277  Haris Lokavić from the Swiss Cooperation Agency is particularly concerned with 
“extremism via foreign fighters returning and becoming citizens, it shows the influence of 
Arabic countries, for them, BiH is a sphere of influence.”278 
Some incidents of ethnic violence and terrorism are worth highlighting as alarming for 
citizens, NGOs, and internationals alike.  Although deemed as low-level violence they signal 
increasing hate crime, radicalization, and attraction towards extremist groups among youth.  
Jukić (2015) reports that on April 27th, 2015 Nerdin Ibrić, a Bosniak man, attacked a police 
station, ending in one death and two injuries.   Jukić’s article centres its attention in the 
different responses to the incident: RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik immediately reported 
the incident as a terrorist attack and blamed Bosnia’s state institutions for what occurred in 
the RS town of Zvornik.  The Islamic community in BiH condemned the attack, highlighting 
concerns for Bosniaks living in RS at risk of harassment from the authorities.  Valentin Inzko, 
High Representative in Bosnia insisting on the need for Bosnia’s institutions to be more 
coordinated in their work. 
An incident catching many interviewees’ attention as a signal of radicalization in BiH and 
example of divisions misinterpreting situations on the ground is expressed in Ruvić’s (2015) 
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report on the momentary appearance of ISIS flags in the town of Gornja Maoča in Northeast 
Bosnia.  The article focuses on how the town is under constant patrolling by RS authorities, 
due to suspicions surrounding possible recruitment of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria.  
There is a distinction between the Bosnian practices of Islam, characterized by a secular 
“modern” stance, and a stricter, Wahhabi-orientated practice (seen in Gornja Maoča), 
highlighted by citizen Allan Dindić: “Gornja Maoča may not seem so important for most of 
the population but they are dangerous.  One thing is being a Bosnian Muslim and another 
these radical fanatics that you get over there.”279  For Anja Kresojević in Mostar, “Gornja 
Maoča is an example of what happens.  If you are unemployed in these remote villages and 
someone comes and gives you 100 euros it all makes sense.  Low education, all this is easy to 
brainwash people, added to the economic needs and the rhetoric of supporting your brothers 
in Syria, this is the formula.”280  In the case of Zlatan Velagić, in Zenica, Gornja Maoča is 
“mostly blown out of proportion by media here, we do not have problems as the Middle East 
with Islamic terrorism.  Yet this is a fertile land for that, a land which fights against education 
cannot do much against radical ideas appealing to simple minds which are easier to 
understand, they will thrive as long as this country continues degrading education.”281    
As divisions influence different issues, it is concerning how the Federation and RS interpret 
separately issues of radicalization, violent incidents, and terrorism.  De Borja, Tcherneva, and 
Wesslau (2016) write how religious-inspired terrorism in BiH risks damaging the already 
frail, post-conflict community relations, illustrated in the negative rhetoric between RS and 
the Muslim majority in the Federation concerning terrorism.  Touma (2017) reports how 
despite Bosnian authorities tracking down foreign fighters and terrorism suspects, the main 
problem affecting counter-terrorist policies is the lack of coordination between the many 
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security and police agencies in the country, a responsibility assigned to the State Prosecutor’s 
office through its Terrorism Task Force.  The 2016 OSCE report on BiH hate crimes 
highlights that despite continuous training efforts on tackling hate crimes, the limited progress 
in this comes from an inadequate legal framework, particularly avoiding investigation of bias 
in dealing with hate crimes, treating them as minor offences.  Many denounce the excessive 
focus that counterterrorist debates have placed on Islamic radicalization.  For OSCE 
representative Samra Ramić, “Radicalization is not about Islamic terrorism, it is a broader 
issue that should concern every citizen.  There is a lack of recognition of how radicalism is an 
issue for the future in BiH, outside Islamic groups.”282  For Allen Dindić, from Sanski Most, 
“all these chetnik groups, they are forbidden in Serbia but are present in RS, but people do not 
care about this, we are just used to it all.”283  Croat extremism is a concern of Anja Kresojević 
in Mostar: “there is this idea of an independent Croatia as the best nation of people; you see 
this sentiment strongly in church.”284  She concludes with how ethnic divisions push radical 
ideas: “all sides have extreme views and without education, it is so easy to get into this,  
elders and priests in communities make people feel represented by them, they got legitimacy 
through this formula.” 
Such different interpretations affect decision-making towards radicalization and extremism.  
Measures against radicalization in RS are viewed as mechanisms against Bosniaks living in 
the entity.  Researcher Majda Halilović explains: “RS often relies on police to ‘radar’ these 
issues and seeks this as a way to oppose Muslims in BiH.   They use this to portray Muslims 
as problematic others and end up getting public support for this.”285   She concludes that 
focusing on Salafist extremism in RS serves to ignore the chetnik problem in the entity: 
“these issues of problematic groups are put aside by this one problem of the Salafists.  This is 
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a view adopted by the international community which ends up putting aside other forms of 
radicalization.” “This is all big talk that comes from RS against radicals, it is all propaganda 
as you do not see the same in the Federation”286 states Sanski Most local Allan Dindić.   NGO 
leader Goran Bubalo sees in Milorad Dodik’s discourse on RS separation an influence on 
radicalization:  
“With all this talk from Dodik about a referendum and separation this poses a 
great risk for many here considering the rising radical rhetoric in many 
communities.  Bosniak politicians are not doing anything to help maintain RS 
here either which complicates things further.”287   
Practitioner Jasmin Jasarević is concerned with the lack of a national policy surrounding this 
issue, going back to stagnant politics: “we have a lot of conferences on hate speech, but what 
we want is the state to take responsibility.  There is no involvement of public institutions, 
which is where we want policy done.”288  Haris Lokavić, from the Swiss Cooperation 
Agency, recognizes that although foreign fighters have been criminalized by law in BiH, 
“there is no official de-radicalization stance and particularly in prisons. There is little 
communication between prison authorities and security authorities in BiH.  We simply do not 
have a program on de-radicalization here.”289   
The problem of radicalization and extremism combines factors presented previously: 
ethnopolitical divisions maintain prejudice between young people, education, and media 
reducing contact between youngsters and the lack of economic prospects and employment 
opportunities have made some turn to radical groups.   A cycle of divisions perpetuates this 
problem: as communities mistrust one another and have little prosperity, blaming each other 
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for their situation sparks violence.  As a response to such violence, further divisions, blaming 
and lack of coordination between authorities repeat this cycle.   The political deadlock and 
antagonistic stances between RS and the Federation’s authorities further complicate the issue. 
What is legitimate in reconciliation? International and civil society organizations in BiH 
Having analysed different barriers to reconciliation, how these are perceived by different 
actors in the country and how they connect or separate peacebuilding agents and citizens, a 
final analysis of how these actors perceive themselves and each other is required.  This 
section starts with how internationals justify their work in BiH and how NGOs and citizens 
view them.  Then it looks at civil society on sustainability and legitimacy issues, particularly 
how citizens and internationals perceive NGOs.    
International presence: supporting or hindering reconciliation? 
Looking at the themes from field interviews, for international actors, with a long-term 
presence in BiH, legitimacy derives from good communication, pushing accountability and 
anti-corruption into the political agenda and promoting local ownership.  For international 
actors, communication is highly relevant for legitimacy.  For an international representative: 
“what gives legitimacy is your private personal authority and also honesty in communicating 
with locals, what we have learned in BiH is not to be diplomatic but tell people honestly what 
you can do and want to do in order to avoid high expectations.”290  For Haris Lokavić from 
the Swiss Embassy, “our approach is to communicate, speak about partnerships.  We do 
exploratory work, dialogue with civil society and stakeholders for development and 
cooperation before launching a program.”291  Communication amongst internationals is a 
requirement for coordinating reconciliation efforts:  
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“A main issue for the international community is lack of communication between 
international actors.  We try to fix this, coordinate efforts with certain projects.  
There is a lot of work on hate crime and hate speech, yet if all efforts really 
contributed to communicating their work, the impact would be bigger,”292 said 
Samra Ramić from the OSCE. 
Constantly pressuring for accountability, rule of law and transitional justice is another 
perceived legitimacy source.  The OHR sees its contribution as bringing attention to 
ethnopolitics: “As RS is trying to dismantle or discredit state-level institutions, we are trying 
to counter that by monitoring, bringing this to the attention of the international community, 
forming a structured dialogue on justice and helping them deal with the challenges and open 
issues in the judiciary”, stated an interviewee.  For an OSCE respondent, “when we work 
with different sectors of government, we incorporate the idea of accountability.  We 
encourage the development of citizen groups and watchdogs as well as communicating via 
social media what is happening at the local level.”293  Transitional justice orientated 
organizations seek to bridge gaps with citizens in their work: “we are fighting denial by the 
facts, talking about judicial facts beyond reasonable doubt.  We do not go into political 
debates,” stated an ICTY-Outreach interviewee.  Connecting with victims is a vital 
requirement for their legitimacy:  “We need to understand their situation as they are 
disappointed with the legal proceedings and system.  They hear about us via victim 
associations, contact us and we look at the process in courts”294, stated Adisa Fisić from 
TRIAL.  For the journalist organization BIRN: “we are an energy that can help victims and 
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others, such as detainees, to make sure that the law works for them, to see that crimes are 
being prosecuted”295 , stated Erna Maćkik. 
International approaches are characterized by local ownership.   From an institutional focus, 
local ownership is understood as a political process, expected to spill over into various 
elements of society, both socio-political and economic (Lemay-Hebert and Kappler, 2016, 
p.13).    For reconciliation, local ownership is about fostering partnerships with local 
organizations.  “We try to have local partners on board, on the project board and 
management.  Our preferences are given to projects with institutions to show ownership of 
processes”296, stated Haris Lokavić from the Swiss Embassy.  For Nihad Gavranović, of the 
OSCE, 
 “Our approach is working not only with organizations that are solely socially-
minded but with those working wide range of issues (marginalized communities, 
people with disabilities, environmental issues).  We see success in securing local 
ownership, from authorities and NGOs to create some sustainability for the ideas 
that we promote on the ground.”297 
 This reflects Lemay-Hebert and Kappler’s (2016, p.12) view that local ownership is viewed 
as the main challenge in Bosnia’s reconstruction by international players, as many agencies 
explicitly state a lack of local ownership over peacebuilding, ascribing it to the nature of 
(complex and problematic) cooperation with local authorities.  In addition, the local 
population appears divided about the need to strengthen ownership or ask for stronger degrees 
of intervention.  
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Understanding international’s views of legitimacy requires observing their approach to 
political actors, as most reconciliation obstacles stem from politics.  Establishing partnerships 
with public institutions or between these and civil society actors is the most common 
response.  Kappler (2015) explaion of the local connection for peacebuilding projects: 
international donors imply a higher legitimacy for their projects by localising their strategies 
in different shapes and forms.  This form of legitimacy is derived from a project’s local 
identity and its rootedness in local networks.  This localisation of internationally designed 
projects occurs either via consultations with local stakeholders or by employing local staff.  
For Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHWB), serving as a meeting point between 
institutions and civil society is vital, obtaining legitimacy “through networking, to be the 
buffer zone that speaks the language of the people and decision makers.  Implementing 
projects requires solidifying strategic alliances with associations and public institutions,”298 
stated Aida Vezić.  Something similar is expressed by the OSCE: “our parliamentary work 
supports the process of shaping laws in key areas of governance, developing partnerships via 
our civil society contact, sponsoring a bottom-up approach where we organize work where 
citizens are involved in the planning of activities”,  stated an anonymous interviewee.  For the 
ICTY-Outreach, legitimacy requires supporting the BiH State court: “we collaborate with 
them at the professional level, exchange information daily, answer requests for legal 
assistance, exchange evidence, witness protection measures.  We train them and help develop 
effective research tools for their own cases”299, stated an interviewee. 
All of these justifications have generated different responses from civil society actors and 
citizens alike, highlighting tensions and support.  The international community, being distant 
from the every day and not experiencing the daily problems of the country, reduced its 
legitimacy (Kappler, 2013).  Regarding ‘local ownership’, this term often refers to difficulties 
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experienced by peacebuilding missions, often by faltering lack of grounded legitimacy, 
seeking to balance between not enough and too much involvement from interveners(Lemay-
Hebert and Kappler, 2016).  The risk of ‘local ownership’ is that is it becomes a superficial 
term that serves as a device to manipulate local agencies.  Think tank representative Ivona 
Celebićić focuses on avoiding high expectations: “what we learned from these 20 years is that 
we expect too much from internationals, they can’t and didn’t sort our stuff out.”300  Various 
NGO leaders were more critical: for Elmina Kulasic, “legitimacy is put into question 
regarding who is shaping the approach: are the donors with their proposals and their 
partnerships with NGOs or the real needs of the people?”301  Mevludin Rahmanović stated,  
“We have a High Representative who has a lot of power but they don’t do a lot, 
they keep saying that you have to deal with your own issues.  There are some 
good efforts but I am not satisfied.  High Representative with Bonn powers who 
no longer uses it, you need to show some leadership when dealing with our 
politicians.”302  
 For Luljetta Goranji, “the international community focuses on a few hotspots here in Bosnia 
but does not have a national approach to the issues, sometimes they do not listen to us [civil 
society].”303  An interviewee from Youth Initiative for Human Rights was particularly 
concerned with demands from international donors regarding reconciliation projects:  
“Donor timeframes become a problem, needs assessments too.  Nobody asks 
people what they need and people are not involved in project discussions.  They 
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are told what to do from Sarajevo, a patronizing approach.  Asking the population 
for needs is seen as lack of planning rather than a useful strategy.”304  
Citizens displayed mixed feelings about internationals, recognizing their importance in 
stopping the war, initiating reconstruction but questioning their current disposition towards 
BiH.  “we cannot do it on our own, we need their support”305 says Sarajevan Vesna 
Vidaković, who thinks BiH could return to war if it wasn’t for internationals whom, in her 
view, prevented escalating violence after the Zvornik terrorist incident.   Kenan Cengić, in 
Sarajevo, believes that “their work falls on deaf ears.  They are not accomplishing anything 
because they interact solely with liberal individuals, their equals.  This simply does not get us 
anywhere.”306  Slobodanka Sodic in Prijedor blames them for the country’s problems: 
“Bosnian politicians have it good here with all that international money”307, a view shared by 
Seada Velić from Livno: “politicians and people who receive this [international] money do 
not invest it in anything.  Politicians don’t care about people, just about themselves.”308  
Others were more poignant: for Zlatan Zubić in Prijedor: “We’ve had twenty years of them 
speaking and saying we have peace now, you will have your own government.  What we have 
is a government that doesn’t do anything whilst Valentin Inzko makes a 40,000 KM salary 
doing nothing.”309  Zlatan Velagić in Zenica adds, “Lack of involvement of the High 
Representative is causing many problems when they stopped ensuring the peace process that 
is when all our problems started.”310  For Brčko-based Tatjana Milovanović, internationals 
 “Are not very useful now.  They were expecting this hand-over process to us.  
The OSCE told us by 2008 that they were pushing for a big reform in politics, 
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they put all political leaders in a hotel to solve the political stalemate in Bosnia 
and there was no agreement, no solution.”311  She believes that the international 
community needs to push the government for reforms, whilst civil society projects 
should focus on pressuring for political change. 
NGOs: (dis)connecting state and citizens in reconciliation 
Legitimacy and sustainability are fundamental in the Bosnian NGO world. Legitimacy refers 
to connecting with citizens through work, supporting their needs.  Sustainability is concerned 
with maintaining, through time, projects and ideas supporting reconciliation.  For NGOs, 
sources of legitimacy derive from addressing key issues, establishing trusting relations with 
citizens and having a long-term presence where they are needed.  On the other hand, 
sustainability is presented as problematic, derived from funding issues, distancing between 
international donors and citizens and obstacles for establishing partnerships. 
For NGOs, responding to people’s needs is a source of legitimacy.  Mervan Miroscija 
stressed, “Strategic planning is based on local needs, which has been recognized by citizens.  
We address real local problems of ordinary people.”312 For Wahidin Ohmanović, proving that 
work comes from a genuine local interest is a priority: “we try to keep CIM [his organization] 
as inclusive as possible, trying to show everybody that we do this because we believe in it and 
not for money or outside interests.”313  Edina Vošanović highlights that legitimacy requires 
understanding work as a process rather than a temporary solution: “the community trusts us 
and we keep connecting with new generations, this is not a temporary thing but rather a 
process as we keep our projects running for years despite funding problems.”  Diana Pegić 
has a similar view: “it is long-term, professional work.  We work with children’s needs and 
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we listen to them.  We always come back to the places where we do our work, our legitimacy 
is out of the long work with children and the trust we get from them.”314 
Responding to needs requires creating trusting relations with citizens.   Kemal Salaca 
recognizes that working with veterans implies dealing with mistrust put in place by 
politicians, hence “what we try to do is to make an easy approach to the public; you need 
good relations with the public.  We are an organization that brings all three ethnicities 
together to make a project successful.”315  For Marija Vuletić, her gender-based work depends 
on “gaining trust from women, helping them understand that feminists don’t hate them.  Our 
advantage is that we have the trust of the local women and are improving the situation in our 
local contexts with them.”316  In Mevludin Rahmanović’s case, trust-building in Sanski Most 
counters politicians’ dividing efforts: “we need to show what reconciliation and peace means.  
When we say that we need to be in a good relationship with Serbs we see that through our 
examples.  Getting trust from the people is key for our organization as it keeps people 
connected to us.”317 
Sector views turn negative when addressing sustainability, concerned with donor emigration 
from BiH, ‘dirty’ NGO tactics inhibiting cooperation, and donor-driven and donor-dependent 
nature of the sector.   “Writing projects, reporting on them, fitting into assigned priorities, 
doing fundraising, showing how it [the NGO sector] learned to be an industry, an 
entrepreneur instead of a critic, a corrector of the powerful, the one that sets bad policies 
straight regardless of whose they are” (Bozicević, 2007, p. 128).   In BiH, many NGOs 
remain limited by ad hoc or narrowly directed funding sources and by the policy environment 
they operate in, compromising severely their ability to implement autonomous policies 
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(Evans-Kent and Bleiker, 2010).  Problematic for Bosnian NGOs is the current situation 
where the EU, despite concerned with maintaining leverage over political elites and state 
actors, views civil society demands for justice as conflict generating and destabilizing 
(Rangelov et. al, 2016).  This comes down to the EU’s top-down view of transitional justice, 
reflected on civil society engagement with formal justice mechanisms.  The only areas of EU 
support in this sense have to do solely with monitoring, outreach, awareness and victim 
engagement with the justice system.  Elmina Kulasić highlights this: “we don’t have 
institutions, Bosnian foundations for the NGO sector, nor long-term approaches.  The donor 
community shapes NGO work via funding which makes NGOs aid dependent.”318  Wahidin 
Ohmanović expressed concern with how “most donors have left or redirected their grants.  
Donors always go towards NGOs in Sarajevo and Banka Luka and it is an NGO mafia, a 
circle of NGOs that are elite.”319  For Velma Sarić “the NGO sector is a dirty competition for 
funding, you have this lobby in donor dinners, and you have five or six NGOs always 
attending this.  This lobbying excludes many organizations from the process and turns it all 
into a private business.”  Koutkova (2013) uses the term ‘the usual crowd’ to define the group 
of NGO leaders that attend the same seminars and events, seeing the NGO sector as a leader-
centred, personality-based type of management model that contributes to clientelism and 
networking in the sector.  Leslie Woodward, NGO co-founder, added how Bosnia’s NGO 
‘mafia’ is composed of organizations that “acquire funding without monitoring procedures or 
transparency.  They are the ones donors get comfortable with.  There is a lot of nepotism in 
donor funding.”320   Not only has this small elite of NGOs benefitted from sustained financial 
support from foreign donors but also become adept at diversifying their donor base over time, 
reducing their vulnerability to changing donor policy (Sterland, 2006) 
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International actors and civil society actors use donor dependency and lack of sustainability, 
as a critique of poor growth in the sector.   As civil society burgeoned from the emergence of 
NGOs, it has grappled with the difficulties of civic participation.  This is an area affected by 
the fickle nature of donor funding, which has seen a tendency of NGOs becoming temporary, 
short-term projects without strong constituencies, with a tendency to dissolve or become 
inactive after donor money has been spent (Richmond and Franks, 2009).  Barnes et al (2004) 
identify an underlying dilemma: on one side, internationals acknowledge they are the driving 
force behind civil society, yet they identify a lack of vision and agenda for civil society by 
domestic actors, which challenges sustainability.  On the other hand, local actors admit that 
the lack of domestic ownership of civil society is problematic but argue that the role played 
by the international community in BiH displaced domestic actors.  International intervention 
initially reduced the potential of local grassroots NGOs in two ways:  international 
organizations hiring citizens with higher education who would otherwise have become active 
in civil society, and creating a dependency trap where civil society initiatives depended on 
assessments of western donors and less on local needs (Bieber, 2002).   Despite viewing 
themselves as politically independent, the NGO sector has created its own forms of patronage 
tied to either local government (for the more nationalist orientated organizations) or the 
international community (Kurtović, 2015, p. 645).  This problem, typical in post-war 
democratization processes, goes back to the tendency of outsiders working in non-western 
countries, to look for structures representative of the forms of civil society present in modern 
western societies (NGOs, Trade unions, etc.) (Pouligny, 2005).  When donors do not find this, 
they create a civil society with groups mirroring western society that suddenly emerge and 
claim this label, groups that are far from covering the range of modalities of a collective 
organization, ending in a difficulty in establishing links with other existing social 
arrangements at the community level (Pouligny, 2005).  This constitutes an exclusion in 
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processes of democratization within liberal interventions that reject political cultures too 
different from the dominant western forms, ignoring the traditional ways of political 
organization for the sake of a local experiment of modern democratic representation.  In the 
case of BiH, the grounds for this are the difference between NGOs and other forms of 
political organization.  In this sense, Mervan Miroscija identifies a poor environment:  
“Protests, demonstrations and assembly are denied as political elites attack CSOs 
on the ground, particularly if they work on corruption or reconciliation.  
International donors finance these projects.  Limited projects where organizations 
try to meet donor standards, not the problems of communities on the ground.  This 
is impossible in the case of transitional justice”321   
 
For an international interviewee, “the NGO sector goes where the money is, they follow the 
interests of the international community, and when it has a political interest in something they 
fund NGOs in particular policy areas, and NGOs simply have to adapt.”322  Goran Bubalo 
recognizes that NGOs “are working for the money.  There is no way to share information in 
calls for proposal and big organizations use small organizations as restricted partners when 
there are requests for joint projects.  The NGO world became a business.”323  For Marija 
Vuletić, “Donors do not know the state of things on the ground yet here you are forced to 
fulfil donor politics.  Their policies are project-based and lead to this high-level competition.  
Many of their projects are not accessible to us and the state does not give much funding 
either.”324 
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Civil society’s problems, from lack of sustainability and funding crisis to the inability to 
establish partnerships due to corrupt, competitive practices, further disconnect NGOs from 
citizens, leading to mistrust.  The donor-dependent NGO sector in BiH is characterized by 
low levels of citizen involvement and a separation from society as it is made up of NGO 
professionals whose sense of accountability and political focus is on international donors and 
agencies (Fagan, 2005).  As organizations get access to funding, they change in accordance 
with the conditions set by donors, risking losing touch with society, reducing their ability to 
build trust (Kappler, 2013).  Reflecting on the 2014 protests, Vesna Vidaković in Sarajevo 
comments:  “people are doing protests but NGOs do projects, they take money.  Bosnia 
should get rid of NGOs; they are just like the political parties in parliament.”325  Tatjana 
Milovanović in Brĉko believes “they are not trusted by citizens.  The trend was to go into 
communities, do your project and leave.  You do not come back nor do you leave anything 
behind.  Communities are fed up with this.”326  “They get money from state budgets or 
overseas donors, they do activities but I don’t see them doing anything smart, yet they talk a 
lot about it,”327 said Slatan Zubić in Sarajevo.  For Najra Krvavac, in Sarajevo: “NGOs 
became another form of business, now you have experts in writing projects for the U.N., 
OSCE and all those organizations.  The result is 10% of the money goes to the cause but the 
rest of that money, god knows!”328  “There are too many of them, I see them as small 
enterprises that enjoy international funds.  They are displayed as an opportunity to find jobs 
and make a living, but a lot are just a waste of time,”329 stated Damir Ugljen in Mostar. 
The distancing between citizens, NGOs, and internationals in their understanding of 
legitimacy shows that efforts towards communication, trust-building and dealing with 
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pressing needs have not engaged fully with ethnopolitics and the ‘apparatus’ enforcing ethnic 
divisions.  The view of NGOs as money-driven organizations forgetting citizens’ needs whilst 
favouring donor priorities, structures the mapping of reconciliation.  This dilemma is present 
in radicalization, excessive international focus on Salafi influences coupled with an inability 
to promote consensus amongst authorities separates peace-builders and citizens.  International 
and NGO interest in enterprise creation, employment training and alternative education miss 
dealing with corrupt, nepotistic and client-focused practices of political groups draining the 
economy.  Separation is evidenced in protests avoidant of NGOs and citizen self-organization 
as recognition of the unwillingness of other actors to help. 
International efforts promoting returnee inclusion, NGO projects providing an alternative, 
reconciliation-driven education and initiatives to raise awareness of problematic issues 
compete with segregationist practices and politicised information, driving citizens away from 
both nationalist and international/NGO provisions for alternative education and positive 
media reporting.  All of these intersections turn to a concern, the focus of separations: 
‘politics’.  Intervention approaches monitoring and advocating for change and promoting 
reconciliation lack the reach and strength that ethno-nationalists have of state power.  Dayton 
drafted the origins of this divided map, but it is in the intersections between internationals, 
NGOs, and citizens where truth telling, justice-seeking and reconciliation-prone efforts either 
survive or perish. 
Summary 
Analysing what interviewees identify as barriers to reconciliation uncovers common linkages 
between actors engaged in peacebuilding as well as those who have witnessed the 
transformation process in Bosnia Herzegovina from its early post-war period to recent times.  
Many concerns expressed in this chapter (the impossibility of reforming the Dayton 
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agreement, stagnation of the political and economic systems, use of media and education as 
structures that inhibit future reconciliation) show that although problems are shared by most 
actors, they are experienced in different ways, producing a distancing between peacebuilding 
actors and citizens on the ground. 
From a reconciliation perspective, the Dayton process cemented a structure of government 
legitimizing ethnic divisions in the country.  It has ended in incentives for corruption and 
deadlock between ethnically orientated governmental authorities, inhibited, and delayed the 
establishment of legislation vital to transitional justice concerning reparations, a possible truth 
commission, and political recognition for victims, protection of victims of sexual crimes, and 
the establishment of laws for protecting socio-economic rights. 
All interviewed actors are concerned particularly with the ability of ethnopolitical parties to 
promote practices contrary to reconciliation: the promotion of hate speech ethnically focused 
propaganda for political purposes and their manipulation of socio-economic structures for the 
benefit of politicians.   Reliance on Dayton and the impossibility of its reform as Constitution 
of BiH has created obstacles for cooperation between different authorities, political leaders, 
and platforms, which thrive on politics of separation.  Opposition to reconciliation is a 
perception shared by all interviewees who specify various sources of ongoing tension derived 
from the divided nature of the post-Dayton system.  Amongst these, interviewees highlight 
hate speech and genocide denial contrary to transitional justice efforts to avoid collective 
blaming for the past, citizen ethnic ‘mistrust’ that favours ethnopolitical parties, lack of 
accountability surrounding the constant deadlock of the system and the poor progress in 
economic development.  Civil society representatives who promote reconciliation are affected 
directly, deemed as enemies of local or even national authorities as well as seen with 
suspicion and mistrust by citizens in the areas where they operate. 
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In the case of citizens, the ‘identitarian matrix’, or the reliance of Dayton on the concept of 
the three constituent peoples of BiH has led to a barrier to everyday life, an obstacle for 
citizens in their pursuit of education, employment, professional development and social 
relations, all areas deemed highly relevant for reconciliation.  Ethnic identity feels imposed, 
obligatory and in many cases unnecessary.  For generations who lived before the war, 
Dayton’s ethno-religious identities are seen as an imposed consequence of the victory of 
ethnopolitical interests from the war.  Many remember ethnic or religious identity being 
irrelevant during the Yugoslav era or something that concerned a private rather than a public 
sphere.  For younger interviewees, born after the war, it becomes a barrier, not only in 
relating to communities from other ethnic groups but also in the acquisition of employment 
(often needing a ŝtela derived from affiliation to a political party) or being exposed to forced 
political rhetoric in schools and universities. 
Divisions are set in place via education and media.  These two structures become tools for 
ethno-politicians to promote hatred and divisions in society, negatively affecting the 
prospects of future generations achieving reconciliation.   Stemming from Dayton’s lack of 
acknowledgment of education as a tool for reconciliation, mono-ethnic and segregationist 
practices have become mechanisms for infiltrating ethnopolitical interests into the youth and 
children of BiH.  Newer generations are perceived as more radicalized than those who can 
remember the war due to exposure to narratives and teaching that presents dividing views of 
the past or that maintains little or no contact between students from different ethnic groups.  
For peacebuilding agents, this represents a difficulty in getting young people to participate in 
initiatives towards memorialisation, peace education or workshops to get young people 
working together.  As efforts to promote reconciliation-orientated education compete with 
mainstream (mono-ethnic and segregationist) education practices, they find difficulties in 
accessing schools, getting authorization from educational and political authorities and 
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effectively contest the dividing rhetoric that surrounds young people’s lives.  For young 
people themselves, obstacles are even more problematic: low quality of education, very little 
preparation for the national job market, exclusion of ethnic minorities from education, and the 
imposition of political and confessional views in teaching and learning. 
This is further complicated by the workings of politicised media, where negative reporting 
that seeks ethnic angles on information and that promotes political propaganda becomes the 
trend.  A shared area of concern is with the ownership by political parties of media channels 
in BiH and their use for promoting anti-reconciliation messages such as hate speech, genocide 
denial, and negative and ethnically focused reporting, as well as avoidance of reconciliation 
stories in the news.  For international and civil society actors, this presents an obstacle in their 
interest to foster messages of reconciliation.  Very little or often no mainstream channels 
report on the workings of NGO activities and in various cases negatively spin information in 
order to sustain divisions, or tell a one-sided view of the past.  Such competition has led many 
NGOs to create their own media outlets, including own publications, youth journalism 
platforms, and workshops, but due to a shortage of funding and support, they struggle to 
contest mainstream media.  This clearly affects prospects for effective outreach of transitional 
justice and reconciliation initiatives within the population. 
If peacebuilding is intended as the establishment of structures that avoid the re-emergence of 
future violence and the maintenance of sustainable peace, then the views from all actors 
regarding economic stagnation, low unemployment and lack of development outside 
ethnopolitical structures remain a concern that threatens efforts for post-conflict 
reconstruction.  The divergence in this regard stems from a constant support from 
peacebuilder agents in the stimulation of economic recovery via neo-liberal practices in BiH 
contrasted with the negative and frustrated citizen experiences with the BiH economy.  
Organizations recognize the economy as an area for planning peacebuilding matters, where 
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authorities from different ethnic groups are expected to work together in the development of 
economic reconstruction, the promotion of employment opportunities and particularly 
enterprise creation as ways to get people to work together, to benefit from peacebuilding and 
to empower victims and the poor.  Yet, for most interviewed citizens, the economy holds little 
promise and is rather a source of frustration and corruption than of real change.  Illustrative of 
this is the high level of youth unemployment, contributing to various tendencies.  The co-
option of Bosnian youth into ethnopolitical structures for acquiring employment, of a citizen 
drain from Bosnia, where youth, in particular, seem to give up on BiH as a place for their life 
projects and the engagement in survival strategies such as depending on diaspora remittances 
or at worst, joining radical organizations as foreign fighters.   
A consequence of the economic and political stagnation derived from the complications and 
issues derived from Dayton’s post-war state system is the protest and response to floods in 
2014.   The emergence of anti-government protests and the unification of citizens during 
catastrophe has represented an unintended form of cooperation that hints at a natural 
reconciliation, yet represents a form of contestation not only of ethnopolitics but of the work 
from international and civil society actors, representing a major site for divergence in this 
map of Bosnian peacebuilding.  As such, it provides for an interesting momentum in Bosnia’s 
post-war reconstruction as it showed discontent and rejection of the ethno-political structures 
that have held a tight grip over political and economic progress but also of the presence of 
international actors and the donor-driven NGOs that make part of civil society.  The moment 
is interpreted as a lost opportunity, where violence and the possibility of political co-option 
from elites disrupted the spaces for change, yet it serves as a driver of the distance between 
peacebuilding and citizens, to the point that it begins to display concerns about legitimacy and 
acceptance of peacebuilding decisions in society.  The fact that interviewees put at the same 
level concerns with the corruption of political authorities and disappointment with donors and 
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NGOs representing social interests mark the schism in the map.  Despite sharing concerns in 
vital areas, questioning of intentions, interests, and resources from international and civil 
society actors mark their separation with citizens, a division that will be more prominent in 
the study of legitimacy. 
Both unaddressed issues of the past, combined with the challenges of reconciliation for future 
generations have contributed to the rise of extremism and youth radicalization in BiH, a 
problem that makes another area of convergence between peacebuilding actors and citizens.  
Here youth as a target for peacebuilding seems disconnected from the processes of change 
expected from state-building and transitional justice.  The intergenerational passing of 
trauma, together with post-war structures that facilitate a dividing mentality between young 
people (education, media, politics, popular culture, parents) inhibit the prospects for youth 
constructing a multicultural country as they are constantly warned about the perils of the 
ethnic ‘other’.  This has led to radicalization affecting youth via the emergence of various 
extremist groups, an offshoot from radical ideologies persistent in BiH, but also stemming 
from lack of economic progress and the rising rhetoric from ethnopolitics.  This combination 
has emerged in a radical discourse in BiH that brings the risk of renewed violence.  This has 
seen expression in the recruitment of young foreign fighters travelling abroad but also in the 
recruitment of young people into extremist groups at the local level, reproducing violent 
propaganda from the past. 
All of these different sections of the peacebuilding map point towards the issue of legitimacy 
and the existing perceptions between peacebuilders and citizens in regards to the post-conflict 
process in BiH.  The distancing between peacebuilders and citizens is appreciated in the 
different responses to what constitutes legitimacy.  International organizations focusing on 
technical terms such as accountability, outreach, and local ownership as priorities in 
peacebuilding, contrasted with a questioning from citizen responses on what the purpose of 
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the international presence is, particularly after the move from heavy intervention and Bonn 
powers towards the era of ‘local ownership’.  Stronger is the feeling of disconnect between 
NGOs and citizens in the interviews.  Organizations talking about the need to deal with local 
needs, keeping local interests in mind, and having a long and extended presence in local 
communities versus expressions such as ‘money-driven’ organizations that are on the side of 
donors rather than citizens.  All of these discrepancies point towards a complex relation 
between donor-NGO-citizens that displays the tensions in peacebuilding on the side of those 
who work, plan or have witnessed reconciliation work in the last 21 years in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
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CHAPTER 7 - THE STATE-BUILDING AND 
RECONCILIATION NEXUS: CONNECTING THIN AND 
THICK RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Introduction 
This section concludes with the steps and ideas emerging from the nexus’ mapping of thin 
and thick reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), contrasting meanings for 
reconciliation as a working concept in peacebuilding and experience for citizens.  It 
summarizes issues withina cademic literature and contextual information on Bosnia’s 
reconstruction.  Afterwards, it highlights discussions present through data collection: possible 
connection between thin and thick understandings of reconciliation from international actors 
and NGOs and the contrasting views from Bosnian citizens building their own organic 
conceptualizations.  The chapter ends discussing areas of tension and agreement between 
peacebuilders and citizens, analyzing main reconciliation barriers. 
Creating the nexus: linking top-down and bottom-up in state-building and transitional 
justice 
State-building and transitional justice are activities supporting or hindering peacebuilding: a 
process towards solidifying peace, avoiding relapse into conflict.  Through conceptual 
clarifications, the nexus defines narrow and broad practices: narrow peacebuilding sees state-
building separate from reconciliation, whereas comprehensive linkages between these 
practices harbour a broad and holistic peacebuilding, where such interactions between top-
down and bottom-up bring in a more inclusive peacebuilding.  Narrow forms of 
peacebuilding turn into negative peace: the cessation of hostilities and violence, missing 
options for foundation of durable and self-sustaining structures.  Interaction between broad 
state-building (that includes high-level institution-building and the creation of political 
communities and culture on the ground) and broad reconciliation (concerned with both thin 
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(legalistic/institution-based practices and thick/healing and grounded practices) supports a 
holistic approach that considers the socio-political context of interventions, working through 
tensions and agreements, supporting a more legitimate process. 
The study looked at reconciliation understandings, from international and local actors, 
revealing how a categorization of reconciliation permitted disjointed practices.  Literature 
advocates linking top-down and bottom-up reconciliation approaches, moving beyond 
political agreements and state-building towards citizens priorities, it “needs both top-down 
and bottom-up processes, to be effective it must proceed in both dimensions simultaneously” 
(Fischer, 2016a, p. 26).   Reconciliation “involves both bottom-up and top-down approaches, 
grass root level and institutions, which aims at restoring relationships between people, 
communities, as well as between institutions and citizens, and at establishing civic trust.” 
(Brand and Idrizi, 2012, p. 4).    Judith Brand mentioned: 
 “State and citizens have a link in reconciliation: when citizens and organizations 
share the same values then trust in institutions can occur, for this, they need to 
guarantee safety and allow people to enjoy their rights.  This also leads to people 
trusting in other fellow citizens as they know that they share the same values.”330 
Defining reconciliation, as a working concept, seeks inclusion within peacebuilding.  How the 
term is defined and practiced can harvest legitimacy by being broadening it to include a wide 
array of ideas, actors and priorities (a holistic approach) or work against legitimacy, 
narrowing it to single practices (as with its legalistic influence, prioritizing retributive practice 
focused on accountability and institution-building).  Acknowledgment of the limited reach of 
transitional justice mechanisms is needed; each measure’s weakness provides incentives 
towards interaction with the others to make up for individual limitations (De Greiff, 2012, p. 
                                                          
330 Interview, 06-06-2016 
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34).  This affects scholarship, as transitional justice research overemphasizes literature on 
single case mechanisms, failing to consider timing, sequencing or interaction of transitional 
justice mechanisms collectively.  (Skaar and Malca, 2015, p.17) 
Transitional justice mechanisms cannot be viewed as trade-offs or as either/or choice but as a 
contextual study opening up spaces for implementing different means to achieve 
reconciliation.  Connecting practices helps address different needs, as the option is rarely 
either peace or justice.  Transitional justice involves not only a range of tools and processes 
but also decisions among them (Sriram, 2007).  Reconciliation work uses many vehicles, 
from arts to economic forms of cooperation, local conditions define which objectives and 
practices are relevant (Komesaroff, 2016).   Yet, the distancing between legal (thick) and 
psychosocial (thin) practices leading to contradictory interventions is concerning.   Legal 
dominance in transitional justice discourse sees justice delivery as quintessentially a matter of 
state or state-like institutions (McEvoy, 2007).  Excessive faith in transitional justice 
institutions works against ownership and accountability to the communities they are designed 
to serve.  Missing connections between bottom-up approaches with national contexts and 
state-based mechanisms also limits the reach for victims’ needs and narratives to go beyond 
the immediate local, and eventually limiting the move from individual to collective and even 
national reconciliation.   
Setting up the nexus: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s reconciliation barriers 
Analysing tension and agreement in reconciliation required looking at Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
state-building and transitional justice as structures for reconciliation.   Technicalities, modes, 
and priorities established in both processes, distanced peacebuilding from organic/citizen 
forms of politics, justice and reconciliation, establishing legitimacy and ownership problems, 
dividing between thin and thick reconciliation, separating internationals from locals.  In state-
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building, institution-building was prioritized over establishing political community between 
former adversaries, and in transitional justice, the ICTY was given too many expectations as a 
retributive tool, prioritized over reparations, socioeconomic justice, truth telling or 
memorialization.   The international reconciliation discourse separated itself from local 
understandings and needs: the object of hope for many people was normality, not the crossing 
of national boundaries (Jansen, 2013).  Reconciliation appeared on people’s horizon not as a 
priority but as a side effect of their hope for reducing war’s abnormailites. 
ICTY’s dominance affected the establishment of a judiciary, leaving a legacy of ethnic 
mistrust in the handling of cases, accusations of ethnic bias, delays and political obstruction 
to the delivery of justice.  The ICTY did not aid reconciliation, it was not seen as dispensing 
impartial justice; Serb and Croats emphasize how a biased court works against reconciliation 
whilst Bosniaks cannot see reconciliation whilst certain war criminals remain free (Clark, 
2009b).   Developing civil society in BiH suffered a similar fate; its NGOization made this 
realm an artificial, donor-driven setting, finding it difficult to gain citizen trust, encountering 
obstacles in political elites who have deemed organizations and practices contrary to the 
interests of their constituencies. 
Assembling the nexus: contrasts between reconciliation frameworks and citizen mind-
sets 
The first step towards identifying tension and agreement in peacebuilding is observation of 
thin and thick reconciliation practices.  First, it recognizes the need for connecting trauma-
healing and restorative practices, one focused on workshops for victims and veterans to deal 
with trauma, another concerned with compensation and reparation.  Both approaches put 
victims as beneficiaries of reconciliation and as such necessitate one another.  Achieving 
healthy ways to deal with trauma via workshops where victims build relations with other 
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victims, perpetrators and other communities is incomplete without legal structures for 
compensation, support, and recognition.   
Advocacy for reparative and socioeconomic justice in BiH can benefit from the knowledge 
and networks established in psychosocial practices of trauma-healing where practitioners 
understand victims’ needs by engaging with them on an everyday basis.  This space can bring 
local concerns and needs into state-building for reparative justice.   Disconnecting 
psychosocial work from state-building’s reparative justice leads to an empty western practice 
of trauma-healing focused on diagnosis and treatment of symptoms, ignoring the social 
context and socially available at the community level that could support trauma-healing 
(Charbonneau and Parent, 2012).  This can become psychological imperialism, imposed from 
the outside upon a passive and disempowered ‘patient’.  Connections between trauma-healing 
and restorative/reparative justice are underpinned by a transitional justice aim: recognition.  It 
is not about acknowledging victims great capacity for dealing with suffering but about 
providing victims with recognition as equal rights bearers and citizens, engaging in the 
redress that can assuage suffering, restore violated rights and affirming victims standing as 
citizens (De Greiff, 2012, p.42) 
In dealing with ‘truth’, practices rely on truth telling as an interpretative approach 
contributing to dealing with the past between individuals and local communities, establishing 
dialogues between conflicting truths and an understanding that ‘every side had victims and 
perpetrators.’  In addition, fact-finding as processes concerned with objective, forensic and 
legalistic truths specifying how atrocities occurred, identifying individual perpetrators and 
information for identifying the missing.   
Despite creative approaches to truth telling, lack of regulation within the law and of 
recognition from political actors, make these efforts controversial and conflictive rather than 
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communicative.  Lack of a political process for truth telling including authorities at local and 
national levels makes ‘truth’ projects compete with ethnopolitical rhetoric denouncing them 
as false, opposed to citizen interests and as attack on certain ethnic truths.  This also affects 
fact-finding, lack of political recognition has allowed contestation of forensic truths via hate 
speech, genocide denial and praising war criminals as war heroes.  Civil society organizations 
leading these projects work under difficult conditions; their work is rarely encouraged by 
governments and local authorities, therefore organizations cannot count on material support 
(Fischer, 2016a, p. 45).  Activitsts work in isolation, risking being misunderstood by society 
and target of threats from nationalistic politicians.   Looking at the bigger picture, there are 
conflicting claims about truth telling peace effect: that truth telling is vital for reconciliation, 
contributing to individualizing guilt and to the psychological healing of victims (Skaar, 
2013).  Too much confidence in the effects of truth telling, makes its relationship with 
reconciliation questionable.  In the case of a prospective truth commission (in BiH or the 
Balkans), this needs to be managed in a sensitive manner, otherwise, it could heighten ethnic 
divisions.  Too much truth telling can be counterproductive, generating more social cleavages 
(Skaar, 2013).   The inability in BiH to establish a truth commission allows denial of what 
happened prior to Dayton, bringing in the problem that collaborators of the previous regime 
remain in office after transition, possibly undermining the new regime or being vulnerable to  
Blackmail from those aware of their past involvement (Elster, 2012, p. 97)331.  Regarding  the 
claim that truth telling allows national healing it is unclear how ideas of individual recovery 
from violence can have any bearing. ‘Do nations have psyches?’ asks Mendeloff (2004). 
                                                          
331 Illustrative of this is Sorguc’s (2017) report on the prosecution of Miroslav Kraljevic with war crimes, 
particularly murder and forcible disappearance of 22 people as well as detention, torture in Vlasenica in 1993.  
At the time of the indictment, December 2017, Kraljevic serves office as mayor of Vlasenica after being a 
successful politician for the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, leading party in RS.  
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Cooperation, another reconciliation form calls people to ‘work together’ in pursuit of 
common economic needs.  This approach can engage peacebuilding with what genuinely 
matters for citizens, establishing a clear connection between thick practices that make 
authorities from different ethnic backgrounds to work together) with thin practices where 
citizens (particularly young people) can break ethnic barriers and mutually benefit from 
peacebuilding.  This connection is challenged by problems of political accountability that 
allows ethnopolitical parties to gain control over the job market, making it difficult for 
enterprise and private businesses to boom, maintaining jobs within the state, affecting the 
prospects of different ethnicities working together.  The problem with cooperation is 
depoliticisation; the risk of politics is that conflict may be non-communal, driving 
communities apart rather than a communal bringing of people closer together (Schaap, 2004).  
Reconciliation depends on a population within a state coming to think of itself as  a single 
people, which makes reconciliation, not an imposed concept but an idea worked out 
politically by those who should get together to reconcile in the first place (Schaap, 2008) 
Another approach is retributive justice via the ICTY.  It has been subject to ongoing 
criticisms for lack of local outreach, excessive demands on accountability and rule of law, 
ignoring the reparative, rehabilitative demands of victims as well as limiting its scope of 
action prospects for reconciliation.    Little evidence exists regarding the claims of the ICTY 
dissipating calls for revenge, individualizing guilt or establishing a historical record.  Whilst 
Serbs and Croats claim bias against them, Bosniaks express anger with light prison sentences 
handed down by the tribunal (Clark, 2009b).  In addition, trial truths are often partial and lost 
in juridical details, contested ethnically and politically.  Denial becomes widespread, as 
almost a natural reaction in Bosnia evidenced by the politicised memorialisation of past 
events (Clark, 2009b). 
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The main tension appears with the gap between the high aspirations of the international 
community and the actual practice: justice conceived by UN actors and defined in narrow 
terms, avoiding any connection with projects for rebuilding social relations (Eastmond, 2010, 
p.3).  The hijacking of transitional justice by political elites ushered in scepticism about the 
ICTY, as a discourse contrary to local ideas about justice.  This ended reinterpreted within 
ethno-nationalist narratives of victimhood, guilt, and innocence. Claiming that tribunals 
contribute to social solidarity and a democratic political culture, depends on whether the 
judicial standards are accepted by most of society, which includes looking at how political 
leaders and elites use the law to influence social norms (Arenhövel, 2008, p. 575).  The 
transitional justice claim that the ICTY would the Balkan wars was quickly refuted by events 
like Srebrenica and Kosovo.  More complex is the claim that condemnation of ethnic 
persecution added to individual accountability would transcend identity politics and advance 
towards a liberal order (Skaar, 2013).  Criminal trials have often divided small multi-ethnic 
communities, causing further suspicion and fear.  Additionally, reinterpretation of indictments 
and contestation from political leadership has contributed to furthering social divisions.  The 
case of the ICTY illustrates how domestic governments are able to act in ways that constrain 
the functioning of international tribunals (Loyle and Davenport, 2015).  What is clear 
regarding retributive claims is that re-establishing a legal and justice system cannot by itself 
bring healing let alone reconciliation.  It is needed for establishing an environment in which 
responsibility for crimes is attributed and perpetrators are punished so society can move to 
spaces of mutual respect and acceptance, often promoted by other mechanisms (Barakat, 
2005). 
The final approach is peace education as a local practice of conflict transformation.  As thick 
reconciliation, peace education competes against mainstream schooling practices tending 
towards mono-ethnic and segregationist education.  Reconciliation through education is an 
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informal practice that occurs sporadically, outside of the classroom and of dominant 
schooling structures, away from parent and relative narratives regarding the past and the 
conceptualization of the ethnic ‘other’.  Education for peacebuilding and reconciliation 
projects often fail in recognizing the ways in which children have learned and been socialized 
through their own perspectives of violence; the idea that children are active social, economic 
and political agents inside and outside of educational experiences is often unaddressed by 
peace education programmes (Jones, 2016, p. 194) 
Contrasting peacebuilding project formats, the next step in mapping refers to localised 
reconciliation through citizen interpretations and experiences. These narratives contrast with 
technical understandings of reconciliation, displaying an alternative, organic way of 
reconciliation criticising, opposing or ignoring mainstreamed practices.  The first 
interpretation equates reconciliation with forgiveness and recognition, including processes for 
public apology, recognizing victims as rights bearers and an insistence on compensation and 
reparation for those most affected by atrocities committed during the war.   People concerned 
with socioeconomic justice, insist on dealing with pressing issues of victims and the 
economic welfare of society rather than with demands for accountability and rule of law, 
buzzwords for international transitional justice.  Regarding forgiveness, an arena where 
interventions have little or no space for engagement, it is a power held only by victims that 
cannot be claimed by others (Fischer, 2011, p. 415).  Linking reconciliation with forgiveness 
can risk failure, forcing peacebuilding to concentrate more on coexistence or social 
reconstruction.  Forgiveness has a religious/emotive component that in BiH is quite 
conflictive; it is better to focus on trust-building at different levels of society (Fischer, 2011, 
p. 415).   Socioeconomic justice emerges as a possibility for broader understanding of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding, combining legal reparative and restorative dimensions 
of justice that can have societal repercussions in the form of rebuilding trust, societal 
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solidarity and even opening up discussions about the past (Hronešova, 2016).  A holistic 
approach to dealing with the past requires a dimension on reparation, reaching neglected 
economic and structural categories in an attempt to re-establish the conditions before violence 
(Lai, 2016).  
‘Youth in reconciliation’ highlights the prospective dimensions of transitional justice, 
demanding that peacebuilding meets young people’s needs: better quality education, better 
youth employment prospects and the establishment of spaces for the personal and 
professional development of youngsters.   In peacebuilding literature, youth feature in many 
forms: as dissidents/rejectionists during peace processes, as possessing shifting identities and 
roles form political activism to criminal activity, key actors in negotiation and mediation, key 
actors in relation to new justice mechanisms and security forces, actors in socio-political 
violence post-agreements and as peacemakers (McEvoy-Levy, 2001).  For BiH, this demands 
attention to the education system as peacebuilding site, bringing concerns with how political 
interests derived from Bosnia’s state-building process have found entrenchment in education 
structures, promoting separation, and segregation practices. 
A highly critical and poignant understanding comes from interviewees deeming reconciliation 
as an external imposition, a foreign concept with little utility in the country and example of 
domination of international interveners.  Those defending this perspective reject western 
formulations of reconciliation, projects, and ideas serving foreign interests rather than local 
needs.  Contestation focuses more on a critique of internationals rather than a full ontological 
rejection of reconciliation, as a more organic, Bosnian-made reconciliation is evident in 
citizen responses to floods affecting the country in 2014. 
This natural conceptualization presents communication as prominent feature of reconciliation; 
the term becomes an everyday dialogue between neighbours allowing a less technical dealing 
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with the past, but more importantly to find connections enabling cooperation, integration, and 
coexistence between former antagonists.  The problem with this organic reconciliation is its 
risk of politicisation, particularly from ethnopolitical interests permeating society, prevalent 
prevalent in mainstream politics.  The opportunity presented in communication is the fact that 
dialogue can be orientated towards solving pressing problems and needs between neighbours, 
something mainstream politics has not achieved. 
Finally, reconciliation is viewed as development.  Concerns with the stagnating economy, 
rising unemployment (particularly for young people) and lack of impact from peacebuilding 
on alleviating people’s immediate needs Deamnds concentration on fostering development 
and putting current problems into the fore of peacebuilding.  If peacebuilding seeks to 
maintain sustainable peace and to avoid further escalation of violence, it simply cannot ignore 
this area of engagement.  It is here where citizen tensions are rising and where renewed 
violence can appear. 
These two chapters’ findings, of technical frames and the grounded, natural and everyday 
conceptions of reconciliation, are linked through mapping tensions and agreements by 
analysing views on what constitutes difficult barriers to reconciliation.  This mapping makes 
visible the shared concerns between international, civil society actors and citizens alike, 
showing discrepancies in the ways problems are experienced by different actors and looking 
at how legitimacy and recognition are perceived via the workings of reconciliation. 
Mapping the nexus: convergence and divergence in peacebuilding 
The first area concerning all actors is the post-war political system and the rise of 
ethnopolitical parties and strategies directly affecting reconciliation.  The first identified 
obstacle is the Dayton agreement, which created more incentives towards separation than 
reconciliation.  Of particular concern are the excessive layers of government, creating spaces 
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for corruption and lack of accountability that made their way into state-building, threatening 
reconciliation directly.  Ethno-political structures and strategies promote hate speech and 
genocide denial, questioning advancements of transitional justice, inhibiting the progression 
of legislation towards reparations, victim recognition, and guarantees for minority rights or 
even the reform of Dayton’s constitution.  This effect works in two directions: one opposing 
organizations and actors that promote coexistence, cooperation or reconciliation, presenting 
them as threatening national or entity-based interests, promoting through propaganda within 
their constituencies the idea that NGOs and international work simply promotes corrupt 
western interests.  The second sees citizens obliged to be categorized and identified within the 
identitarian matrix of the ‘three constituent peoples’, forcing an ethno-religious identification 
excluding minorities and forcing citizens into the ethnonational structures put in place within 
the political and economic system. 
The second area starts with the education system and media as platforms for ethnopolitical 
interests, spreading messages opposing reconciliation.  The education system, characterized 
by mono-ethnic and segregationist practices, becomes the perfect mean for infiltrating 
political interests into young students and children, guaranteeing a continuation of tensions 
and mistrust characterizing relations between different communities.   BiH education creates 
a continuity of social and political divisions.  Instead of organically teaching new generations 
about rule of law and respect for human rights, it turns them into victims of the highly divided 
system with little incentive for interaction and development of a unified society (Čustović, 
2014).  For international and civil society organizations, the barriers emerge as a 
mainstreamed discourse against reconciliation via teaching and learning stimulating student 
separation.  This becomes a form of truth telling where students are exposed to politicised 
narratives of the past being delivered and assessed in languages, history and religion lessons.   
In this sense, Nordquist (2006, p.13) insists on the importance of dealing with history so it 
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does not become a new reason for conflict, bringing a warning for inter-generational 
reconciliation: while being a victim translates into a second generation, the same does not 
apply for perpetrators.  Solving this challenge requires a conscious rebuilding of 
understanding of a common fate and history, which takes time and effort.  Problematic for 
NGOs are the difficulties in accessing students for interethnic initiatives such as peace 
education, and initiatives to teach conflict transformation pedagogies.  For citizens, concerns 
regarding the low quality of teaching, demands for ethnic identification and acceptance of 
politicised narratives of the past, the system’s inability to prepare competent citizens towards 
the job market and the exclusion of groups not part of the three constituent peoples show 
potential agreement with international and civil society.  This requires considering education 
as active part of peacebuilding and an urgent need to eliminate segregationist and politicised 
structures prevalent in schools and universities.   
In the case of media, there is also an agreement with how political ownership of media outlets 
in the country has led to biased, one-sided reporting, and promoting negative stories 
perpetuating differences, separation, and tensions between different ethno-constituencies.  
This opposes reconciliation, as the political strategy behind media manipulation has been 
promotion of hate speech against particular ethnic groups, promotion of ethnic/collective 
blaming, denial of genocide and of outcomes of retributive justice, as well as lack of 
recognition and reporting of reconciliation news and initiatives in the country.  For 
peacebuilding actors, this limits their outreach efforts (an area that has been constantly 
criticised as a source of distancing between international and local actors) as they cannot have 
their work promoted within mainstream media, relying on more informal channels that do not 
extend to most of the population.  For citizens, well aware of how politicised media is, this 
represents a source of mistrust that extends to the informal channels established by 
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international and civil society actors; lack of trust in information and sources represents a 
credibility gap in the work done by peacebuilders. 
The third area has to do with the ability of initiatives to promote economic development and 
deal with pressing economic needs such as employment, prosperity, and sustainability of the 
economy.  This area shows contrasting views between peacebuilders and citizens, the first 
insist on how fostering cooperation between entities and local authorities contributes to 
improving economic indicators and boosting the local economy towards employment, 
entrepreneurship, and development.  In the case of citizens, there is a complete 
disappointment with the economic system and with promises made of integration into the 
European economic framework and promotion of neoliberal capitalist practices.  Citizens 
display concerns with corrupt practices forcing people into joining political parties to acquire 
employment, with the need to leave the country in search for better opportunities (boosting in 
recent years an interest in some citizens to become foreign fighters). Particularly concerning 
are high levels of youth unemployment, potential triggers for interethnic clashes, as political 
propaganda can frame lack of prosperity as caused by the ethnic ‘other’. 
Important in shaping the boundaries of tensions arising from corruption and economic 
stagnation are the 2014 protests and responses to the floods, showing potential for a local 
resistance separating itself from international and civil society frames and establishing a 
democratic protest outside mainstream peacebuilding.  Mujkić (2015) recognizes this as a 
moment of connection between citizens and internationals: protests led to citizens finding out 
what international actors really thought of ethno-nationalist elites, as most dignitaries seemed 
to share the same resentment towards oligarchs as the majority of the Bosnian population 
(Mujkić, 2015, p. 635).  Anti-government protests showed signs of social mobilization across 
ethnic lines, with a strong focus on urban centres: Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Mostar.  The unity of 
protesters showed how problems and difficulties faced by citizens were strong enough cause 
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for promoting cooperation that publicly rejected the corruption and manipulation of 
politicians.  Interviewees identify ethnopolitical leaders as manipulators of protests, initiating 
violence and disrupting what was to be a democratic challenging of the status quo.   The 
debate on violence during protests centred on the issue of whether those who attacked 
government buildings were paid agents of political parties in their effort to maintain power, 
leading to the belief that citizen anger became co-opted by a political plot to delegitimize 
their demands altogether (Kurtović, 2015, p. 647).   The support between citizens during 
floods was also a short flash of cooperation, mobilizing resources and support in the middle 
of political indifference for those affected by natural disaster.  
A fourth area has to do with extremism and radicalization amongst youth.  This is identified 
as a new source of potential violence, yet one that comes from unaddressed issues of the past, 
with the exclusion of specific ethnic groups within certain areas of the country, and the poor 
socioeconomic prospects for young people regarding employment and prosperity.  A 
combination of previous factors making part of the nexus, (intergenerational passing of 
trauma, lack of interethnic contact, propagation of hate speech and negative narratives of 
collective blame) influenced the rise in youth extremism.  Extremism is present in the 
appearance of radical groups within all three constituent peoples, some even joining forces as 
foreign fighters travelling to conflict areas like Syria and Iraq, and returning with even more 
radicalised forms of thinking.  Response to this issue is also fragmented by the political 
system and its reliance on ethnic structures: there is no consensus on how to respond to the 
perils of terrorism and extremism and different policy approaches within the Federation and 
Republika Srpska lead to further discrimination and harassment rather than guaranteeing 
security for all Bosnian citizens. 
The nexus’ endpoint arrives with interpretations of legitimacy in peacebuilding.  Observing 
different understandings of legitimacy clarifies agreements and tensions in the way actors 
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working on reconciliation are perceived.  Peacebuilders, and particularly international actors, 
see legitimacy justified in their constant pressure towards accountability, public outreach of 
transitional justice and the idea of local ownership as the handover to local authorities, civil 
society actors, and citizens of the mechanisms, institutions, procedures and structures put in 
place by international intervention.  For NGOs, justification comes with an extended presence 
in the field (organizations who were present during the war see some recognition in their 
long-term engagement in peacebuilding).  Also by working in remote and often excluded 
areas of the country, insisting on constant engagement with target populations, contesting 
short-term approaches with little presence outside main urban centres.  The contrasting 
responses of citizens show where disconnections and tensions are most visible.  Terms like 
‘money launderers’ and ‘money-driven organizations’ when assessing NGOs and contesting 
international presence, indicates citizens viewing reconciliation practices as disconnected 
from everyday needs.  The message is that, crucial for achieving sustainability in such 
practices is that local ownership is not just promoted by international and civil society actors, 
but ensured through the implementation of transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms 
(Mobekk, 2005, p. 289).  Without genuine local ownership, one addressing the political 
problems in BiH, the success of such initiatives will be critically reduced.   The current 
problem for many reconciliation initiatives is that lack of engagement with politics on behalf 
of NGOs as well as excessive reliance on donor priorities, trends, and agendas, making 
reconciliation practices, and peacebuilding a process with very little meaning for citizens’ 
lives. 
Through different areas, the nexus links state-building and reconciliation, integrating thin and 
thick forms of reconciliation as well as perceptions, between international, civil society actors 
and citizens on what has worked and failed reconciliation work done.  Connecting thin (state-
building) and thick (reconciliation) forms permit opportunities for peacebuilding.  Holistically 
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approaching a peacebuilding form beyond legalist or state-building forms, requires 
connecting institutional frameworks (transitional justice) with work at local and individual 
levels, gaining legitimacy by bringing victims and citizens views as guidance on what 
alternative approaches to mainstream peacebuilding.  Gains made by ground work on 
reconciliation, such as trauma-healing processes or truth telling initiatives require linkage 
with high level political processes to push for legislation and political structures permitting a 
comprehensive approach repairing victims, communicating different truths and educating on 
reconciliation.  Each identified issue represents a possibility for rethinking peacebuilding as 
an alternative connecting thin and thick, the high level and the grassroots practice.  Tension 
areas (as with legitimacy perceptions, discrepancies surrounding economic projects or  
distance between international retributive justice and local demands for socioeconomic 
justice) require immediate attention: these are the sources for a re-ignition of violence.  Areas 
of agreement between actors (identifying ethnopolitics as a barrier, denouncing education and 
media as obstacles, concerns surrounding extremism and terrorism) require consistency and 
support from peacebuilding agents.  Reduced policy interest and investment in these could 
potentially signify a gain for actors investing in past war mongering and in keeping society 
divided. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Personal trauma-healing through the nexus 
When describing positionality in Chapter 2, I mentioned how being a victim of Colombia’s 
war influenced my decision to research peacebuilding.  As such, final reflections on this 
process must account for how this personal issue with victimhood and trauma developed 
through this research. 
Planning, researching, and writing this thesis meant facing at various points the personal 
question of how my experience with injustice relates to doing research.  The first challenge 
began by leaving Colombia, taking this journey into an unknown country.  Reading about 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, its different modalities of atrocities, violence, and injustice, reminded 
me of injustices in my own country for more than fifty years.  I constantly talked about the 
Colombianization of Bosnia or the Bosnification of Colombia, referring to commonalities 
between our societies when enduring pain and suffering but also the resilience, and courage 
that individuals and societies find amidst war. 
Personally, there were many moments where I had to face up to my own issue, exposing me 
to the fears derived from repeating one’s story about trauma and my personal concern with 
being labelled ‘a victim’.  The first moment came after my arrival at Birmingham, in a 
supervision meeting.  As to the question of why undertake research on reconciliation, I 
mentioned my father’s disappearance.  This forced me to acknowledge that I too have a 
painful journey; one that affected my decision to study peace and conflict issues, but that has 
always made my life gravitate around a series of unanswered questions regarding the location 
and fate of my father and problems with not knowing the past. 
A breakthrough occurred in this personal process.  In July 2015, whilst attending the 
Gregynog ideas lab, an event aimed at critical scholars in international relations, what I 
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thought unimaginable occurred: I decided to tell the narrative of my father’s disappearance to 
a room full of strangers.  It was at this time that, despite feeling a range of conflicting 
emotions and thoughts, I understood this idea of trauma-healing and reconciliation.  By 
narrating my personal trauma, I confronted the possibility of being seen as a powerless victim 
and at the same time felt the release that comes with truth telling.  Sure, my father was not 
going to suddenly appear by me telling my story, but this emotional release, this letting go of 
bottled up trauma occurred.  It was the first time I defined my Ph.D. as a quest seeking 
answers and connections that I could never get regarding my father’s disappearance.  I ended 
my intervention with “To the question of why is a Colombian researching Bosnia, I can only 
say that I hope to find someone who can cope with this better than me.” 
This was precisely the opportunity Bosnia presented me through ethnographic fieldwork.  I 
heard stories of survival, I accompanied victims as they mourned and demanded justice, and I 
spoke with many who witnessed injustice, felt pain and had many unanswered questions.  
This created an unbreakable link to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In one of my interviews, with a 
psychosocial practitioner, I decided to ask how trauma-healing works for relatives of the 
disappeared.  This person’s answer exemplified what this process meant for me: 
“When it comes to a disappeared person the grieving process is never finished.  
People want to find the bones, a physical proof; they want to have a funeral.  For 
those who cannot find their missing ones, there has to be an internal decision and 
strength to enter mourning and find acceptance to this idea of never finding them.  
And they do a mourning process, which can turn into an eternal decision.  This 
constitutes a problem, when you decide that it is done, that the person will not 
come back, you have to ask how does on mourn someone that you have not seen 
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dead.    Their cycle is different; it’s an endless cycle of reconciling with 
oneself.”332 
My decision to embrace this process as personal empowerment saw an opportunity on August 
30th, 2016 during the celebration of a street action for the International Commission for 
Missing Persons, commemorating the international day of the disappeared.  It was obvious I 
had to be there and raise awareness in Sarajevo about the difficulties faced by Bosnians who 
still do not know the fate of their relatives.  I felt my journey had a purpose that I was 
somehow giving back, through my trauma-healing, to this society that had opened their 
hearts, minds, and voices to me.  Helping in this process somehow made my trauma useful.  I 
spoke to people, I participated in a symbolic protest and I wrote this message of 
encouragement: 
“When you miss a piece of your life, understanding others, their pain, and their 
quest helps you deal with your own traumas.  Thank you for this.  Louis Francis 
Monroy (Colombia).  In memory of Francisco José Monroy Arcila, wherever he 
may be.” 
Doing this PhD, through all its different stages, I faced survival and empowerment, of 
accepting that despite not being able to control the past, I can somehow contribute, via my 
work, to dealing with issues of truth, justice and perhaps that extremely difficult word I have 
been working with for the last four years: reconciliation. 
 
 
  
                                                          
332 Interview, 11-10-2016 
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF CONDUCTED INTERVIEWS 
No. Name  Organization City Date 
 ACADEMICS/RESEARCHERS 
1 Joseph Kaminski International 
University of 
Sarajevo 
Sarajevo May 13 
2 Kirsten Johnson Independent 
researcher 
Sarajevo August 16 
3 Randal Pulej-Shank Independent 
researcher 
Sarajevo August 18 
4 Jessica Smith Independent 
researcher 
Skype September 1 
5 Focus Group: Svitac NGO 
Monica Reeves  
Eleanor Pearson 
Anne Bonits 
SVITAC Brčko Brčko September 9 
 CITIZENS 
6 Emir Dzino N/A Vareŝ May 16 
7 Najra Krvavac N/A Sarajevo May 20 
8 Kenan Cengić N/A Sarajevo May 21 
9 Focus group: 
Elvir Muminović 
Najra Krvavac 
Zenko (Anonymous) 
N/A Skakavac May 22 
10 Masa Nurkić N/A Sarajevo May 23 
11 Alma Imamović N/A Sarajevo June 1 
12 Seada Velić N/A Livno June 2 
13 Boris Predić N/A Prijedor June 18 
14 Dragana Sredić N/A Prijedor June 18 
15 Aleksa Vućen N/A Prijedor June 18 
16 Mustafa Niksić N/A Sarajevo June 21 
17 Vesna Vidaković N/A Sarajevo June 22 
18 Anonymous citizen N/A Sarajevo June 23 
10 Daniel Jovanović N/A Prijedor June 24 
20 Slobodanka Sodić N/A Prijedor June 26 
21 Emina Sabljaković N/A Sarajevo July 20 
22 Sladjana Milunović N/A Sarajevo July 22 
23 Nejra Kadic N/A Gornji Vakuf July 21 
24 Tatjana Milovanović N/A Brčko August 1 
25 Ada Hasanagic N/A Sarajevo August 3 
26 Aleksandra Kuljanin N/A Sarajevo August 3 
27 Nevena Medić N/A Srebrenica 
(Skype) 
August 3 
28 Sara Velaga N/A Jajce  
(Skype) 
August 3 
29 Aida Murtić N/A Sarajevo August 9 
30 Amina Isaković N/A Sarajevo August 31 
31 Goran Djurić N/A Tuzla September 1 
32 Allan Dindić N/A Sarajevo September 2 
33 Idriz Emirović N/A Sarajevo September 3 
34 Zlatan Velagić N/A Zenica September 13 
292 
 
35 Slatan Zubić N/A Sarajevo September 20 
36 Selma Hodzić N/A Mostar October 6 
37 Anja Kresojević N/A Mostar October 6 
38 Damir Ugljen N/A Mostar October 6 
39 Lejla Crnkic N/A Sarajevo October 10 
40 Emir Kapetanović N/A Sarajevo October 25 
 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
41 Luljetta Goranji Nansen Dialogue 
Center Sarajevo 
Sarajevo April 10 
42 Goran Bubaló Mreza Mira Sarajevo April 13 
43 Sretčko Latal Social Overview 
Service 
Sarajevo April 24 
44 Adnan Hasenbegović Center for Nonviolent 
Action 
Sarajevo April 25 
45 Tanja Milovanović Nansen Dialogue 
Center Prijedor 
Banja Luka May 4 
46 Leslie Woodward Post-Conflict 
Research Center 
Sarajevo May 24 
47 Edvin Cudik UDIK Sarajevo May 27 
48 Safet Sarić Post-Conflict 
Research Center 
Sarajevo June 1 
49 Focus Group 
Judith čand 
Soraja Zagić 
FORUMZFD Sarajevo June 7th 
50 Milan Sitarski Institute for Social 
and Political Research 
Mostar June 15th 
51 Tamara Cvetkovic Center for 
Peacebuilding 
Sanski Most June 19 
52 Mevludin Rahmanović Center for 
Peacebuilding 
Sanski Most June 19 
53 Wahidin Ohmanović Center for 
Peacebuilding 
Sanski Most July 19 
54 Amir Zulić Association of 
Concentration Camp 
Survivors (SULK) 
Sarajevo June 29 
55 Dzenana Karup-Drusko Human Rights 
House/RECOM 
Sarajevo July 3 
56 Ivona Celebićić Promente Sarajevo July 14 
57 Elmina Kulasić Association for 
Transitional Justice 
and Remembrance 
Sarajevo July 15 
58 Velma Sarić Post-Conflict 
Research Center 
Sarajevo July 16 
59 Kemal Salaca War veterans 
association, juvenile 
volunteers of war 
Sarajevo July 22 
60 Anonymous NGO Youth-focused NGO Sarajevo July 23 
61 Nejra Neimarlija KULT Sarajevo July 23 
62 Valery Perry (Various 
organizations) 
Sarajevo July 27 
63 Maja Kapo Wings of Hope Sarajevo July 28 
64 Marija Vuleetic Cure Foundation Sarajevo August 11 
65 Lejla Sinancević Foundation for Local Sarajevo August 19 
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Democracy 
66 Anonymous SBB Politician SBB Anonymous August 31 
67 FOCUS GROUP 
Edina Vošanović 
Volunteer 1 
Volunteer 2 
Volunteer 3 
Volunteer 4 
Volunteer 5 
Volunteer 6 
 
SVITAC Brčko  Brĉko 
 
 
 
 
 
September 9 
68 Jasmin Jasarević PRONI Youth Center Brčko September 10 
69 Majda Halilović Atlantic Initiative Sarajevo September 19 
70 Suada Kapić FAMA  Online 
response 
October 5 
71 Lana Prlić SDP Online 
response 
October 10 
72 Dijana Pegić Genesis Project Banja Luka October 13 
73 Focus group 
 
Zlatana Gruhonjić 
Zoran Vukovac  
Center for Democracy 
and Transitional 
Justice 
(CDTJ) 
Banja Luka October 14 
74 Aleksa Matić Be a Man Club Banja Luka October 17 
75 Sabahudin Mujkić ERASMUS 
NETWORK BiH 
Sarajevo October 19 
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
76 Stefan Mueller GIZ Sarajevo May 27 
77 Sinisa Sagević CARITAS Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Sarajevo June 10 
78 Adisa Fisić Track Impunity 
Always 
Sarajevo June 23 
79 Aida Vezić Cultural Heritage 
Without Borders 
Sarajevo July 15 
80 Mervan Miroscija Open Society 
Foundation 
Sarajevo July 16 
81 Alexandra Gatto EU delegation Sarajevo July 21 
82 Erna Maćkik Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network 
Sarajevo July 22 
83 Anonymous OSCE 
Representative 
OSCE Sarajevo July 22 
84 International Organization 
Representative (Anonymous) 
Anonymous Sarajevo July 24 
85 Anne Havnor Norwegian Embassy Sarajevo August 31 
86 Matthew Holiday International 
Commission for 
Missing Persons 
Sarajevo September 1 
87 Focus Group: 
Samra Ramić 
Nihad Gavranović 
Organization for the 
Security and 
Cooperation in 
Europe 
Sarajevo September 6 
88 Jasmin Hasic Humanity in Action Sarajevo September 7 
89 Karis Lokavić Swiss Cooperation 
Agency 
Sarajevo October 5 
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90 Amela Pulej-Shank Mennonite central 
Committee 
Sarajevo October 11 
91 Anonymous ICTY 
OUTREACH representative 
ICTY Outreach Sarajevo October 11 
 
Total number of interviewees: 104 
Total number of anonymous respondents: 12  
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